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ABSTRACT
Many of the tool-using activities of both chimpanzees and children involve a 
complex mixture of interconnected causal relationships between a tool and a reward, and 
much of this tool-use is thought to be acquired, at least in part, by social learning. 
However, despite the considerable research effort focused on both causal understanding 
and social learning, few studies have directly addressed the potential interaction between 
these areas. It seems likely that the way in which an individual learns to use a tool 
through observation will be significantly influenced by its imderstanding of the causal 
relationships that it observes. This thesis presents a series of nine experiments with 3- to 
7-year-old chimpanzees and 3- 6-year-old children, designed to investigate whether 
causal information is involved in determining which social learning strategy they employ. 
The first set of experiments demonstrated that chimpanzees could be influence to switch 
between imitation and emulation to solve the same task, by altering the availability of 
causal infonnation. When causal information was available, by presenting a tool-use task 
in a transparent condition, chimpanzees were found to reproduce only the results of a 
model’s behaviour, consistent with emulation. However, when the availability of causal 
infonnation was restricted, by presenting the same task in an opaque condition, the 
chimpanzees included a greater proportion of the model’s behaviour, consistent with 
imitation. The second set of experiments revealed that chimpanzees could learn specific 
causal infonnation by observation, such as the significance of tool-reward contact. 
However, they may be overwhelmed by observing multiple causal relationships, or those 
involving unobservable causal principles, such as gravity or force. The common view that 
the widespread evidence for emulation in chimpanzee social learning studies indicates a 
deficit of imitative capacity may therefore be misleading. The results of tliis thesis 
suggest more generally that when causal information is available, chimpanzees tend to 
use emulation. They are also able to imitate, but do so mainly in situations were 
emulation is not possible. Thus, the availability of causal infonnation plays an important 
role in chimpanzee social learning, by determining which learning strategy is employed, 
and ultimately the degree of behavioural fidelity that is achieved. In contrast, the studies 
with children revealed that they imitate the actions that they observe without appearing to 
consider the causal efficiency of their behaviour. This may be due to a greater focus on 
the actions of a demonstrator rather than the results or goals of their behaviour, and a 
greater tendency to inteipret those actions as intentional.
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S u m m a r y  o f  C h a p t e r  1
Many definitions of culture exist, however most agree that culture can be broadly 
deteiinined by identifying differences in the behaviour* of two or more populations of the 
same species. These differences must not result from genetic variation between the 
populations, or ecological differences between the habitats. Using this criterion, claims for 
culture have been made for many phylogenetically diverse taxa, including birds, fish, marine- 
mammals, rodents and primates. However, of all these species, the cultiual repertoire of 
chimpanzees is by far* the greatest. Thirty-nine cultural variants, which are present at some 
sites, and yet absent at others, have been reported at long-term study-sites tluoughout Africa. 
Nevertheless, the acceptance of chimpanzee culture remains controversial. A number of 
authors argue that observational data alone camiot adequately exclude ecological or genetic 
explanations for the observed population differences. Instead, it has been argued that the 
acceptance of chimpanzee culture should hinge on the social learning mechanism by which 
behaviours are transmitted throughout a population.
CHAPTER 1
T h e  o r i g i n s  o f  c u l t u r e
1.1 A history of cultural theory
For most of human history, it has been assumed that we are the only species with the 
capacity for culture. Although Darwin had suggested that there might be a continuum 
between the mental abilities of humans and other animals almost a century before, many 
scientists still believed that the capacity for culture was uniquely human, and was what set us 
apart from other animals. The concept that non-human species may have culture was first 
introduced by Imanishi (1952), who suggested that Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) 
may develop population-specific behavioural differences as a result of social, rather than 
genetic variation. However, these reports initially fell on deaf ears, and it was not until the 
1960’s, when reports of the sweet-potato washing behaviour of Japanese Macaques from 
Koshima Island spread, that the scientific community was forced to acknowledge the 
potential for culture in non-human species.
1.1.1 Sweet-potato washing by Japanese macaques
In 1953, hno, a young female macaque from Koshima Island, began washing pieces 
of provisioned potato in a nearby stream in order to remove sand before eating them. Over 
the course of the next two years, potato washing spread tluoughout her community, spreading 
first to her mother and close associates, then later to all but the adult male members of her 
community ( Kawaniura, 1959; Kawai, 1965; Itani & Nishimura, 1973). Many reports of this 
phenomenon concluded that the behaviour spread from one individual to the next because 
they learned from each other and hence, this was the first evidence for cultural transmission 
in a non-human animal (Nishida, 1987).
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that these conclusions were premature. More 
recent studies have revealed that food washing has arisen spontaneously in other macaque 
populations (Hirata, Watanabe, & Kawai, 2001), and under different conditions (Suzuki, 
1965). Potato washing might therefore have developed spontaneously and spread tluoughout 
the Koshima Island community because monkeys that displayed some food washing
behaviour were preferentially provisioning by human caregivers, and not because the 
behaviour was passed between individuals by cultural transmission (Galef, 1992; Green, 
1975). Nevertheless, although hno’s achievements may have been more modest than 
originally thought, her behaviour was responsible for an increase in both interest and 
acceptance of the study of non-human culture.
1.1.2 Definitions o f culture
Even today, the acceptance of non-human culture remains a controversial issue 
(Whiten, Homer, & Marshall-Pescini, 2003). Disagreements stem partly from variations in 
the definitions of culture used by different groups of researchers (McGrew, 1998). In order to 
understand the evolutionary conditions that may have favoured the development of culture in 
humans, it is widely accepted that many phylogenetically distant species must be studied. 
However, definitions that are too broad or too restrictive are not useful from a comparative 
point of view. For example, many definitions typically from anthropology, state that culture 
relies on language and beliefs, and often include the words ‘man’ or ‘human’, hence 
eliminating other animals a priori. At the other extreme, less discriminatory definitions, 
which grant culture to all species that acquire behaviour thiough any means other than 
genetic inheritance, tell us nothing of comparative interest. Behavioural scientists have 
therefore attempted to create definitions that fall between the two extremes. Although a gieat 
number of these definitions now exist, most share the same central features.
All definitions acloiowledge that cultural behaviours must be acquired, at least in part, 
by social learning (Boesch & Tomasello, 1998; Fragaszy, 2003; McGrew, 1992; Whiten et 
al., 1999). In other words, cultural behaviours must be learned by passing infonnation 
between the members of the population. Most also agree that cultures can be identified by 
differences in the behaviour of two or more populations of the same species than cannot be 
explained by genetic variation between the populations, or ecological differences between the 
habitats.
Population differences that arise tlnough genetic variation cannot be considered as 
cultural because the behaviour of each individual is pre-programmed, for example comb
building in bees {Apis spp). The genes that code this behaviom* are inherited once per lifetime 
(Ridley, 1996), and therefore population differences can only arise in the same species due to 
genetic mutation and genetic transmission leading to local spread of the behaviour. The 
differences do not result from learning and are therefore not cultural.
Individuals may acquire behaviours during their lifetime by individual learning. For 
example, an organism may learn to adapt to its environment by modifying its behaviour 
tlnough its own experience. However, like genetic inlieritance, individual learning cannot 
lead to culture. If the members of two populations are exposed to two different habitats, the 
members of each population may exhibit different behaviours because they converge on 
different optimal responses. However, these behaviours cannot be considered as cultural 
because they were learned by individual experience, and not from other members of the 
population. By defining culture in this way, based on the exclusion of ecological and genetic 
variables, cultures have been identified in a wide range of species \
1.2 The phylogenetic distribution of culture
Claims for culture have been made for many phylogenetically diverse taxa, including 
birds, fish, marine mammals, rodents and primates. Regional song dialects have been 
reported in several species of songbird (Catchpole & Slater, 1995; Marier & Tamura, 1964; 
Slater, 1986). Pod-specific differences have been reported in the vocalisations of Sperm 
Whales (Physeter macrocephalus){R.Qn&Q\\ & Whitehead, 2001), and humpbacked whales 
(Megatera novaeangliae) (Noad, Cato, Bryden, Jenner, & Jenner, 2000). Killer Whale pods 
(Orcinus orca) display variations in both the vocalisations and feeding behaviours that they 
use (Rendell & Whitehead, 2001). Group-typical behaviours have been reported in the 
feeding behaviour of black rats (Rattus rattus) (Terkel, 1996), and Californian sea otters 
(Enhydra lutrus)(QomiQX, 1980). Population specific differences have been reported in reef
‘ It was originally suggested that group-typical behaviours of animals should be viewed as analogous, 
and not homologous to human cultine, and that therefore the word ‘culture’ should be reseiwed for humans, and 
‘tradition’ used for other animals (Galef, 1992). However, many authors use both words synonymously in the 
literature, and hence tliis will be the case for the remainder of this thesis.
fish, including migration routes, schooling-sites and feeding behaviours (Helfman & Schultz, 
1984; Warner, 1988; Bshary, Wickler, & Fricke, 2002; Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). Capuchin 
monkeys (Cebus spp) have been found to differ between communities in both food choice 
and food processing behaviours (Panger et al,, 2002; Peny & Manson, 2003; Peny et al.. In 
press).
However, many of these reports refer to only one or two behaviours, and therefore the 
cultural repertoire of these species is relatively limited (Whiten et al., 2003). In contrast, 
studies of ape populations have revealed a great richness in the number and diversity of 
behavioural variation reported. Twenty-four population specific behavioius have been 
reported in Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), including tool-use and social signals (van Schaik 
et al., 2003). However, studies of chimpanzee behaviour (Pan troglodytes) indicate that they 
have a diverse cultural repertoire that exceeds all other animals with the exception of humans 
(McGrew, 1992; Boesch, 1996b; Boesch & Tomasello, 1998; Whiten et al., 1999; Wliiten et 
al., 2001).
1.3 Chimpanzee cultures
Chimpanzee behaviour has been the focus of research attention for over a century 
(Whiten & Ham, 1992). Researchers have been drawn to chimpanzees for many reasons, the 
first of wliich is their phylogenetic proximity to humans (Morin et al., 1994 Byrne, 1996; 
Krings, 1997). During the last century much has been learned about the phenotypic evolution 
of humans by studying fossil evidence from ancestral hominids. However, our Imowledge of 
cognitive evolution remains limited. Many researchers believe that as our closest living 
relative, chimpanzees can be used as a ‘referential model’ for human evolution, providing 
both physical and behavioural data. Tliis data can then be used to infer the characteristics of 
the common ancestor from which chimpanzees and humans diverged approximately 4-6 
million years ago, and therefore the conditions which may have driven the evolution of our 
own cognitive abilities (Gibson, 1993; McGrew, 1993).
Another reason for this interest stems from the sheer diversity and flexibility of 
chimpanzee behaviour that is demonstrated by both wild and captive populations (McGrew,
1993, 1994). In 1973, Jane Goodall reported 21 behavioural traits, including tool-using and 
social interactions that she believed represented cultural variations between chimpanzees at 
her study site in Gombe and other African populations (Goodall, 1973). In 1992, McGrew 
listed 19 tool-using behaviours that differed between communities, and in 1998, Boesch and 
Tomasello reported 25 differences that could represent culturally specific behaviour. The 
most recent surveys have reported as many as 39 population specific behavioiu's that are 
customary at some sites, and yet absent at others (Whiten et al., 1999; Whiten et al., 2001). In 
this study, researchers pooled the data collected from six long-term study sites tluoughout 
Africa. At these sites, chimpanzees have been obseiwed for between 10 and 40 years, and 
hence the majority of behavioural variants have been recorded. Sixty-five potential variants 
were originally put forward, indicating the flexibility of cliimpanzee behaviour. From this 
list, those differences that may have ecological or genetic explanations were excluded, 
leaving 39 behaviours that include courtship, grooming and tool-use (see Fig. 1.1).
One of the best known examples of chimpanzee cultui'e is nut-cracking, which is 
perfoiined by chimpanzees at Bossou and Taï (Boesch & Boesch-Achennan, 2000). The 
chimpanzees crack nuts {Coula edulis and Panda oleosa) on solid anvils, such as surface 
roots and loose stones, with hammers made of stone or wood. These nuts are a valuable 
source of energy, providing a proficient adult nut-cracker with up to 3000 calories per day 
(Boesch, 1993). While the same nut species are present at other study sites tluoughout the 
evergreen belt, nut-cracking is conspicuously absent from these sites (Boesch, 1996a; 
McGrew, Ham, White, Tutin, & Fernandez, 1997). McGrew (1997) was able to 
systematically show that at Lope, Gabon, where nut-cracking is absent, chimpanzees have 
adequate access to suitable nut species, as well as suitable hammers and anvils with which to 
perfonn nut-cracking. He also showed that the lack of nut-cracking behaviour was not the 
result of availability of alternative high-energy food sources, or a lack of material 
intelligence. Instead, he concluded that the chimpanzees of Lope did not crack nuts simply 
because it was not part of their culture. Similar arguments have been made for the other 
cultural variants shown in Figure 1.1, that are present at some sites, yet absent at others 
(Boesch, 2003; Whiten et al., 2003).
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Figure 1.1 Taken with permission from (Whiten et al., 1999) page 684. Population specific behaviour patterns 
found at the six long-term study-sites in Africa. Squares = customary behaviours, circles = habitual behaviours, 
monochrome = behaviours that are present, plain grey = behaviours that are absent without ecological 
explanation, and horizontal bar = absence with ecological explanation.
1.4 Chimpanzee and human cultures
It is not just the scale of behavioural variation shown by chimpanzees that is of 
interest from a comparative perspective. Several authors have proposed chimpanzee and 
human culture may be similar in more fundamental ways:
1.4.1 Community differences
Chimpanzee and human communities each have a distinct cultural profile which 
makes it possible to assign an individual to its home community on the basis of its behaviour 
alone (Whiten et al., 2003).
1.4.2 Shared mean ing
Many human cultural traits involve arbitrary behaviours that have a shared meaning. 
This can be seen most clearly in gestures. For example, extending a hand towards an 
individual upon meeting is regarded by many communities as a sign of welcome. In most 
cases the recipient of this gesture will respond by taking the person’s hand and shaking it up 
and down. Both the gesture and the response provide no information about the meaning of 
the act, yet the meaning is shared by both individuals. Similarly, there are a number of 
examples of shared meaning in chimpanzee cultures (Boesch, 2003).
‘Leaf-clipping’ is the practice whereby chimpanzees rip leaves apart with their 
mouths in order to generate a loud tearing sound, but do not ingest any part of the leaf. Male 
chimpanzees horn Taï regularly leaf-clip before drumming on tree trunks (Boesch, 1996b). 
At Bossou, leaf-clipping is perfoimed to elicit play (Sugiyama, 1981). At Mahale however, 
males leaf-clip in order to attract oestrus females (Nishida, 1987). Chimpanzees from each 
site have never been observed to leaf-clip in a culturally atypical context, and at each site, 
recipients of this arbitrary gesture will always respond in the correct cultural way. At Bossou 
the recipient will initiate play with the performer, whereas at Mahale females will react to 
leaf-clipping by presenting to the performer (Boesch, 1996b).
Interestingly, male chimpanzees at Taï attract females by Imocking their knuckles on 
tree trunks, and not by leaf-clipping (Boesch, 1996b). Other members of the Taï community
will always react to the kiiuckle-knock by presenting, regardless of the sexual state of the 
recipient, or the gaze direction of the actor. This indicates that all members of the population 
recognise the meaning of the gesture, and react accordingly (Boesch, 1996b). A similar 
argument has been made for ectopaiasite removal (see Boesch 2003).
1.4.3 Collections o f related ideas
Many anthiopological definitions of culture state that culture is more than a list of 
behaviours, it is a collection of related ideas (LeVine, 1984). There are two possible 
examples of this from chimpanzee cultures. Chimpanzees from Taï forest in West Africa 
have been observed to use 20 different tools, including complex behaviours such as nut- 
cracking and tool modification. Chimpanzees may modify the same tool in up to three 
different ways, and often without trial and enor (Boesch & Boesch, 1990). In contrast, 
chimpanzees from Budongo and Kibale in East Africa, use only five and six tools 
respectively, and these are often more nidimentary than those of Taï. This variation has no 
obvious ecological or genetic explanation, and it may suggest that Taï chimpanzees have a 
collection of shared ideas about the application of tools to a wide variety of problems that is 
not common to other populations (Boesch, 2003; Whiten et al., 2003).
Similarly, while Central African communities employ modified ‘brush-sticks’ to 
collect termites {Macrotermes spp) and nesting ants (Dorylus gerstaecheri and D. 
nigricanus) (Sugiyama & Koman, 1979; Sugiyama, 1985; S. Suzuki, Kuroda, & Nishihara, 
1995), communities fiom East Africa use unmodified sticks as probes for the same tasks 
(Goodall, 1986). It is possible that Central and East African populations have a different 
collection of ideas about the appropriate configuration of tools.
1.4.4 Cumulative cultural evolution
Cumulative cultural evolution refers to additive, incremental improvement upon an 
original behaviour, such that the resulting behaviour could not be invented from scratch with 
each new generation. This process is also known as ‘the ratchet effect’ (Tomasello, Kruger, 
& Ratner, 1993). It is easy to find examples of cumulative culture in modern Western human 
society. Everyday technologies such as mobile phones, computers and cars have reached
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their present designs through a series of incremental improvements on earlier models. 
Although the technological achievements of chimpanzees are a far cry from cars and 
telephones, there are several potential candidates for cumulative culture. In a recent study 
that was designed to investigate the history of chimpanzee nut-cracking using traditional 
archaeological analysis, it was found that this behaviour may date back 900 years (Mercader, 
Pagner, & Boesch, 2002). Unfortunately, chimpanzee populations have only been observed 
scientifically for 40 years, therefore it is unlikely that researchers will be able to witness 
ratcheting first-hand. Nevertheless, if chimpanzee populations have been cracking nuts for 
the better part of a millennium, it is possible that ratcheting may have occurred in this 
behaviour, hideed, the complex foim of nut-cracking found at Taï and Bossou in West Africa 
may well be an elaboration of a simpler ancestial behaviour common in many chimpanzee 
connnunities. In its simplest foim, hard-shelled nuts are opened by hitting them with the hand 
or against tree trunks and roots (Boesch, 2003). This behaviour may have been elaborated in 
West Africa to incorporate a hammer and anvil, and in one case an additional stone to level 
the anvil (Matsuzawa & Yamakoshi, 1996). It has also been suggested that the practice of 
leaf-sponging, in which leaves are chewed in the mouth, removed and used to absorb water 
from inaccessible sources such as tree hollows, may have originated from an ancestral 
behaviour of well digging (Matsuzawa & Yamakoshi, 1996). When looking at the 
development of chimpanzee culture, it is important to consider that in early pre-agricultural 
human history, there was very little evidence for ratcheting in stone technology for almost a 
million years (Boesch & Tomasello, 1998; McGrew, 1998).
1.4.5 The distribution o f cultural variants
Human culture varies in many ways, and it is often possible to track the distribution 
of a particular* cultural variant or group of variants from an origin. A second collaborative 
study, which pooled records from long-tenn chimpanzee study sites throughout Africa, was 
aimed to assess whether patterns of behavioural diffusion could be found in chimpanzee 
cultures (Whiten et al., 2001). It was found that the distribution of several of the 39 cultural 
variants previously identified (Whiten et al., 1999) could be traced between populations back 
to one or multiple origins. For example, ‘leaf grooming’ (whereby an individual picks a leaf
11
and while inspecting it closely starts to groom it) appears to have started from a unitary 
source and extended to a large, but defined region of East Africa (Whiten et al, 2001).
Chimpanzee and human populations are therefore qualitatively similar not only in the 
degree of behavioural variation, but also in some of the subtler characteristics of their culture.
1.5 Criticisms of the claim of chimpanzee cultures
There are a number of potential shortcomings associated with assigning culture to 
chimpanzees based upon observational data. For example, high-resolution comparisons of 
habitat ecology are not abundant in the literature. Ecological differences that may be critical 
to behavioural expression in chimpanzees may be indistinguishable to a human observer 
(Tomasello, 1990). In addition, even if environmental uniformity is assumed, past ecological 
conditions, which may have driven behavioural differentiation camiot be determined (Call &
Tomasello, 1998). The number of population specific behaviour patterns that result from 
ecological differences may therefore be underestimated.
The degree of habituation, and therefore the probability of observing behavioural 
variants differs between sites (McGrew, 1992, 1994). The status and number of individuals 
involved may influence the probability of observing a specific behaviour. For example, 
behaviours that are perfoimed by high-ranking conspicuous individuals, or that convey an 
obvious adaptive advantage, may be more noticeable than subtle behaviours of a subordinate 
(Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1994). The number of variants that have been identified because 
they are present at one site, yet absent at others, may therefore be overestimated.
As a result, it has been suggested that ecological and genetic variables can only truly 
be excluded by perfoiming translocation experiments, such as those that have been 
successfully carried out with reef fish (Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). If individuals from 
population A are translocated to population B, and adopt the behaviour of B, then the î
differences between A and B cannot be genetic. Similarly, if the whole population A is \
relocated to the habitat of population B, and does not adopt B’s behaviour, then the |
12
differences between groups A and B cannot be related to ecology (Laland & Hoppitt, 2003). 
However, such experiments are practically and ethically difficult with chimpanzees.
It has therefore been argued that the acceptance of chimpanzee culture should hinge 
upon evidence that the behaviours are learned socially, by passing information from one 
individual to the next in a population by any social learning process (Whiten & Ham, 1992; 
Russon & Galdikas, 1995; Boesch, 1996b). However, others have specified that cultures can 
only be acquired by particular social learning processes such as imitation and teaching 
(Nagell, Olgin, & Tomasello, 1993; Tomasello, Kinger et al, 1993; Tomasello, Savage- 
Rumbaugh, & Kruger, 1993). The following chapter will therefore focus on the study of 
social learning processes in chimpanzees.
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S u m m a r y  o f  C h a p t e r  2
Social learning can be defined as learning that results from observation of, or 
interaction with another individual or its products. Social learning is distinct horn non-social 
learning in that the observer acquires a new behaviour as a result of this interaction, and it is 
not merely influenced to perform behaviours that already exist in its repertoire. Social 
learning can be broadly divided into four categories (observational conditioning, emulation, 
imitation and teaching), each varying with the fidelity with which the observer reproduces 
the actions of the model. Some authors are willing to accept any form of social learning as a 
mechanism for cultural transmission. However, others maintain that only imitation can 
guarantee that behaviours are transmitted with enough fidelity between individuals for 
discrete cultural variants to be maintained.
Experimental studies of chimpanzee social learning have found evidence for imitation 
in the context of non tool-use tasks. These studies have shown that cliimpanzees can imitate 
novel manual and facial gestures, object manipulations and the sequential and hierarchical 
structure of obseiwed actions. They are also able to imitate gestures that involve out-of-sight 
body pai'ts, and imitate object manipulations after a substantial delay.
However, in contrast, tool-use tasks have typically failed to find evidence for 
imitation. Instead it seems that chimpanzees employ non-imitative social learning strategies, 
specifically emulation to solve these tasks. It therefore appears that chimpanzees use 
difference social learning strategies to solve different types of problems. However, this trend 
may be related to the amount of causal information that is available in each task, rather than 
the task domain per se.
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CHAPTER 2
S o c i a l  l e a r n i n g
2.1 The requirements of culture
Due to the potential uncertainty of determining culture using only observational data 
(see section 1.5), some authors have suggested that culture should be determined by the 
cognitive processes tlirough which behaviours are passed between the individuals of a 
population. In other words, culture must be detennined by the social learning mechanism by 
which behaviours are transmitted (Nagell et ah, 1993; Tomasello, Kruger et ah, 1993; 
Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et ah, 1993).
2.1.1 A history o f social learning
Historically, it was believed that most behaviours were transmitted by imitation, 
which was thought to be a relatively simple process that was widespread tlnoughout the 
animal kingdom, and common in primates. However, the increased interest in studies of 
animal culture and social learning has lead to a fundamental change in this assumption. The 
study of Israeli black rats (Rattus rattus) provides a good example. These rats have developed 
an efficient way to extract seeds fiom pine-cones by removing the scales fi'om the bottom of 
a cone and following the natural spiral of the scales to the top. Alternative methods, such as 
biting tlirough each scale, bum more energy than the seeds provide. This behaviour was 
initially though to result from complex social learning, as only young rats that were raised 
with their mothers learned this efficient technique. Young rats that were cross-fostered with 
mothers who did not strip scales, did not discover this efficient teclinique on their own. 
However, it was found that young rats could learn the efficient technique if  they were given 
cones that had been started in the appropriate way (either by a conspecific or a human). 
Young rats could therefore learn the efficient strategy if their attention was draw to the 
relevant part of the problem (Aisner & Terkel, 1992). Hence, complex behaviours need not 
be the result of complex social learning (Galef, 1988). Studies like these have lead to a 
reappraisal of the existence, distribution and significance of imitation. Subsequently, a more 
sophisticated concept of social learning has been developed (Whiten & Ham, 1992; see
15
Figure 2.1). However, before social learning can be discussed in more detail, a distinction 
should be made between social and non-social processes.
2.2 Non-social processes
Members of a population may behave in similar ways as a result of either genetically 
controlled behaviour or individual learning. Behaviours that are under genetic control may 
be similar between individuals because of convergent evolution, common ancestry or 
Batesian or Mullerian mimicry (Ridley, 1996). Individual learning may lead to behavioural 
similarity between members of a population if they are exposed to the same enviromnents 
and therefore converge on the same optimal, individually learned strategies (Whiten & Ham, 
1992). Behavioural similarities that arise through non-social processes are executed under 
genetic control, or are learned tln*ough an individual’s own interaction with its environment. 
They are therefore not involved in cultural transmission.
2.3 Social processes
Behaviours that result from social processes arise from observation of, or interaction 
with another organisms or its products (Heyes, 1994). Social processes can be broadly 
divided into behaviours resulting from social influence, and behaviours resulting from social 
learning.
2.3.1 Social influence
Behavioural similarities may arise between members of a population because the 
behaviour of one individual is influenced by either the presence of another individual or its 
products. However, the first individual does not learn a new behaviour tlirough this 
interaction. For example, ‘enhancement’ occurs when an observer’s attention is draw to a 
particular object, or location in the environment by the actions of a model (Thorpe, 1956). 
The obseiwer may then converge on the same behaviour as the model because their individual 
exploration is constrained by the limited responses possible at that location or with that 
particular object (Thoipe, 1956; Whiten & Ham, 1992; Heyes, 1994).
Figure 2.1 Taxonomy of social and non-social processes
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2.3.2 Social learning
Social learning is distinct from social influence in that the observer actual learns a 
new behaviour by obsei*ving another individual. Social learning encompasses several 
different learning mechanisms, each varying with respect to the fidelity of the match between 
the actions of the model and the actions of the observer (Whiten & Ham, 1992; see Fig. 2.1).
(i) Teaching
The demonstrator modifies their behaviour in accordance with the observer’s state of 
knowledge (Boesch, 1991; Caro & Hauser, 1992).
(ii) Observational conditioning
An observer associates the behaviour' of a model (e.g. fear) with a pai-ticular stimulus. 
When the observer is then exposed to the stimulus they respond with the same behaviour as 
the model (Whiten & Ham, 1992).
(iii) Emulation
An observer learns about the results of a model’s actions, but not about the details of 
the behaviour required to bring about that result (Tomasello, Davis-Dasilva, Camak, & Bard, 
1987). For example, an individual may learn to use a tool by observing the effect of the tool 
in gaining a reward, and seek to reproduce this outcome using their own efficacious actions, 
such as manipulating the tool with a different hand or arm movement. The critical 
characteristic of emulation is that the obseiwer learns about essential features of the 
environment, rather than about the behaviomal processes involved in task solution 
(Tomasello, 1998a).
The possibility that an individual may learn about results by observation, was first 
highlighted by (Tomasello et al., 1987) to differentiate a level of social learning more 
sophisticated than enhancement (see above), but without the behavioural fidelity required for 
imitation. This learning mechanism was later named ‘emulation’ (Tomasello, 1990). As a 
term, ‘emulation’ has been used divergently within the literature to describe a wide range of 
social learning processes. Firstly it was used to describe copying only the results of a model
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(Tomasello, 1990), then later to describe copying the affordances and causal relationships of 
a task (Tomasello, 1996; Want & Hams, 2001, 2002). Others have sub-divided emulation 
into several different categories (Byiiie, 1998; Custance, Whiten, & Fredman, 1999).
One of these sub-categories is obj ect-movement re-enactment. This occurs when an 
observer recreates the movements of objects that are manipulated by the demonstrator, but 
not the body actions of the demonstrator that produced the movement (Custance et al., 1999). 
For example, an obseiwer would recreate the direction in which a bolt was pushed or pulled, 
but would not use the same behaviour that they observed. The distinction between imitating 
the body movements of the demonstrator, and re-enacting the object movements of their 
actions therefore lies only at the junction between the body and the object (Whiten, In press). 
In this respect object movement re-enactment could be considered to overlap somewhat with 
imitation. However, object re-enactment involves learning about aspects of the environment 
rather than bodily behaviour, and for this reason it is classified under emulation.
Throughout this thesis, the teiin emulation will be used in a general way to describe 
learning about the affordances, end-states, or object movements of a task. In other words, 
emulation will be used to describe learning about the enviromnental features of a task, rather 
than the details of the observed bodily behaviour.
(iv) Imitation
By contrast, imitation occurs when an obseiwer learns some specific aspect(s) of the 
intrinsic form of an act from the obseiwation of a model (Whiten & Ham, 1992). An observer 
would therefore produce a recognisable (if not accurate) copy of the original behaviour 
required to bring about the same result as the model. For example, an individual may learn to 
use a tool by obseiwing the effect of the tool in gaining a reward, and then seek to reproduce 
the same effect by using the same behaviour, such as the same hand or ami movement as the 
model. Imitation is distinct from other fomis of social learning in that the behavioural 
technique of the model is attended to, and therefore the observer reproduces a more complete 
copy of the model’s original behaviour .
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Byrne & Russon (1998) have suggested the category (or subcategory) of programme 
level imitation, whereby the observer copies the overall structure of the model’s actions, but 
not at a detailed level. However, this hypothesis has not been backed-up with empirical data, 
and hence many authors have discounted it (Matheson & Fragaszy, 1998; Tomasello, 1998a; 
Want & Harris, 1998; Whiten, 1998a; Whiten, 1999; Whiten, 2000).
As the number of social learning studies increases, the terminology that is created to 
distinguish different processes becomes increasingly complex. Call & Carpenter (2002) and 
Carpenter & Call (2002) have therefore suggested that instead of creating more teiins, 
researchers should classify the type of infonnation that an obseiwer learns in terms of actions, 
results and goals. Different combinations of these tluee types of infonnation could be used to 
describe emulation (results and goals) and imitation (actions). However, a great number of 
different combinations would be required to distinguish all the teims that are currently in use. 
Therefore, although this approach may be useful in some situations, it will not necessarily 
decrease the number of different processes that are described.
2.3.3 The requirements o f cultural transmission
Some authors consider any form of social learning to be sufficient for cultural 
transmission in chimpanzees (Whiten & Ham, 1992; Russon & Galdikas, 1995; Boesch, 
1996b), arguing that if the same level of behavioural variation between two populations was 
described in humans, anthropologists would not hesitate to grant culture (McGrew, 1992; 
Boesch, 1993; McGrew, 1993; Boesch, 1996b; Boesch, 1998; McGrew, 1998). However, 
others are more particular.
(i) Teaching
Some authors have suggested that in order for a species to have culture, it must show 
evidence of active teaching (Galef, 1988, 1992; Premack & Premack, 1999). However, active 
teaching seems rare in chimpanzees. There are only two reports of this behaviour, both 
involving mothers from Taï apparently teaching their offspring to nut-crack. On one occasion 
a mother was observed to correct the position of her son’s nuts on the anvil. On the other 
occasion a mother was seen to demonstrate the correct hammer giip to her daughter (for more
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details see Boesch, 1991). Nevertheless, active teaching is only one form of pedagogy, and 
more commonly mothers are seen to ‘stimulate’ or ‘facilitate’ the acquisition of nut-cracking 
by their offspring, by leaving appropriate hammers and anvils for them to use, and intact nuts 
on the anvil (Boesch, 1996a). Active teaching may be rarer because at the age when young 
chimpanzees start to interact with nut-cracking apparatus (approximately 2-years-old) 
teaching would be conceptually difficult, and it may be more efficient for mothers so shape 
their offspring’s individual efforts (Boesch, 1996a).
It is easy to assume that all human cultures depend heavily on active teaching. 
However, this view overlooks many societies, such as those of hunter-gatherer communities, 
where children learn mainly by obseiwation and eavesdropping (Rogoff, Chavajay, & 
Matusov, 1993; McGrew, 1993). The evidence from chimpanzee studies suggests that they 
may have the cognitive capacity for active teaching, but that the rarity of reports makes this a 
poor criterion for culture.
(ii) Imitation
histead, it has been suggested that culture should be detennined by the presence of 
imitation, as this is the only social learning mechanism that can guarantee that behaviours are 
transmitted accurately enough for a cultural variant to be maintained. It is argued that other 
forms of social learning are too inaccurate for variants to remain distinct over time (Galef, 
1992; Heyes, 1993; Tomasello, Kruger et al., 1993; Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et ah,
1993). Therefore much research interest has focused on identifying those species that have 
the capacity for imitation.
2.4 Identifying imitation
Many researchers believe that although observations of wild populations are essential 
for identifying particular behaviours which may result from cultural transmission, only 
controlled experimental studies are able to adequately isolate the particular learning 
mechanism wliich may be involved (Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1994). Because of the potential 
importance of imitation as a requirement for culture, many experimental studies have focused 
on documenting the phylogenetic distribution of imitation in non-human species. Thus,
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experiments are often designed primarily to look for imitation, describing alternative non- 
imitative mechanisms only when it is not found. The increased focus of research on imitation 
has attracted attention from a number of different disciplines, including child development 
(Want & Harris, 2002; Whiten, 2002b), artificial intelligence and robotics (Dautenhahn & 
Nehaniv, 2002) as well as neurophysiology (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; 
Miklosi, 1999) and neuropsychology (Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002; Hurley & Chater, In press). 
The literature on imitation is therefore rich and scattered.
2.4.1 The two-action method
As the literature increases, the task of excluding alternative, non-imitative social 
learning processes becomes increasingly cumbersome. However, it is generally accepted that 
the strongest evidence for imitation conies from studies that employ a two-action design 
(Shettleworth, 1998). The two-action method was initially used by Thorndike (1911; cited in 
Shettleworth, 1998), then later by Dawson & Foss (1965), to control for non-imitative 
processes such as enliancement. Two-action designs involve an insti'umental task that can be 
solved equally in two different ways. For example, obtaining a food reward by pushing a 
handle (behaviour A), or pulling the same handle (behaviour B). One group of individuals 
obseiwes a model solve the task using behaviour A, the other group observes the model use 
behaviour B. Since the model acts on the same object, in the same part of the environment in 
each case, this controls for enhancement. When subjects from each group are then given the 
opportunity to interact with the apparatus, if they use the same teclinique that they observed 
to solve the task (A or B), this is a good indicator of imitation (Dawson & Foss, 1965; Galef, 
1988).
However, although the two-action method is a good measure for imitation in theory, 
in practice researchers often do not apply the necessary controls. For example, it is possible 
that one of the two-action alternatives (behaviour A or B) is easier, or closer to behaviours 
already in an individual’s repertoire than the other. In addition, if subjects from each group 
observe parts of the apparatus being moved in two different directions, it is possible to use 
object movement re-enactment to solve the task (see section 2.3.2) giving the illusion of 
imitation (Dorrance & Zentall, 2001; Zentall, 2001). hi order to control for this, it has been
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suggested that the model must act on the same object, manipulating it in the same direction, 
and that the two-action method is incorporated by using different body parts. For example, a 
lever is moved to the left using either the beak (behaviour A) or the foot (behaviour B) 
(Don*ance & Zentall, 2001; Zentall, 2001). Some authors have claimed that only this 
methodology can be used to identify ‘true imitation’ (Voelkl & Huber, 2000).
2.4.2 The problem o f novelty
Others have criticised imitation studies because the behaviour of the model is not 
completely novel to the obseiwer (Byrne & Russon, 1998). However, this criticism has lead 
to further disagreements about definitions of novelty. Is it sufficient to ascertain that the 
behaviour is novel in the context of the study (Zentall, 2001), or can actions that involve the 
recombination of existing behaviours into a novel sequence be accepted? (Whiten, 1998b). It 
seems impractical to insist that behaviours are completely novel, since this restricts studies of 
species with a limited repertoire (Galef, In press), and overlooks the fact that new behaviours 
are assimilated into existing knowledge, and do not erase and replace old behaviours (Huber, 
1998). It would therefore be more practical to determine that a behaviour has a low 
probability of being produced in the context of a task, by incorporating a control condition 
(Zentall, 2001).
2.4.3 The role o f intentions
Another line of disagi'eement stems from the possible role of intentions in imitation. 
Tomasello, Ki*uger et a l, (1993) have argued that imitation requires an obseiwer to represent 
the intentions behind the demonstrator’s actions. However, others have argued that imitation 
requires the observer only to represent what the demonstrator did, not what they thought or 
desired (Heyes, 1998). An individual’s understanding of other’s intentions can never be 
measured directly. Thus arguments about intentions are not productive, and according to 
some, are best avoided (Zentall, 2001).
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2.4.4 Removing environmental variables
In order to get round all the potential disagreements listed above, it has been 
suggested that the strongest evidence for imitation comes from gestural imitation, where 
there is no environmental component. Arguments about emulation, imitation and 
enhancement are therefore avoided (Heyes, 1998; Russon, 1998).
2.5 Evidence for imitation in chimpanzees
2.5.1 Early studies o f im itation
Imitation was originally thought to be a relatively simple cognitive process that was 
common in primates. Indeed, the phrase ‘to ape’ has become synonymous with ‘to copy’ in 
common language. This view dates back to early studies of chimpanzee social learning which 
claimed that home-raised chimpanzees were able to imitate many everyday actions of their 
human caregivers, such as sewing (Sheak, 1917; cited in Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995), 
smoking a pipe (Kearton, 1925), applying lip-stick (Hayes & Hayes, 1952), and painting a 
wall (Kohler, 1927). These reports were later backed-up with evidence from experimental 
studies. Hayes & Hayes (1952) trained their home-raised chimpanzee, Viki, to reproduce 
actions using the command ‘Do-as-I-do!’ They reported that she was able to imitate a 
number of novel object manipulations and arbitraiy manual and facial gestures. The imitative 
abilities of chimpanzees therefore seemed clear.
However, these early conclusions were brought into question following a study by 
Tomasello et al., (1987). Chimpanzees observed a conspecific model use a rake to obtain out 
of reach food. It was found that chimpanzees who observed the model using the tool 
perfonned significantly better that chimpanzees who observed the model manipulate the tool 
in a non-functional manner. Nevertheless, the successful chimpanzees did not imitate the 
same technique as the model. Instead, it appeared that they had learned that the rake could 
function as a tool, but they did not learn the specific details of the model’s behaviour. This 
study lead to the first description of emulation (see section 2.3.2), and suggested that, like 
Imo the Japanese macaque (see section 1.1.1), and the pine-cone stripping rats of Israel (see 
section 2.1.1), seemingly imitative behaviours may also result from alternative non-imitative 
processes in chimpanzees (Tomasello, 1990; Galef, 1992). This lead to a renewed interest in
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chimpanzee social learning and a new era of controlled experimental studies. Table 2.1 lists 
all the studies to date that have found evidence for imitation in chimpanzees.
E v i d e n c e  f o r  i m i t a t i o n
Author Task Domain Cognitive Process
(Custance et al., 1995) Gestures Non tool-use Imitation
(Myowa, 1996) Gestures Non tool-use Imitation
(Tomasello, et a l, 1993) Object manip. Non tool-use Imitation
(Bering, et al,. 2000) Object manip. Non tool-use Imitation
(Bjorklund, et al,. 2000) Object manip. Non tool-use Imitation
(Bjorklund, et al,. 2002) Object manip. Non tool-use Imitation
(Wliiten, et al,. 1996) Obj manip. Feeding Non tool-use Imitation
(Whiten, 1998b) Obj manip. Feeding Non tool-use Imitation of sequence
(Marshall-Pescini, 2002) Obj manip. Feeding Non tool-use Imitation of hierarchy
Table 2.1 Experimental studies of chimpanzee social learning that have found evidence for imitation.
2.5.2 Gestural imitation
The early study by Hayes & Hayes (1952) was later repeated by Custance et al., 
(1995) under more controlled experimental conditions. They found that, like Viki, their 
chimpanzees were also able to imitate novel arbitrary gestures, including some which 
involved out of sight body parts, such as touching the back of one’s head. These gestures are 
thought to provide particularly convincing evidence for imitation, as the imitator cannot see 
what they are doing. In order to match the actions of the model they must be able to represent 
how the actions look from another individual’s perspective (Piaget, 1952; Heyes & Ray, 
2000). Myowa (1996) and Bard & Russell (1999) have shown that chimpanzee neonates are 
able to reproduce observed facial gestures, including tongue protrusion and mouth opening. 
These studies therefore coiToborate earlier evidence that chimpanzees can imitate novel 
actions that have no environmental component.
2.5.3 Object manipulation
Experimental studies have also shown that chimpanzees can imitate actions with 
objects. For example, Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et al, (1993) used the ‘Do-as-I-do!’ 
technique to show that human raised chimpanzees could imitate 16 simple and complex
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novel object manipulations. Similar results were later reported (Bering et a l, 2000; Bjorklund 
et a l, 2000; Bjorklund et a l, 2002). These studies were of additional interest because they 
involved deferred imitation. The authors found that young chimpanzees were able to imitate 
observed objet actions following a 10-minute delay. Piaget (1952) suggested that imitating 
actions after a delay of this length was cognitively demanding because it involved symbolic 
representation of the actions in long-teini-memory.
Studies which have employed the two-action method, such as the ‘artificial fruit’ 
employed by Whiten et a l, (1996), have shown that chimpanzees can imitate object actions 
that are related to food processing. The artificial fruit is a box containing food, that is 
designed to mimic a naturally defended fruit. The box can only be opened by removing a 
number of external defences, such as bolts and pins. Subjects obseiwe a demonstrator open 
the fruit in one of two ways, which are designed to control for stimulus enhancement. The 
use of the same technique by both the obseiwer and the demonstrator can be taken as an 
indicator of imitation. Additional modifications of the original ‘artificial fruit’ design have 
demonstrated that chimpanzees can imitate at the level of the sequential and hierarchical 
structure of the model’s actions (Whiten, 1998b; Marshall-Pescini, 2002).
2.5.4 Enculturation
One of the major concerns with investigations of ape social learning is that the rearing 
histoiy of an individual may affect its perfonnance in experimental tasks. Some authors have 
argued that extensive human contact (known as enculturation Tomasello, Kinger et a l, 1993; 
Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et a l, 1993), can lead to a fundamental change in the socio- 
cognitive development of gieat apes (Premack, 1983; Call & Tomasello, 1998). It has been 
proposed that enculturation increases a broad band of socio-cognitive skills due to increased 
exposure to objects with specific fimctions, increased observation of human models, attention 
focusing through training, and being treated as an intentional individual (Call & Tomasello, 
1998; Tomasello, Kruger et al, 1993; Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et al, 1993). This 
possibility was highlighted by Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et al, (1993), who found that 
enculturated chimpanzees and human children were significantly better at imitating novel 
object actions than mother raised chimpanzees, leading to the assumption that only
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enculturated chimpanzees could imitate (Nagell et al., 1993; Call & Tomasello, 1998). 
However, many accounts of the achievements of enculturated chimpanzees are anecdotal. 
Imitative behaviours are more likely to be recorded in a home environment due to a far 
greater opportunity to observe novel behaviours in comparison to a few hours of 
experimental data. There is also little control over the extent or age at which enculturation 
occurs (Call & Tomasello, 1998).
It seems unlikely that evolution has favoured a dormant imitative capacity that is not 
expressed imder natural conditions. Instead, chimpanzees are likely to demonstrate the apex 
of their abilities in the natural conditions in which the behaviour evolved. Exposure to human 
culture may therefore only replace the rich social and physical environment that would be 
experienced in the wild (Boesch, 1993; de Waal, 1998; Whiten, 2000). Captive studies that 
yield negative evidence for imitation might therefore result from impoverished social and 
physical conditions that lead to the retardation of development. The importance of the 
relationship between a model and an observer has been recognised in recent years (Coussi- 
Korbel & Fragaszy, 1995; Caldwell, Whiten, & Morris, 1999). Enculturation may therefore 
not transfonn cognitive abilities, but increases the willingness of the subject to imitate 
because they have an affiliative bond with the model (de Waal, 1998). Furtheiinore, studies 
which have found evidence for imitation did not involve chimpanzees with extensive human 
contact (Custance et al., 1995; Myowa, 1996; Whiten et al., 1996; Whiten, 1998b; Marshall- 
Pescini, 2002).
In summery, the literature suggests that investigations of chimpanzee social learning 
have come full circle. The strict experimental procedures of recent studies have demonstrated 
that chimpanzees can indeed imitate. They are able to imitate novel manual and facial 
gestures, actions with objects, defened actions, and the sequential and hierarchical structure 
of an observed behaviour. After almost a century of research, even the most sceptical authors 
are prepared to review their opinions and concede that apes ape after all (Galef, In press).
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2.6 The function of imitation
Now that the imitative ability of chimpanzees has been established, what is of interest 
is the evolutionary function of imitation. In other words, under what conditions is imitation 
employed? (Miklosi, 1998). This question can be best addressed by looking at the conditions 
under which chimpanzees do not employ imitation. Wlrat is immediately obvious is that all 
studies that have failed to find imitation have involved tool-use (see Table 2.2). In contrast, 
Table 2.1 shows that studies that have found evidence for imitation have involved non tool- 
use tasks. There therefore seems to be a relationship between the task domain and the social 
learning mechanism that chimpanzees employ to solve it.
No EVIDENCE FOR IMITATION
Author Task Domain Cognitive process
(Hamiah & McGrew, 1987) Nut-cracking Tool-use Social learning (not specified)
(Sumita, et al,. 1985) Nut-cracking Tool-use Social learning (not specified)
(Tonooka, et al,. 1997) Probing Tool-use Social learning (not specified)
(Hirata & Moriniura, 2000) Probing Tool-use Social learning (not specified)
(Bard, et al,. 1995) Probing Tool-use Social learning (not specified)
(Paquette, 1992) Probing Tool-use Social learning / Trial & eiTor
(Celli & Tomonaga, 2001) Probing Tool-use Social learning / Trial & error
(Tomasello et al., 1987) Raking Tool-use Emulation
(Nagell et al., 1993) Raking Tool-use Emulation
(Myowa & Matsuzawa, 2000) Open box Tool-use Emulation
Table 2.2 Experimental studies of chimpanzee social learning that have failed to find evidence for imitation. 
Where the cognitive process is defined as ‘social learning’ the authors were unable to identify which social 
learning process was in action.
Rather than argue that the relationship lies in a strict distinction between tool-use and 
non-tool use, it could be that there are other differences between to the two domains that 
produce this dichotomy. Wlriten, Horner, & Marshall-Pescini, (In press) have identified a 
number of variables which may influence an individual’s tendency to imitate, one of which is 
the availability of causal information.
Studies that have found evidence for emulation have typically involved tool-use, and 
thus have involved causal relationships between objects, such as a tool and a reward. In these 
situations, chimpanzees may employ emulation because they have access to infonnation
4
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about the causal relationships of the objects involved. Chimpanzees may preferentially 
employ emulation because extracting rules of action from the causal relationships involved in 
a task can allow social learned behaviours to be generalised to different conditions 
(Tomasello et al., 1987; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1994; Want & Harris, 2001, 2002).
In contrast, studies that have found evidence for imitation, such as the ‘Do-as-I-do!’ 
paradigm used by Hayes & Hayes (1952) and Custance et al., (1995), have no environmental 
component, and thus no available causal infonnation. Similarly, in studies that have involved 
object manipulation, such as the ‘artificial fruit’ used by (Whiten et ah, 1996; Whiten, 1999; 
Marshall-Pescini, 2002), the tasks involved manipulation of a single object with the hands, 
and did not involve causal relationships between objects. Causal infonnation was therefore 
either unavailable or difficult to infer, and the chimpanzees may have employed imitation to 
solve each task because emulation was not possible. Thus, the trend for imitation in non tool- 
use tasks, and emulation in tool-use tasks may be related to the availability of causal 
information, and not the task domain per se.
However, this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. The following chapter 
will review the literature on chimpanzee causal knowledge to assess whether chimpanzees 
have sufficient knowledge of the physical world to wanant a likely involvement in 
determining which social learning strategy chimpanzees employ.
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S u m m ary of C h a p te r  3
Chapter 2 indicated that chimpanzees may use different social learning strategies to 
solve different types of tasks. One potential variable that may determine which strategy 
chimpanzees employ is the availability of causal information. This chapter investigates 
whether the causal laiowledge of chimpanzees is sufficient to warrant a likely involvement in 
social leaning.
Studies of chimpanzee causal laiowledge have mainly been conducted in the context 
of tool-use. Observations of wild populations suggest that they are able to select tools that 
have appropriate configurations for the requirements of a task, such as termite-fishing or ant- 
dipping. When an appropriate configiuation is unavailable, they are able to manufacture tools 
by destructive modification of raw materials. Wild chimpanzees use tool-sets of up to four 
different types of tool. They are able to manufacture tools in advance of use, and flexibly 
employ tool-use skills in different situations. Observational studies therefore suggest that 
chimpanzees have a relatively sophisticated understanding of causality.
However, controlled experimental studies have revealed that chimpanzee causal 
knowledge is based solely upon obseiwable aspects of the environment. For example, as long 
as two objects are in contact, a chimpanzee will view the objects as attached together and 
treat them as a whole. Chimpanzees do not seem to interpret the world in terms of 
unobservable phenomena, such as gravity or force that bind a cause and an effect. Instead, 
much of their laiowledge seems to be gained by forming associations between reliable 
patterns of regularity in the environment, such as event A is always followed by event B. 
These rules can be used to reliably predict the outcome of an event, and can be employed in 
different situations. However, chimpanzees do not seem to understand causality in the same 
sense as an adult human (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, the causal laiowledge of 
chimpanzees, however basic, is all that is required to identify many causal features of the 




C h im p a n z e e  c a u s a l  k n o w l e d g e
The previous chapter indicated that chimpanzees appear to use different social 
learning strategies to solve different types of task. Specifically, they use imitation to solve 
non tool-use tasks, and emulation to solve tool-use tasks. One potential factor that may 
influence chimpanzee’s tendency to employ imitation or emulation is the availability of 
causal infonnation. However, before this can be discussed in more detail, it is necessary to 
determine whether the causal knowledge of chimpanzees is sufficient to wanant a likely 
involvement in social learning.
3.1 Observations from wild populations
Causal knowledge can be divided into two domains; knowledge of physical causality 
and knowledge of social causality. The focus of this thesis does not allow for social causal 
Icnowledge to be discussed in any detail. However, for a review see Visalberghi & Tomasello 
(1998). Knowledge of physical causality has mainly been investigated in the context of tool- 
use.
3.1.1 Selection o f raw materials
Wild chimpanzees have been reported to use tools with highly specialised functions, 
and they appear able to select suitable raw materials on the basis of shape, strength and 
flexibility. For example, tools that are used to collect nesting ants (Dorylus gerstaecheri and 
D. nigricanus) must be inserted into the nest cavity, and removed once the ants have 
swarmed halfway up the tool. If tools are too long they will be difficult to control, but if they 
are too short, they will not collect a sufficient number of ants before the tool must be 
withdrawn, as ants can deliver a painful bite. Similarly, if a tool has too many side branches 
it camiot be swept tlnough the hand or mouth, however if it is too thin it will easily break. In 
comparison, tools that are used for teimite fishing are usually longer and more pliable as they 
must be inserted into thin and winding tunnels within the termite mound (Goodall, 1986; 
Tomasello et al., 1987; Boesch & Boesch, 1990; Suzuki et al., 1995). Chimpanzees may 
spend time choosing a tool, picking up and discarding several pieces of vegetation before an
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appropriate configuration in selected. Several tools may be selected at once, and stored in the 
lap or placed on the giound nearby so that replacements are available should one tool become 
damaged (Goodall, 1986). However, vegetation with the appropriate configuration may not 
always be available, and tools must therefore be manufactured from raw materials.
3.1.2 Tool manufacture
Tools can be manufactured by modifying raw materials using four basic categories 
(Beck, 1980):
(i) Detach -  sever from substratum or separate fr om main plant
(ii) Subtract -  remove obstmctive parts, such as leaves or side branches
(iii) Reshape -  shaipen or blimt point, bend or straighten
(iv) Combine -  constmct a tool from two or more separate parts
Chimpanzee tool modification is mainly destructive, and therefore involves only 
categories (i) to (iii). Chimpanzees have been reported to modify tools using more than one 
of these categories. For example, chimpanzees from Taï Forest were reported to modify tools 
using up to tliree categories in 93.4% of obseiwed cases (Boesch & Boesch, 1990). Similarly, 
chimpanzees in Guinea have been reported to manufacture ‘brush-sticks’ to collect teiinites 
by biting or crushing the tip of the tool with a rock. This behaviour involves detaching, 
subtracting and reshaping the tool to create a greater surface area on which termites can 
become attached, and hence increase tool efficiency (Sugiyama & Roman, 1979; Sugiyama, 
1985).
3.1.3 Tool-sets
Chimpanzees in the Ndoki Forest, Congo, have been reported to use brush-sticks in 
combination with perforating sticks, which are used to puncture deeper into the subterranean 
section of a temiite mound and therefore access more termites (Suzuki et al., 1995). Tool-sets 
have been reported in Gambia, where chimpanzees were found to use four different tool 
configurations to obtain honey. The chimpanzees used large and small ‘chisel-sticks’ to break 
the crust and widen the resulting hole, a ‘bodkin-stick’ to puncture the nest seal, and a
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‘dippiiig-stick’ to retrieve the honey. Each tool was manufactured appropriately for its 
specific function (Brewer & McGrew, 1990).
3.1.3 Planning ahead
Boesch & Boesch (1990) reported that many of the tools manufactured by 
chimpanzees in Taï Forest were modified prior to use with no tiial and error. Chimpanzees at 
Gombe have been reported to select an appropriate tool for termite fishing up to 100m away 
from, and out of sight of the nearest termite mound (Goodall, 1986). Chimpanzees at Taï who 
crack nuts (Coula edulis and Panda oleosa), have been shown to memorise the location of up 
to five stone tool sites, and therefore to minimise the transport distance of nuts to the nearest 
anvil (Boesch & Boesch, 1984).
3.1.4 Flexibility o f tool-use
Chimpanzees demonstiate an ability to flexibly deploy their tool using skills when 
required. For example, when stone anvils were no longer available for nut-cracking, 
chimpanzees from Taï Forest switched to using fallen tiee stumps (Sakura & Matsuzawa, 
1991). Chimpanzees at Gombe were reported to generalise adaptive tool behaviour to lever 
open food storage boxes with sticks (Goodall, 1986).
Observational studies therefore indicate that wild chimpanzees are able to select and 
modify tools to specific requirements, suggesting that they appreciate the physical properties 
of objects that allow them to function as tools. However, observational data typically lacks 
descriptions of an individual’s experience prior to the reported event. It is therefore not 
possible to determine the depth at which chimpanzees understand the causality of their 
actions. Hence, experimental studies have been employed to study chimpanzee causal 
laiowledge under controlled conditions.
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3.2 Experimental studies of causal knowledge
3.2.1 Early studies o f causal Imowledge
Chimpanzee causal knowledge has been the focus of experimental research for almost 
a century. Kohler (1927) performed a series of experiments with seven chimpanzees at the 
Anthropoid Station, Tenerife between 1913 and 1917. One of Kohler’s initial experiments, 
which required chimpanzees to use a box as a step to retrieve an out-of-reach banana, yielded 
very positive results. Unfortunately, often only Kohler’s preliminaiy work is cited in the 
literature, leading to a biased interpretation of his results (Povinelli, 2000). When the task 
changed so that the chimpanzees were required to use two boxes to reach a banana that was 
suspended even higher from the ceiling, the chimpanzees revealed striking conceptual 
shortcomings. For example, they tried to ‘stick’ the box to the wall and climb up it, followed 
by an array of behaviours that demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the type, or quantity of 
contact that was required to make an object stable. Kohler’s subsequent experiments reported 
the same conflict between seemingly insightful problem solving, and behaviours that 
suggested a lack of appreciation of basic causal principles. Accordingly, Kohler concluded 
that chimpanzees’ understanding of the world appeared to be tied to observable phenomena. 
For example, he noted that as long as two objects are in contact, a chimpanzee will view the 
objects as attached together and treat them as a whole, with no appreciation of physical 
connection (Kohler, 1927).
3.2.2 Recent studies o f causal laiowledge
However, later studies appeared to show chimpanzees in a more favourable light. 
Nevertheless, many of the conclusions that were drawn from these studies have now been 
brouglit into question. For example, Dohl (1968 cited in Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001) 
reported that his home-raised chimpanzee Julia could use five different keys to open five 
different nested boxes in the correct order, without trial and error. However, the report does 
not give adequate details about the control conditions, or the level of Julia’s previous 
experience.
Premack (1976) used picture cards to investigate causal knowledge in a language- 
trained chimpanzee, Sarah. The chimpanzee was shown a picture of an object (such as an
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apple), and an effect (cut apple) and asked to choose a picture that represented the correct 
cause (a knife). Although Sarah could pair up the correct cause and effect on the majority of 
trials, it is possible that her previous experience with these objects enabled her to learn 
associations about the scenes that were presented. For example, Sarah may have selected the 
‘knife’ card simply because she has seen a knife with an apple more than the alternative 
combinations. She may therefore have had no understanding that the Imife represented a 
cause, and would not need to understand the purpose of the task to succeed (Tomasello & 
Call, 1997).
Mathieu, Daudelin, Dagenais, & Decarie (1980), studied chimpanzees’ knowledge of 
contact. Chimpanzees were shown two cloths, one with a desirable object lying on it, and the 
other with an object next to it. One of the two chimpanzees was able to pull the correct cloth 
in order to retrieve the object significantly more than chance. However, it is unclear what 
controls were taken for associative learning.
Premack & Premack (1994) investigated causal knowledge in adult chimpanzees and 
3 to 4-year-old childi'en. Both groups obseiwed a human demonstrator place an apple under 
an opaque container and a banana under another container. The subjects were then distracted 
for two minutes, after which time the demonstrator reappeared eating either an apple or a 
banana. The subjects were then allowed to search under one of the containers for fruit. If the 
demonstrator was eating a banana, all the children and some of the cliimpanzees successfrilly 
chose to search the container holding the apple, and vice versa, implying that they understood 
there were only two pieces of fmit and therefore only one left under the containers.
3.2.3 Tubetash
In 1989, Visalberghi and Trinka published the first in a series of experiments that 
were designed to investigate causal knowledge in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and 
great apes, in tool-use tasks (Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989). Subjects were required to modify 






Tools Tape holding tools together
(c)
f
_ Tool Removable end
Bundle condition
Tape must be removed 
before tools can be 
inserted
H-stick condition
Ends must be removed 
before tool can be 
inserted
Figure 3.1. (a) Clear plastic tube containing food reward, (b) Bundle: the outside tape must be removed before 
one o f  the tools can be used to dislodge the food reward, (c) H-stick: the obstructive ends must be removed 
before the stick can be inserted into the tube to dislodge the reward.
Capuchin monkeys were able to solve the task in every trial, but errors persisted 
throughout the experiment and did not decrease over time. For example, the monkeys often 
inserted the tape that they had removed fi'om the tools in the bundle condition, or the 
obstructive ends fi*om the H-stick condition. Therefore the solution was only achieved by 
trying all possible alternatives (Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989; Visalberghi & Limongelli, 
1994). In contrast, when chimpanzees, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and orangutans (Pongo 
pygmaeus) were exposed to the same task, errors were few and deceased rapidly across trials 
(Visalberghi, Fragaszy, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995). As a result, the apes were thought to 
have a deeper understanding of the relevant causal features of the task (Visalberghi & 
Limongelli, 1998).
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Monkeys and apes were then tested using a tube with a trap in the middle (trap-tube), 
with food placed on one side of the trapping hole (see Fig. 3.2). Subjects were required to 
insert a tool in the correct end of the tube so as to remove the food without pushing it into the 
trap. The correct end of tool insertion was therefore dependent on the position of the food 






Figure 3.2 Trap-tube apparatus with trap in middle, used by (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994; Visalberghi et 
al., 1995).
One of the four capuchin monkeys obtained the reward significantly more than would 
be expected by chance. However, altering the position of the trap (see Fig. 3.3), revealed that 
this monkey had developed an inflexible rule-based strategy, centred on the distance between 
the food and the end if the tube. This strategy could not be generalised to new experimental 
conditions (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994). When the investigation was extended to 
chimpanzees, 2 of the 5 succeeded above chance. In contrast to the monkeys, the 
chimpanzees therefore seemed to have a better understanding of the causal features of the 





centre o f tube
SUCCESS
Trap
Figure 3.3 The altered position o f  the trap. A distance-based rule cannot be used to solve the task, as the food 
reward is always placed in the centre o f the tube.
However, Povinelli & Reaux (2000) have argued that moving the position of the trap 
excluded only one of several associations that the chimpanzees could use. By inverting the 
trap and rendering it ineffective, Povinelli, et al., found that Megan, the only chimpanzee to 
perform significantly better than chance, continued to avoid the trap. She did this even when 
continuation of this strategy was penalised by placing the tool on the side closest to the trap, 
so that she had to pick up the tool and walk to the other side of the tube in order to continue 
using her rule. The authors concluded that her success was based on a complex set of 
associative rules that could be applied in different conditions. It was argued that chimpanzees 
may out-perform monkeys in the trap-tube task not because they have superior causal 
knowledge, but because they have a more sophisticated ability to extract observable patterns 
of regularity by association (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998; Povinelli, 2000). This ability 
may have enabled them to discover that insertion of the tool closest to the trap always 
resulted in success.
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3.2.4 Chimpanzee causal Imowledge
111 summary, observational studies of wild chimpanzees suggest that they have 
sophisticated knowledge of physical causality, which allows them to select and modify tools 
in advance, and to the specific requirements of a task. However, when chimpanzee causal 
knowledge is investigated under controlled experimental conditions, it seems that much of 
their causal knowledge is based upon observable aspects of the environment. Chimpanzees 
do not seem to interpret the world in teiins of unobservable phenomena, such as gravity or 
force that bind a cause and an effect. Instead, much of their knowledge seems to be gained 
by forming associations between reliable patterns of regularity in the environment, such as 
event A is always followed by event B, These rules can be used to reliably predict the 
outcome of an event, and can be employed in different situations. Nevertheless, the causal 
knowledge of chimpanzees, however basic, is all that is required to identify many causal 
features of the world. Chimpanzee causal knowledge is therefore sufficient to potentially be 
involved in social learning.
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S u m m ary of  C h a p te r  4
Psychological studies of chimpanzees have mainly been conducted from an 
evolutionary perspective, in order to make comparisons between the mental abilities of 
chimpanzees and humans. Comparative studies, which have tested human children with 
similar tasks to chimpanzees, have found that, like chimpanzees, children are able to imitate 
novel gestures, and object manipulations after a delay, as well as the sequential and 
hierarchical structure of observed actions. However, children tend to imitate actions with 
greater fidelity than chimpanzees, and employ imitation in situations where chimpanzees 
have been found to emulate. Children may predominantly employ imitation because it is a 
highly adaptive strategy that plays an important part in many aspects of their development. 
However, like chimpanzees, the role of intentions in imitation is unclear.
Both chimpanzees and children pass tlrrough the same stages of development, but it 
seems that children have a more sophisticated understanding of causality than chimpanzees. 
They actively seek causal explanations for observed events, and are able to infer 
unobseiwable mediating forces such as gravity and force. In contrast, the literature suggests 
that chimpanzee causal knowledge is based on observable features of the environment. 
Nevertheless, the causal Imowledge of both chimpanzees and children is sufficient to identify 
the relevant aspects of a demonstration, and therefore to be involved in social learning.
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CHAPTER 4
C o m p a r a t i v e  s t u d i e s  w i t h  h u m a n  c h i l d r e n
4.1 Comparative studies of social learning
Psychological studies of chimpanzees have primarily been undertaken in order to 
compare their cognitive abilities with those of humans. A number of authors have therefore 
conducted comparative studies witli chimpanzees and children under very similar conditions. 
Nagell et al., (1993) repeated the raking study of Tomasello et al., (1987) with 2-year-old 
children (see section 2.5.1). They found that unlike the chimpanzees, children imitated the 
actions of the model with high fidelity, although emulation would have lead to a more 
efficient solution. Similarly, Whiten et al., (1996) found that 2- to 4-year-old children opened 
an artificial fruit by reproducing the exact form of the actions they had witnessed, and were 
therefore less efficient than chimpanzees. It seems that chimpanzees and children use 
different social learning strategies to solve the same tasks. Specifically, it appears that 
children employ imitation in the same situations whereby chimpanzees tend to emulate.
4.1.1 The predominance o f im itation in ch ildren
The prevalence of imitation in young children is well documented. Imitation is known 
to play an important role in early language acquisition (Meltzoff, 1988) and object 
loiowledge (Abravanel & Gingold, 1985; Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996). Neonates are able 
to imitate novel manual and facial gestures after only a few hours of life, indicating that the 
capacity for imitation may be present fiom birth (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983, 1989, 
1994). Indeed, it has been suggested that imitation may be such an adaptive learning strategy 
in child development that it is routinely employed in situations where alternative learning 
strategies would be more efficient (Whiten et ah, 1996).
4.2 Similarities between chimpanzees and children
4.2.1 Comparative studies
Chapter 2 indicated that chimpanzees do imitate in some situations, and there are 
some similarities between the imitative capacities of chimpanzees and children. For example, 
human infants as young as 9-months-old are able to reproduce novel actions following a
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week-long delay, indicating that, like chimpanzees, the representation of actions in long-term 
memory is involved in imitation (Meltzoff, 1988a, 1988b). Both human and chimpanzee 
neonates are able to imitate novel facial gestures, such as tongue protrusion and mouth 
opening (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Myowa, 1996; Bard & Russell, 1999). In addition, like 
chimpanzees, 3- and 4-year-old children are able to imitate details of the sequential and 
hierarchical structure of observed actions (Whiten, 2002a).
4.2.2 The imitation game
A  number of authors have pointed out that the predominance of imitation in children 
may be due, in part, to early developmental experiences. Human mothers from all cultures 
imitate the vocalisations and gestures of their babies. Hence, children have months of early 
experience with face-to-face turn taking in which they can leam the ‘rules’ of the imitation 
game, and in most cases, care-giver imitation comes before imitation by the infant (Jones, 
2003). In contrast, chimpanzees do not typically have the opportunity to learn about imitation 
in the sense of taking turns to copying the actions of a demonstrator. However, chimpanzees 
who are raised in a home enviromnent do typically have this early experience with their 
human care-givers, and hence they may show imitation more readily, not because they have 
special ‘enculturated’ abilities, but because they have early experience with the imitation 
game (Bard, 1998). It seems that when care-givers encourage early imitation, both 
chimpanzee and human neonates are capable of gestural imitation. Adult chimpanzees have 
also shown evidence of gestural imitation in situations where they have been explicitly taught 
the turn taking procedure inlierent in the ‘Do this!’ paradigm (see sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2; 
Custance et ah, 1995; Bard, 1998).
4.2.3 Intention in imitation
The fidelity with which children imitate can be determined by their perception of the 
model’s goal. For example, after watching a model touch their right ear with the right hand, 
children will often touch their left ear with their left hand. However, the fidelity of imitation 
increases if they obseiwe the model cross their arms and touch both ears with opposite hands. 
In the first case, children perceive the goal of the model to simply be touching an ear.
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However, in the second case the goal of the model is clearer, and children copy with greater 
fidelity (Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & Gattis, 2000; Gattis, 2002).
If children observe a model attempt, but fail to perfomi an action (such as pulling 
apart a dumb-bell shaped toy), they are able to complete the action although they did not 
observe the final result (Meltzoff, 1995). This has been interpreted as evidence that the 
children understand the intention of the model. However, Huang, Hey es, & Chamian (2001) 
and Charman & Huang (2002) have suggested that the completion of a failed attempt may be 
explained by alternative non-imitative processes. For example, children may pull apart the 
dumb-bell toy simply because their attention has been drawn to it, and they subsequently 
converge on the same behaviour through individual exploration because the number of 
potential actions is very limited.
Gergely, Belckering, & Kiraly (2002) found that infants would copy the ‘strange’ 
behaviour of an adult model, as long as they perceived the adult’s actions as intentional. 
Children who observed an adult turn on a light switch with their head whilst their hands were 
occupied by holding an object, would turn the light on with their hands. However, if the 
model’s hands were free, the children would also push the switch with their head. The 
authors interpreted this as evidence that the children imitated because they perceived the 
actions of the adult to be intentional, as there was no other reason to use their head, if their 
hands were free.
Carpenter, Akhtai*, & Tomasello (1998) found that 14- to 18-month-old cliildren 
reproduced the behaviom* of a model significantly more when it was followed by the model 
saying ‘There!’ than when it was followed by ‘Whoops!’. However, it may simply be that 
children are able to leam by association that actions followed by ‘There!’ have more 
desirable outcomes (Heyes & Ray, 2002).
Few studies of intention reading have been conducted with chimpanzees. Povinelli, 
Perilloux, Reaux, & Bierschwale (1998) found that chimpanzees could not differentiate 
between a human caregiver who accidentally spilled a glass of juice, and one who
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purposefully poured it on the floor. However, the chimpanzee did not receive the reward in 
either case and therefore their lack of preference for a particular caregiver may not be 
surprising. In contrast. Call & Tomasello (1998) found that chimpanzees were able to 
preferentially search under a container on top of which a human had purposefully placed a 
maker, instead of a container where a marked had been accidentally dropped. However, the |
ieffect of this result was small, and decreased over subsequent trails. The role of intentions in j
chimpanzee social learning therefore remains unclear. |
IThe literature therefore suggest that children copy observed behaviours with greater |
1fidelity than chimpanzees, and that they use imitation in situations were alternative strategies j
would be more efficient. There is some evidence that children are sensitive to the intentions IIof the model, but this is not entirely clear. jI4.3 Comparative studies of causal knowledge |
4.3.1 Seeking causal explanations |
iStudies of human children suggest that they have a more sophisticated understanding of i
Icausality than chimpanzees, seeking causal explanations for observed effects (Tomasello, |
1998b; Povinelli, 2000). For example, Povinelli & Dunphy-Lelii (2001) presented ]
cliimpanzees and 3- to 5- year old children with a block of wood that could be balanced on .J
one edge in order to obtain a reward. From time to time, the block was replaced with a j
‘sham’ block that did not balance because it had rounded edges, or was weighted at the top.
1The children, but not the chimpanzees, were seen to visually inspect the sham block 
following failure.
4.3.2 Knowledge o f unobservable forces 
Children as young as 4- to 6-months-old are sensitive to unobservable causal
principles such as gravity. They are able to use this knowledge to solve tasks that appear 
difficult for adult chimpanzees, such as the contact and gravity problems set by Kohler. For 
example, infants look longer at objects that are not properly supported, thereby violating their 
expectations of the physical world. Unlike chimpanzees, they seem to appreciate the type and
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quantity of contact that is required to make two objects stable (Baillargeon, Needham, & 
DeVos, 1992; Needham & Baillargeon, 1993a, 1993b; see Fig. 4.1).
Impossible Impossible Impossible Possible
Figure 4.1 Object relations shown to 4 to 6-month-old infants in the preferential looking paradigm used by 
Baillargeon et al. Children were found to look longer at the first tluee configurations.
However, studies such as these with very young infants assume that they look longer 
at some events because they understand that they are causally impossible (Baillargeon & 
Graber, 1988). This is often interpreted as evidence that infants understand principles such as 
gravity and inertia (Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995). An alternative explanation may be 
that infants look longer at impossible events because they are, by definition, novel. Therefore 
looking time would not necessarily imply that the children have understood the causal 
principles, only that what they see is unusual. Experiments using this methodology may 
therefore give an artificially early age of the development of causal knowledge in humans 
compared to non-human primates.
Nevertheless, by the age of 3-years-old, children are able to combine different forms 
of causal knowledge to correctly predict the outcome of causal events. For example, Bullock, 
Gelman, & Baillargeon (1982) presented children with a series of domino-like blocks that 
could be toppled over so that the last block hit a lever which ejected a toy rabbit from a 
platform into a toy bed. Children were able to predict from visual inspection, that pushing the 
first block would cause the rabbit to fall into bed. They were also able to distinguish between 
changes to the apparatus that were causally relevant or irrelevant to the fate of the rabbit. The 
ability to predict outcomes in advance implies that, unlike the looking-time studies, children
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were not simply responding to novelty. It seems that by 3-years-old children do have a 
relatively sophisticated understanding of the physical world.
Many other aspects of causal knowledge have been found in children, including: 
Gravity Qiüooà, 1995)
Contact (Bates, Carlson-Lunden, & Bretherton, 1980)
Force (von Hofsten, Vishton, Spelke, Feng, & Rosander, 1998)
Causal chains - understanding that if a chain of events has the order A>B>C, A causes C via 
a causal mediator B, (Bullock et al., 1982; Shultz, Pardo, & Altmami, 1982)
Temporal contiguity - the knowledge that a cause must precede an event (Bullock & Gelman, 
1979; Shultz et al., 1982)
Logical searching - the ability to restrict the search for an object or person on the basis of 
where they were first and last seen (Wellman, Somerville, & Haake, 1979; Somerville 
& Capuani-Shumaker, 1984)
Predictive action - the ability to predict the trajectory of falling or moving objects (Kiist, 
Fieberg, & Wilkening, 1993)
However, the developmental mechanism of children’s causal knowledge is a subject 
of contention. Some authors argue that humans are born with an innate system of ‘core 
knowledge’ around which causal understanding is built (Spelke, Katz, Purcell, Ehrlich, & 
Breinlinger, 1994). This Imowledge develops in accord with three causal principles 
(cohesion, continuity, and contact), with each having specific constraints on the motion of 
objects (Spelke et al., 1995; In-Kyeong & Spelke, 1999).
Others claim that humans are not born with innate knowledge, but with a learning 
bias that constrains and guides the acquisition of causal knowledge (Baillargeon, Kotovsy, & 
Needham, 1995; Goswami, 1998).
In contrast, Piaget (1952) argues that humans are bom with neither knowledge nor 
biases, but that all causal knowledge is acquired through experience with objects. The 
development of causal Imowledge is constrained only by maturation processes such as
46
autoregulation, and therefore must be broken down into stages (Piaget, 1952, 2000). Piaget 
described four categories of sensory motor development in humans. One of which was the 
development of causal Imowledge, which was divided into 6 stages:
Stage 1 -  Reflexes
Stage 2 -  Acts directed at own body
Stage 3 -  Reproduction of interesting effects on external entities
Stage 4 — Hierarchical organisation of Stage 3 (e.g. moving one object to gain access to another)
Stage 5 -  Relating objects to one another 
Stage 6 -  Mental representation of object relations
Piaget maintained that by the age of 12-15 months, children were capable of Stage 5 
object knowledge, and Stage 6 mental manipulations by the age of 18 months. Comparative 
studies have shown that chimpanzees and humans pass tlurough a similar developmental 
sequence (Mathieu et al., 1980; Bard & Russell, 1999). Within the first year of life 
chimpanzees are able to reproduce interesting effects on external objects (stage 3), and 
organise these actions hierarchically (stage 4) (Mathieu & Bergeron, 1981; Poti & Spinozzi,
1994). Vauclair & Bard (1983), investigated object manipulation in two chimpanzees, a 
bonobo and a human child in the first year of life. They observed that all subjects were 
capable of stage 4 manipulations, but that human infants reproduced and organised their 
object actions far more frequently than the other ape species.
4.3.3 Cautionary note
It is important to note that very few relevant experimental studies have been 
performed with non-himian primates. Many of the tasks that have been presented to 
chimpanzees address very specific causal problems, often with tenuous analogies to natural 
behaviours. This sort of experimental paradigm may not be ethologically or motivationally 
appropriate to demonstrate the apex of their ability. In addition, the seemingly impressive 
abilities of very young human infants may be biased by the methodology, which has not been 
systematically used to study non-human primates of the same age.
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4,3.4 Comparative conclusions
In summary, the literature suggest that, like chimpanzees, children are able to imitate 
novel manual and facial gestures, in some situations after a delay, and can imitate the 
hierarchical and sequential structure of observed actions. However, it seems that children 
copy observed behaviours with greater fidelity than chimpanzees and that they use imitation 
in situations were alternative strategies would be more efficient. Both chimpanzees and 
children pass tlirough the same stages of causal knowledge development. However, it appears 
that the major difference between species is that children actively seek explanations for 
observed effects, and are able to implicate unobservable mediating forces, such as gravity. 
There is little evidence to date that chimpanzees do so, although no systematic studies have 
been carried out (Tomasello & Call, 1997; Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). Instead, the 
experimental literature suggests that chimpanzee causal knowledge is based upon an ability 
to identify regularities by association and generalising these to different environmental 
conditions. Nevertheless, the causal knowledge of both chimpanzees and children is 
sufficient to identify causal regularities and hence may be important in social learning to 
identify the relevant features of a demonstration.
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S u m m ary o f  C h a p te r  5
All the experiments with chimpanzees were conducted at Ngamba Island Chimpanzee 
Sanctuary, Uganda. The chimpanzee subjects were mainly bush-meat orphans, who were 
confiscated from traders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at border towns near 
Uganda. With the exception of a tliree-month quarantine period, the chimpanzees have very 
little one-on-one contact with humans. Great care is taken to interact with the chimpanzees 
using species-typical vocalisations and gestures were possible. The chimpanzees do not 
receive any form of training, or demonstrations about how to interact with objects or each 
other. They spend the majority of time in a peer group, but have daily access to a species- 
typical forest environment and interactions with adult conspecifics. Therefore the 
chimpanzees who participated in this series of studies cannot be considered as ‘enculturated’ 
in the typical sense used in the literature.
All experiments with children were conducted at nursery and primary schools in 
Dundee and St Andrews, UK. The children were recruited from schools with a wide etlmic 
and demographic range of pupils. Experiments with children were undertaken from a 
comparative perspective, and therefore care was taken to keep the methodologies of the 
chimpanzee and child studies as similar as possible. The children were given very little 
verbal information about each task. Both children and chimpanzee observed the 
demonstrations from the same perspective, were allowed to move freely around the 
apparatus, and were not prevented from interacting with it during demonstrations.
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CHAPTER 5
S t u d y  s i t e , P a r t i c i p a i s t s  a n d  G e n e r a l  M e t h o d o l o g y
5.1 Study site; Chimpanzees
5.1.2 The Chimpanzee Sanctuary and Conservation Wildlife Trust
Data collection for all the experiments with chimpanzees took place at Ngamba Island 
Chimpanzee sanctuary, Uganda. Ngamba is situated in Lake Victoria, 23 km from mainland 
Uganda (see Fig. 5.1). The sanctuary is run by the Chimpanzee Sanctuary and Conservation 
Wildlife Trust (CSWCT), and receives funding from the Uganda Wildlife Education Centre 
(UWEC), the Zoological Parks Board of New South Wales - Australia, Bom Free -  UK, The 
Jane Goodall Institute -  Germany, and the International Foundation for Animal Welfare. 
CSWCT is also responsible for an educational out-reach project for local schools and 
communities, a snare removal project throughout the national parks of Uganda, and a 
chimpanzee habituation project at Kibale National Park.










U G A N D A
M oroto
N at. Pa  Mbalo
T o r o r o #
• S o r o «M aslildl ^  Kyoga Mi. Ets
^Klbaia # F o r t  Portal
K A M PA LA
K a g tn r  J  
T A N Z A tm
*(0S s e s e  /$. Ngamba
Island
Lako V/ctoria
Figure 5.1 Location o f  Ngamba Island in Lake Victoria, Uganda.
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5.1.2 Ngamba Island
Ngamba Island has an area of approximately 100 acres, of which 98 acres are covered 
by forest. The remaining two acres make up the human camp, which consists of three small 
accommodation buildings for staff and researchers, and a kitchen/store building. The camp 
and the forest are separated by an electric fence (see Fig. 5.2). The north section of the forest 
is flat with open grass areas covering approximately 10%, but the southern section is more 
hilly. Until 1997, the island was inliabited by a fishing community, as is typical of many of 
the small islands in Lake Victoria. The conmiunity logged many of the large trees in the 
forest, and much of the open grassland is the result of human clearing. When the sanctuary 
was first set up in 1998, a group of volunteers cut a series of trails tlnough the forest, miming 
from North to South, and from East to West at 50m intervals. These trails are still the main 
travel route used by both chimpanzees and humans.
CSWCT employs 10 members of staff who work on a 10 day rotation schedule. 
Therefore at any given point there are between tliree and six staff living and working on the 
island (see Fig. 5.3). The staff are responsible for all aspects of island life, including: 
feeding/cleaning/caring for the chimpanzees, looking after visitors and giving public 
presentations to tourists, cooking and cleaning, and helping the researchers when time 
permits. Researchers and staff live side-by-side and depend on a strong relationship to 
perform the daily activities on the island. As Ngamba is not primarily a research station, 
flexibility is essential. There are often days when, due to the number of visitors, or alternative 
activities, it is simply not possible to conduct experiments.
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Figure 5.2 Arial photograph o f Ngamba Island. The human camp can be seen at the bottom o f  the photograph.
Figure 5.3 Five members o f staff from Ngamba Island. From left to right: Minani Grégoire, Isaac Mujaasi 
(Education Officer), Stany Nyandwi (Head Keeper), Robert Okello and Francis Lukwiya.
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5.2 Participants: Chimpanzees
5.2.1 The chimpanzees o f Ngamba Island
In 1998, CSWCT was founded to move chimpanzees living in overcrowded 
conditions at Entebbe Zoo (UWEC) to Ngamba Island. These individuals were all rescued by 
the Uganda Wildlife Authority as orphans of the bush-meat trade and live animal trade from 
Uganda and sunounding countries, and make up the adult group at the sanctuary. Since this 
first group was moved to the island, many more orphans have been rescued. Most of the 
arrivals since 1998 have been young chimpanzees from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, who were confiscated at border towns around Uganda. These individuals are mostly 
under 8-years-old, and make up the juvenile group at the sanctuary. This group is housed 
separately from the adults due to prior complications with integration attempts. All the 
chimpanzees on Ngamba are from the subspecies Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii. The age of 
each individual was estimated upon arrival to the sanctuary on the basis of dental emption, 
size, weight and motor co-ordination. Unfortunately little is known about the history of each 
chimpanzee before they came to Ngamba (see Appendix A).
Before being integrated into the Ngamba community, new arrivals must spend tlrree 
months in quarantine on the mainland. During this period the chimpanzees are cared for by a 
human suiTogate parent. All ‘chimp parents’ are trained to use chimpanzee-typical gestures 
and vocalisations, such as the pant-hoot greeting, food giniits, fear calls, play faces and how 
to tickle and groom effectively. Great emphasis is placed upon using these behaviours in 
order to facilitate the young chimpanzee’s integration into the sanctuary gioups once the 
quarantine period has been completed.
5.2.2 The chimpanzees ’ daily routine
On the island the adult group spends all day in the forest. Whilst in the forest they are 
able to play, forage, nest build and perform many of the activities of a wild chimpanzee 
community. However, the endemic vegetation of the island is not sufficient to support the 
community, so they are provisioned five times per day with a variety of finit and vegetables 
as well as seeds, nuts, eggs and porridge (see Figure 5.4a).
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Figure 5.4 (a) Top picture - 
Members o f the adult group 
spend the majority o f  each 
day in the forest. They are 
provisioned five times each 
day, and come out o f the 
forest to the electric fence, 
where staff throw food from a 
viewing platform that runs 
across the top o f the fence
(b) Bottom picture - Members 
o f  the juvenile group remain 
in the holding facility while 
the adults are in the forest. 
Young chimpanzees receive 
milk in cups, as well as the 
usual food items each day.
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The juvenile group spends the majority of each day in the holding facility while the 
adults are in the forest (see Fig. 5.4b). The holding facility consists of six rooms of varying 
size that are interconnected via a series of raceways and sliding doors (see Fig. 5.5). 
Chimpanzees enter and leave the holding facility though a tunnel that leads out into the 
forest. The tunnel entrance is locked each day while the adults are in the forest. Whilst in the 
holding facility, the juvenile group receives many behavioural enrichment activities in the 
form of simulated foraging tasks, and novel objects.
Figure 5.5 The holding facility at Ngamba Island. The research room is located at the far left o f  the picture. The 
hammocks in which the chimpanzees sleep at night can be seen hanging from the roof.
At night the adult group returns from the forest, and all the chimpanzees sleep in 
hammocks inside the holding facility (see Fig. 5.5). The chimpanzees choose to return each 
night, as the facility provides much needed protection from the frequent tropical storms that 
hit the island. This system enables the juvenile group to have access to the forest before the 
adults leave the facility in the morning, and after they have returned in the evening. During 
these trips into the forest the youngsters are often accompanied by adult female chimpanzees, 
who in many respects take over the role of a surrogate mother. Like the adult group, the 
young chimpanzees are free to perform many of the natural activities of a wild community.
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5.2.3 The issue o f enculturation
A number of authors have argued that extensive human contact can lead to a 
fundamental change in an individual’s socio-cognitive development through increased 
exposure to objects with specific functions, increased opportunity to observe human 
demonstrations, attention focusing through training, and being treated intentionally 
(Premack, 1983; Tomasello, Kinger et al., 1993; Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993; 
Call & Tomasello, 1998). General arguments against this view were discussed in section 
2.5.4. Nevertheless, it might be suggested that the chimpanzees of Ngamba Island are 
enculturated, and therefore that the findings of this thesis cannot be generalised to 
chimpanzees as a whole.
However, the chimpanzees of Ngamba Island experience very few ‘human’ objects 
with specific functions. Any objects that are introduced act as a form of enrichment and 
chimpanzees do not receive demonstrations or training about how the objects should be 
manipulated. The chimpanzees spend the majority of time in a peer group with daily 
excursions into the forest with adult female conspecifics, and are rarely one-on-one with 
humans (with the exception of the tluee-month quarantine period). However, gieat care is 
taken to interact with the chimpanzees using chimpanzee-typical gestures and vocalisations. 
When in contact with humans, the chimpanzees are treated as intentional individuals, but the 
influence of this interaction is less intense than would be experienced by a home-raised ape. 
Therefore the chimpanzees of Ngamba cannot be considered as ‘enculturated’ in the same 
sense as some studied by other researchers (Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993; 
Bering et al., 2000; Bjorklund et al., 2000; Bjorklund et al., 2002). Instead, the stimulation 
that is received on Ngamba Island could be viewed as a replacement for the rich social and 
physical enviromnent that would be experienced in the wild.
The rearing history of the Ngamba chimpanzees, and in particular the juvenile group, 
can be seen as a mixture of nursery housing, coupled with the daily opportunity to interact 
with adult conspecifics in a species-typical forest environment. The Ngamba chimpanzees 
are not enculturated, and therefore the results of this thesis are likely to have implications for 
chimpanzee cognition in general.
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5.3 General methodology: Chimpanzees
All chimpanzee experiments were conducted one-on-one with the chimpanzees, and 
their success was though to depend upon a strong bond between the subject and the 
experimenter, as the young chimpanzees would be separated from the rest of the gioup for 
each study. This bond was developed during a pilot visit between February and April 2000, 
and was strengthened with each subsequent research trip. All experiments were carried out in 
the holding facility. Experiment 1 was canied out in Holding Den 1, but all other 
experiments were conducted in the Research Room (see Fig. 5.6).
Each chimpanzee was tested individually, and therefore subjects had to be separated 
from the rest of the group. This was done with the help of the staff in the mornings, once the 
holding facility had been cleaned. Before testing, subjects waited in a holding room (Holding 
Den 4) adjacent to the test room (see Fig. 5.6). Subjects could choose on a daily basis 
whether or not they wished to participate. If they did not want to do the experiments they 
could refuse to enter the holding room. This occurred on a number of occasions. These 
individuals were allowed to remain with the rest of the gi'oup, and were often happy to co­
operate the following day. In fact, the main problem was that so many individuals wished to 
enter the holding room and participate in the experiments, that it was difficult to isolate the 
coirect chimpanzees each day.
Before each experiment, the apparatus for that particular study was place outside the 
holding facility for 24 hours, so that the chimpanzees could see, but not touch it. This was 
done to familiarise the subjects with the apparatus, and reduce the possibility of neophobic 
responses during testing.
During testing, the apparatus was secured inside the testing room, either by bolting it 
onto a bench (Experiment 1), or attaching it to the centre of the floor (Experiment 4). For 
Experiments 2 and 3, the apparatus was located outside the research room, and subjects 
interacted with it tlirough the bars. In each experiment, the procedure involved a series of 
demonstrations to each subject followed by a series of trials by the chimpanzee.
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All experiments were conducted with the help of a second person. The role of this 
second experimenter was played by a number of volunteers who were working for CSWCT. 
Experiment 1 was conducted with the help of Pauline Osbourne from Australia, Experiments 
2 and 3 were conducted with the help of Ora McNaught, also from Australia. Experiment 4 
was carried out with the help of Amy Clanin, from the USA, and Carla Litchfield who was 
working as a Research Fellow at the University of St Andrews. In addition, various members 
of staff stepped in to help whenever they were available.
The first experimenter was responsible for setting up the apparatus, and performing 
the demonstrations. The second experimenter was required to film all the demonstrations and 
trials on a hand-held Sony Hi8 video recorder,
5.4 Previous research histories: Chimpanzees
A number of the chimpanzees who took part in this series of studies had prior 
experience with social learning experiments. Sarah Marshall-Pescini conducted tluee studies 
between 1998 and 2000 with the Ngamba chimpanzees (Marshall-Pescini, 2002). The first of 
these was a tool-use task, designed to mimic the honey-dipping behaviour of wild 
chimpanzees. The aim of the study was to determine whether the chimpanzees could adopt a 
more complex, yet more efficient strategy by social learning once they had discovered a 
simpler less efficient method on their own. The second study was an experimental 
investigation of nut cracking, and the third study was a non tool-use task which employed a 
modified ‘artificial finit’ to investigate whether chimpanzees could imitate the hierarchical 
stmcture of observed actions (Marshall-Pescini, 2002).
The general methodology of these studies was very similar to the experiments in this 
thesis. However, tlie tasks themselves and the hypotheses behind them were very different. 
Thi’ough Sarah Marshall-Pescini’s work, the chimpanzees learned to tolerate being separated 
from the rest of the group, and being one-on-one with an experimenter in the research room. 
They also learned something of the general methodology of observing a demonstration and 
then being given the opportunity to interact with the same object in front of a camera. Their 
prior experience likely served to facilitate the chimpanzee’s willingness to take part in the
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present set of studies; however, it did not teach them anything specific about the principles 
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Figure 5.6 Schematic representation of the holding facility.
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5.5 Study-site: Children
5.5.1 Gaining permission to work in schools
All the experiments with children were conducted at nursery and primary schools in 
Dundee, and St Andrews, UK. All experiments were conducted once the methodology had 
been approved by the School of Psychology Ethics Committee. Before the local education 
authorities could be approached to request permission to work with children, a Criminal 
Records Check, and a Police Background Check on the researcher had to be performed. Once 
the local councils had given pemiission to work in their schools, the head-teachers of 
individual schools were contacted and arrangements were made for an interview. During the 
interview, the researcher explained the comparative rational of working with both 
chimpanzees and children. The teachers were shown the experimental apparatus and 
photographs of chimpanzees performing the same tasks. Great care was taken to emphasise 
that the children were being studied as a group, and that their overall behaviour would be 
compared to the chimpanzees. The purpose of the experiments was not to look at individual 
differences, or to single out the abilities of particular children. Once the teachers were happy 
with the details of the study, a letter was sent out to the parents of children in the appropriate 
age groups, to ask if they would permit their child to participate in the investigation (see 
Appendix B).
5.6 Participants: Children
The participants for this series of studies were African, Asian and Caucasian children 
between the ages of 3- and 6-years-old. The children were recmited from schools with broad 
catcliment areas that included many ethnic and demographic groups. For ethical reasons the 
names of the participants have been omitted from all experiments.
5.7 General methodology
All experiments were conducted one-on-one with individual children in a separate 
room within each school. The children therefore had to feel comfortable working with the 
researcher, and hence she spent one week at each school before the studies began in order to 
play and interacting with the children. Once the experiments started, each child was given the 
opportunity to choose whether or not they participated in the study on a daily basis. Children
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who did not wish to participate were not forced to do so, nor were they made to feel 
pressurised to take part. If a child declined to take part, they would be asked again on the 
following day. However, if they declined a second time, the child would not be approached 
again (this did not occur frequently).
Once a child had agreed to participate in a study, they followed the experimenter to a 
separate room where other children could not watch or hear the procedure. The apparatus for 
each study was always located on a table, and children were asked to sit on a chair in front of 
the table to watch the demonstrations. In order to keep the methodology of the chimpanzee 
and child experiments as comparable as possible, the children were given very little verbal 
information about each task. If, like the chimpanzees, the children got up and walked around 
the apparatus, or interacted with it during a demonstration, they were not prevented from 
doing so, as this was the case for the chimpanzee participants.
All demonstrations and trials were recorded on a Sony Hi8 video camera that was I
mounted on a tripod within the research room. The camera started recording before each j
child entered the room, and continued to record throughout the experiment. The children’s {
'Jattention was not drawn to the camera (which was usually hidden behind toys and chairs), I1and there was no reason to believe that the children knew their behaviour was being |
recorded. At the end of each experiment, every child was given a reward (usually a small I1toy), and praised for their performance, irrespective of their level of competence. No child aJwas made to feel that their behaviour was different from that of the other children. The child I1was then taken back to their classroom where they typically showed their reward proudly to J
the teachers.
5.8 Data collection and statistical analysis
The experiments in this thesis have been designed to measure the frequencies of 
particular behaviours under different experimental conditions. For example, the number of 
times an individual perfomis behaviour A compared to behaviour B, or the number of times 
an individual is observed to perfomi behaviour C in comparison to the expected frequency.
Thus, the majority of analysis has been perfomied using nominal or frequency data which is
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not normally distributed. Non-parametric statistics have therefore been used because the 
validity of these calculations is not bound by strict assumptions about the distribution of the 
data. When comparing different data populations, median values have been reported as a 
non-parametric measure of the central tendency. For example, the median number of correct 
responses by each individual in group A, compared to the median number of correct 
responses by each individual in group B.
When gi'oup A and group B contain different individuals (a between subjects design) 
a Mann-Whitney t/-test for umnatched samples has been used to deteimine if the two 
populations are significantly different. However, if gioups A and B contain the same 
individuals, tested under different conditions (a within subjects design), a Wilcoxon test for 
matched pairs has been used. These two tests are used most frequently throughout the thesis. 
However, in addition Chi Squared goodness of fit tests have been used to compare observed 
and expected behavioural frequencies, as this calculation makes very few assimiptions about 
the normality of the data. Speaiman’s Ranlc Correlation Coefficients have been used as a 
non-parametric method to analyse the strength of relationships between variables. In all 
cases, unless stated otherwise, the Null Hypothesis has been rejected if the probability that 
the data have been drawn from the same population is calculated to fall below alpha level 
0.05.
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Su m m a r y  of Ch a pt e r  6
The literature indicates that chimpanzees use different social learning strategies to 
solve different types of task (see Chapter 2). Specifically, they tend to employ imitation to 
solve non tool-use tasks, but use non-imitative or emulative learning to solve tasks that do 
involve tool-use. However, instead of assuming that the distinction lies in the difference in 
task domain, it could be that other factors differentiate tool-use and non tool-use tasks. One 
such factor is the availability of causal information. From the definitions of imitation and 
emulation that were given in Chapter 2, it follows that the perception of information about 
causal relationships should be essential for emulation, yet may be less critical for imitation. 
Therefore the availability of causal information may influence chimpanzees to employ either 
imitation or emulation to solve the same task.
In Experiment 1, chimpanzees observed a human demonstrate a tool-use task that 
involved both relevant and irrelevant actions. When the task was presented in a transparent 
condition, so that causal infoimation about the effect of the tool was available, subjects were 
able to selectively exclude the irrelevant actions in favour of a more efficient teclinique, in 
accord with emulation. However, if the availability of causal information was restricted by 
presenting the task in an opaque condition, the chimpanzees reproduced a greater proportion 
of the demonstrated actions, including both relevant and irrelevant paits, in accord with 




E x p e r i m e n t  1: I m i t a t i o n  a n d  e m u l a t i o n  s w i t c h i n g  i n  c h i m p a n z e e s
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapters indicate that chimpanzees use different social learning 
mechanisms to solve different types of problem. Specifically, they seem to use imitation to 
solve problems that do not involve tool-use, and non-imitative or emulative learning to solve 
tool-use tasks. However, the distinction in learning strategy may not be strictly related to the 
task domain. It could be that tool-use and non tool-use tasks differ in other central features 
which relate to the social leaning strategy that chimpanzees employ. One potential feature is 
the availability of causal information, and this will be discussed in more detail below.
The literature suggests that chimpanzee causal knowledge can best be characterised 
by an ability to identify observable patterns of regularity in the environment, which can be 
used to form associations between causes and effects. In comparison, human children appear 
to have a deeper understanding of causality than chimpanzees, as they actively seek 
explanations for observed effects, and are able to infer unobservable mediating forces such as 
gi'avity. Nevertheless, the ability of chimpanzees to extract patterns of regularity and form 
associative rules that can be used in different conditions is all that is required to identify 
many causal features of the world. The causal knowledge of chimpanzees is therefore 
sufficient to warrant a likely involvement in social learning, and it is therefore possible that 
causal infonnation plays a part in determining whether chimpanzees use imitation or 
emulation to solve different types of task.
Emulation can be defined as learning about the results, object movements or 
affordances of a task, but not about the details of the observed behavioui* (see Chapter 2). An 
individual would therefore be expected to learn to use a tool by obseiwing the effect of the 
tool in gaining a reward, and seek to reproduce this outcome using their own efficacious 
actions, such as manipulating the tool with a different hand or arm movement. The critical 
characteristic of emulation is that the obseiwer learns about the enviromnent rather than the 
bodily actions of the model (Tomasello, 1998a).
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In contrast, imitation can be defined as learning about specific aspects of the bodily 
actions of the model. The observer would therefore reproduce a recognisable (if not accurate) 
copy of the original behaviour of the model (Whiten & Ham, 1992). An individual may learn 
to use a tool by observing the effect of the tool in gaining a reward, and then seek to 
reproduce the same effect using the same hand or arm movement as the model. Imitation is 
distinct from emulation in that the behavioural technique of the model is attended to.
Traditionally, imitation has been viewed as the apex of social learning, producing the 
highest fidelity behavioural and enviromnental match to the actions of a model (Galef, 1992; 
Heyes, 1993; Tomasello, Kruger et al., 1993; Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993). 
However, this does not mean that imitation will always be the optimal social learning 
strategy. Tomasello, et al. noted that ‘the most efficient strategy might be to simply observe 
the relation between the tool and the goal and then experiment with the specifics on one’s 
own.’ (1987, p i82). Thus, emulation may be more efficient and flexible in certain situations 
because learning about environmental features, such as results and affordances, might enable 
an individual to generalise socially learned behaviours to different environmental conditions 
and problems (Tomasello et ah, 1987; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1994; Want & Harris, 2001, 
2002).
From the definitions above it follows that the perception of information about causal 
relationships will be essential for emulation, yet may be less critical for imitation (Want & 
Harris, 2001). During emulation an observer must piece together the causal linlcs within a 
task in order to achieve the same result using a different behaviour. In contrast, imitation 
requires only that the observer reproduce the actions of the model with sufficient fidelity to 
recreate the desired outcome, without having to fully appreciate the causal relationships 
involved.
Emulation may therefore be the prefeiTed strategy when critical causal relationships 
are apparent to an observer. In contrast, imitation may be more efficient when such causal 
relationships are not perceivable or are difficult to infer. Imitation may be employed in non 
tool-use studies such as the ‘artificial fruit’ because the causal features of the task may be
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difficult to interpret. The most appropriate way to manipulate a novel object, or remove the 
defences of an ‘artificial fruit’ may therefore be to attend to, and reproduce the actions of the 
demonstrator, in accord with imitation. Imitation may be used to reproduce manual and facial 
gestures because there is no environmental component, and therefore there are no causal 
relationships available to perceive.
In tool-using paradigms, such as the raking study by (Tomasello et ah, 1987), the 
causal relationships that are involved may be more apparent to an observer. Tomasello et al,, 
found that after watching a conspecific use a rake to draw in out-of-reach food, chimpanzees 
used the tool more than a control group who observed the conspecific use the tool in a non­
functional manner. However, they did not reproduce the actions of the model, only the results 
of their behaviour (see Chapter 2). Rather than interpret the results of this study as a deficit in 
imitative learning, it may be that because the chimpanzees could perceive the causal features 
of the task, they adopted emulation as a more appropriate strategy.
If this interpretation is correct, it would be expected that by varying the availability of 
causal information, chimpanzees could be influenced to switch between using imitation or 
emulation to solve the same task. By reducing the availability of causal information it may be 
possible to influence chimpanzees to selectively include parts of a demonstrated behaviour in 
accord with imitation, hi contrast, by increasing the availability causal information, a subject 
could be encouraged to selectively exclude parts of a demonstration in order to develop a 
different or more efficient teclmique, in accord with emulation.
The following experiment was designed to empirically test whether chimpanzees use 
different social learning strategies depending on the availability of causal information. Young 
chimpanzees observed a human demonstrate a tool-use task that contained both relevant and 
irrelevant actions. It was predicted that when appropriate causal information about the task 
was available (by presenting the task in a transparent condition), the chimpanzees would be 
able to use their knowledge of causality to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant 
parts of the demonstration. Chimpanzees would therefore selectively exclude the iiTelevant 
actions so as to develop a different and more efficient technique, in accord with emulation.
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However, if the task was presented in an opaque condition, so that access to causal 
infonnation was restricted, it was predicted that the chimpanzees would reproduce a greater 
proportion of the demonsti ated actions, in accord with imitation.
The methodology for this experiment has been built upon a previous, less successful 
pilot study that was earned out on Ngamba Island between February and April 2000. The 
details of that study can be found in Appendix C.
6.2 Methods
6.2.1 Participants
The participants for this study were 12 members of the juvenile group at Ngamba 
Island, who ranged in age from 2- to 6-years-old at the time of the investigation (Females: 
Pasa 2, Mukisa 3, Yoyo 3, Bili 4, Nkumwa 6; Males: Baluku 3, Indi 3, Asega 3, Yiki 3, 
Umugezi 5, Kalema 6, Umutama 6). The majority of participants arrived at the sanctuary 
between 1999 and 2000, and hence, despite differences in age, had been at the sanctuary for 
approximately the same length of time.
6.2.2 Apparatus
Two structurally identical 20cm^ polycarbonate boxes were used, one clear, the other 
opaque (see Fig. 6.1). On the top of each box was a square hole 3cm x 3cm, covered by a 
‘bolt-defence’ which could be removed to expose a hole. On the front face of the box was a 
square hole 2cm x 2cm, comiected to a sloping opaque tube housed inside the box. This hole 
was covered by a door-defence, described in more detail below. A food reward was placed at 
the bottom of the opaque tube, and could be retrieved by opening the front door, inserting an 
aluminium tool (22cm x 1cm) into the front hole and pulling out the reward. Actions directed 
to the top of the box were not necessary to retrieve the reward. Insertion of the tool in the top 
hole resulted only in hitting a polycarbonate barrier that prevented physical contact between 
the tool and the food tube. Manipulation of the box could therefore be divided into irrelevant 




























Figure 6.1 (a) External view of the clear and opaque boxes, (b) Cut-away diagram of the clear and opaque 
boxes. Note that in both cases the food tube housing the reward is opaque so that the location of the reward 
cannot be directly seen.
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6.2.3 Two-action design
The apparatus incorporated an additional ‘two-action’ design to further investigate the 
importance of imitation (see section 2.4.1). Both the bolt and door defences could be 
removed in one of two ways. The bolt could either be pushed out from the rights or dragged 
out from the left by inserting the tool into a hole at the end of the bolt to reveal the hole 
beneath. The door could either be manually lifted or slid out of the way to reveal the hole 
beneath. Subjects were shown one of two methods of defence removal; method 1 -  push bolt, 
lift door, or method 2 -  drag bolt, slide door (see Fig. 6.2). If subjects performed the obseiwed 
method significantly more than the alternative, this would be a strong indication of imitation 
(Whiten et al., 1996).
In both methods the direction of bolt movement was the same. To control for stimulus 
enliancement, before the bolt was removed, it was hit tlnee times on the opposite end from 
that which would be pushed or dragged (see Fig. 6.3).
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(a) Method 1 - Push bolts /  lift door
I I
PB ITT H3X LD ITF
PB - push bolt with tool from right 
ITT - insert tool into opened top hole
H3X - move tool up and down to hit bottom 3 times
LD - lift open front door




(b) Method 2 - Pull bolts/slide door technique
DB - drag out bolt with tool from left
IT - insert tool into opened top hole
H3X - move tool up and down to hit bottom 3 times
SD - slide open front door
IF - insert tool in front hole
(5==^  ^ - Retrieve reward
Irrelevant actions
Relevant actions
Figure 6.2 Schematic representation o f  the alternative two-action methods o f defence removal, (a) M e th o d  I 
and (b) M e t h o d ! .  The bolt can be pulled or dragged to reveal the hole beneath, and the door can be lifted or slid 
to reveal the food tube behind it. In both cases actions to the top o f the apparatus are causally irrelevant.
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(a) Hitx 3 Push bolt
(b)
Drag bolt
Hi tx  3
Figure 6.3 Schematic representations o f two-action method o f bolt removal, designed to control for stimulus 
enhancement, (a) M e th o d  I  -  Hit bolt on left, push out bolt from right, (b) M e th o d  2  -  Hit bolt on right, drag out 
bolt from left. The bolt can be removed in either way to reveal the irrelevant hole beneath.
6.2.4 Procedure
Subjects observed a human demonstrator use the tool to retrieve a food reward from 
one of the boxes. The demonstration involved two parts; (i) irrelevant actions - removing the 
top bolt and inserting the tool in the top hole and (ii) relevant actions - opening the door and 
inserting the tool in the front hole to retrieve the reward. As noted above, only the relevant 
actions to the front were required to retrieve the reward.
The apparatus was presented in two conditions, opaque and clear (see Fig 6.1). In the 
opaque condition, causal information was unavailable since the surfaces of the box were 
black so that subjects could not see the location of the food tube, or the effect of the tool 
within the apparatus. It was predicted that when the causal information was restricted in this 
way, subjects would selectively include both irrelevant and relevant actions in their own later 
efforts, consistent with imitation.
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In the clear condition, causal information was available, as the effect of the tool inside 
the box could be viewed. It was therefore possible to perceive that actions in the top of the 
box had no causal link with the reward. It was predicted that when causal information was 
available in this way, subjects would be inclined to develop an alternative, more efficient 
strategy by selectively excluding the iiTelevant top actions, consistent with emulation.
In both the opaque and clear conditions the food tube was painted black, so that 
subjects could not see the location of the reward within the apparatus. In addition, the reward 
was wrapped in black plastic so that even if a subject opened the front door and looked down 
the dark tube, they could not see or smell the reward at the bottom.
Subjects were tested individually in Holding Den 1 within the holding facility (see 
Fig. 5.6). Prior to each trial the experimenter entered the room and played with or groomed 
the subject for approximately five minutes. Testing began as soon as the subject was judged 
to be comfortable. The experimenter then moved to the apparatus, which was bolted to a 
bench inside the room. The chimpanzee typically sat close beside, or on the lap of the 
experimenter. In this respect the methodology was naturalistic in that the subject observed 
the demonstration from the same perspective as it was performed, and the proximity of the 
experimenter and subject was analogous to a mother-infant pair.
Following (Whiten, 1998b), each subject received tluee consecutive demonstrations 
before their first trial. They then received a further two demonstrations and two trials:
Demo > Demo > Demo > Trial 1 > Demo > Trial 2 > Demo > Trial 3
Each trial lasted five minutes, or until the subject retrieved the reward, whichever occurred 
first. A second experimenter then re-baited the apparatus while the chimpanzee was 
distracted. To ensure that the subject did not observe the baiting process, they were taken to 
the other side of the room and engaged in a play or grooming session. After trial 3, subjects 
were returned to the holding room for 20-30 minutes before the testing was repeated in the 
alternative condition (opaque or clear; see Fig. 6.4). All demonstrations and trials were 




Figure 6.4 (a) Subject inserts tool into the top irrelevant hole o f the opaque apparatus, (b) Subject inserts tool 
into front relevant hole o f  the clear apparatus to retrieve the food reward.
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Subjects were divided into four groups (see Table 6.1). Groups A and B received 
three trials first with the opaque box (01 -  03) and then three trials with the clear box (Cl -  
C3), to determine whether different social learning strategies were employed in each 
condition. However, it is possible that any change in strategy from opaque to clear condition 
could be due to previous experience with the opaque box. Subjects from groups C and D 
therefore interacted with the clear apparatus first (Cl - C3), then the opaque apparatus (01 -  
03). In order to investigate the role of imitation further, groups A and C observed method 1 
of the two-action alternatives, and groups B and D observed method 2. This can be seen more 


























Male 3yrs Female 6yrs
Mean Age 
3.6 7yrs
Table 6.1 Experimental design for groups A to D. Subjects were matched as far as possible for age and sex. 
Groups A and B worked with the opaque box first (01  to 0 3 )  and then the clear box (C l to C3). Groups C and 
D experienced the reverse order. Groups A and C observed demonstrations o f  m e th o d  I ,  and groups B and D 
observed demonstrations o f m e th o d  2 .
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6.2.5 Coding and data analysis
The video-taped behaviour of each subject was analysed by recording each 
occurrence of the following categories, taken from Figure 6.2:
HBT -  hit bolt with tool (left end, middle, right end)
HBH -  hit bolt with hand (left end, middle, right end)
PB ~ push bolt from right (method 1)
DB -  drag bolt from left (method 2)
ITT -  insert tool in top, ‘irrelevant’ hole
H -  hit Polycarbonate barrier (number of times recorded)
LD -  lift door (method 1)
SD -  slide door (method 2)
ITF -  insert tool in front, ‘relevant’ hole
- retrieve food reward
The proportion of irrelevant actions in each condition was determined by calculating the 
number of tool insertions into the top irrelevant hole (ITT), as a percentage of total tool 
insertions (ITT + ITF). This measure was used because tool insertions could be clearly 
identified and quantified. The percentage of irrelevant tool insertions (ITT) could therefore 
be compared for each group when tested with the opaque and clear apparatus. The data that 
were analysed were frequency data, and hence non-parametric statistics have been used. For 
each chimpanzee, the median percentage of ITT was calculated for the opaque and clear 
conditions. These median values were then compared both within and between groups using 
non-parametric statistics. When the behaviour of individuals from different groups was 
compared (e.g. Group A -  clear condition compared to Group C -  clear condition) a Mann- 
Whitney D-test for unmatched samples has been used to determine if the two populations are 
significantly different. However, when the behaviour of individuals from the same group was 
compared under different conditions (e.g. Group A -  opaque condition compared to Group A 
-  clear) a Wilcoxon test for matched pairs has been used. The remaining codes were used to 




Ten random trials, representing 15 percent of the data, were re-coded by an 
independent obseiwer, naïve to the hypotheses of the experiment. Inter-observer reliability 
was high for both the number of iiTelevant tool insertions (ITT: Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.96) 
and for the number of relevant tool insertions (ITF: Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.99). With the 
exception of Yiki, Mukisa and Indi, all subjects were successful in retrieving the reward. 
These three subjects had difficulty retrieving the reward only because they mashed it into the 
bottom of the tube with the tool, and were not able to lever it out. They were not unsuccessful 
because they used a different overall technique. Success rate was not analysed, because the 
purpose of this study was to detennine the teclmique that the subjects used to reach the 
reward following observation. Medians have been quoted as a non-parametric measure of the 
central tendency.
6.3.1 Experimental groups
There was no significant difference in the number of irrelevant actions (ITT) 
perfoimed by subjects in groups A and B, who interacted with the opaque box first (median 
A “  21.25, median B = 35.06; Mann-Wliitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z = -0.66, Ni = 
3, N2 = 3, p = 0.7, two-tailed). Similarly, there was no significant difference in the production 
of irrelevant actions (ITF) by subjects from groups C and D, who interacted firstly with the 
clear box (median C = 0, median D = 15.48; Maim-Whitney [/-test for umnatched samples, z 
= -0.69, Ni = 3, N2 = 3, p = 0.7, two-tailed). Two collapsed groups, A/B (opaque > clear) and 
C/D (clear > opaque) have therefore been used for the following analysis.
6.3.2 Reproduction o f relevant and irrelevant actions
Subjects from group A/B inserted the tool into the top irrelevant hole significantly 
more with the opaque apparatus than with the clear apparatus (median A/B opaque = 59.05, 
median A/B clear = 6.25; Wilcoxon test for matched pairs, z = -2.20, N-ties = 6, p = 0.03, 
two-tailed; see Fig. 6.5). Subjects from group C/D, who were presented with the clear box 
first, did not perfonn significantly differently from gioup A/B with the clear box (median 
A/B clear = 6.25, median C/D clear = 0; Maim-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z = - 
0.36, Ni = 6, N2 = 6, p = 0.72, two-tailed). However, there was a significant difference in the
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performance of group A/B with the opaque box when compared to group C/D with the clear 
box (median A/B opaque = 59.05, median C/D clear = 0; z = -2.61, N] = 6, N2 = 6, p = 0.01, 
two-tailed). This suggests that the change in behaviour of group A/B from the opaque to the 
clear apparatus was not the result of previous experience with the opaque box. Therefore 
subjects from group A/B showed a tendency to ignore the irrelevant actions significantly 
more with the clear apparatus (see Fig. 6.5).
When subjects from group C/D then transferred from the clear box to the opaque box, 
although there was a slight increase in the reproduction of irrelevant actions, this was not 
significant (median C/D clear = 0, median C/D opaque = 8.34; Wilcoxon test for matched 
pairs, z = -1.60, N-ties = 3, p = 0.11, two-tailed). The data suggest that subjects generally 
continued to ignore the irrelevant top actions with the opaque box, indicating that they were 
able to generalise their previous causal knowledge about the apparatus to the new 
experimental condition (compare A/B and C/D in Fig. 6.5).
■  Opaque 
□ Clear
A/B C/D
Figure 6.5 The median percentage o f  tool insertions into the top, irrelevant hole by subjects from groups A/B 
and C/D in both the opaque and clear conditions. Enor bars represent the inter-quartile range.
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6.3.3 Reproduction o f two-action method o f door removal
Subjects from groups A and C (A/C) who observed method 1 to remove the door 
defence (lift door), employed this technique significantly more than subjects from groups B 
and D (B/D) who observed method 2 -  slide door (median percentage lift door A/C =  96.36 , 
median B/D = 33.33; Mann-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z =  -2 .01 , Ni =  6, N2 =  
6, p = 0.04, two-tailed; see Fig. 6.6). This effect was confirmed by an independent coder who 
was able to correctly identify the method of door removal observed by six randomly selected 
subjects (6 /6 , two-choice binomial, p = 0.03). Similarly, subjects from group B/D, who 
observed method 2 (slide door), employed this technique significantly more then subjects in 
group A/C who observed method 1 - lift door (median percentage slide door B/D = 61.34 , 
median A/C = 8.74; Mann-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z = -2 .01 , Ni = 6, N2 = 6, 








■  Group A/C (method 1) 
□  Group B/D (method 2)
Opaque Clear Total
Experimental conditimi
Figure 6.6 Median percentage o f lift door { m e th o d  I )  used by group A/C who saw m e th o d  / ,  and group B/D  
who saw m e t h o d  2 .  Error bars represent the inter quartile range.
In order to assess whether the order of presentation of the opaque and clear boxes 
affected subjects’ tendency to reproduce the demonstrated method of door removal, a mean 
percentage of ‘correct’ door removal was calculated for each group. For group A/C ‘correct’ 
door removal was method 1 (lift door), and for group B/D ‘correct’ door removal was method 
2 (slide door). It was found that the order of presentation had no significant effect on
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subjects’ tendency to reproduce the demonstrated actions. There was no significant 
difference in the performance of subjects from group A/B who were presented with the 
opaque box first, and group C/D who used the opaque box last (median A/B = 98.05, median 
C/D = 83.36; Mann-Whitney [/-test for umnatched samples, z = -0.08, Ni = 6, N2 = 6, p = 
0.94, two-tailed). Similarly, there was no significant difference in the performance of group 
A/B who used the clear box last, and group C/D who used the clear box first (median A/B = 
63.42, median C/D = 73.35; Maim-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z = -0.65, Ni = 6, 
N2 = 6, p = 0.59, two-tailed).
6.3.4 Reproduction o f two-action method o f bolt removal
The results for bolt removal are not so clear. All subjects performed a large number of 
actions to the bolt using both the tool and their hands. However, the majority of subjects 
discovered that the tool could be inserted into the top irrelevant hole tlnough a small gap 
behind the bolt, and it was therefore not necessary to remove the bolt in order to insert the 
tool. Nevertheless, five subjects were observed to remove the bolt defence, four from group 
A/C and one from group B/D. However, they did not consistently use the obseiwed method, 
and unfortunately there were insufficient data to perfoim statistical analysis. Although only 
five subjects successfully removed the bolt, it is possible that the other subjects were 
influenced by the demonstration, but did not, or could not completely remove the defense. 
However, detailed analysis revealed that subjects performed actions to the middle area of the 
bolt, which was not part of the demonstrated method, as often as they perfoimed actions to 
either end (x  ^= 0.63, df ~ 2, p = 0.73). In addition, there was no significant difference in the 
order in which each part of the bolt was contacted (x  ^ = 0.09, df = 2, p = 0.96). The large 
number of actions to the middle of the bolt suggests that these actions were exploratory, and 
subjects were not influenced by the two-action demonstration that had been observed.
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6.4 Discussion of Experiment 1
6.4.1 Reproduction o f irrelevant actions
Subjects from group A/B, who interacted first with the opaque box, perfoimed 
significantly more inelevant actions in the opaque condition than in the clear condition (see 
Fig. 6.5). In each condition both the structure of the apparatus and the observed 
demonstrations were identical. The only difference between the two conditions was whether 
the box was clear or opaque, and hence the availability of causal information.
Non-social learning camiot explain the results. The food tube in which the reward was 
located and the reward itself were opaque in both conditions, so subjects could not see the 
food directly, and hence food targeting camiot explain why subjects only reproduced relevant 
actions in the clear condition. Therefore, information about the location of the reward must 
have been gained by obseiwation of the demonstrator’s behaviour. Additionally, subjects’ 
tendencies to include or exclude the inelevant actions were present from trial 1. In each case 
there was no opportunity before the first trial to discover the causal features of the task by 
individual learning, and therefore the selective inclusion or exclusion of parts of the 
demonstration must be due to information that was gained by obseiwation.
It is difficult to explain the selective inclusion of non-functional, irrelevant actions in 
the opaque condition by any means other than imitation. Alternative foims of social learning 
specify that the observer attempts to recreate the outcome or the demonstrator’s actions using 
a lower fidelity strategy. The only outcome produced by the irrelevant actions was hitting the 
concealed barrier, which did not in itself result in a salient reward (i.e. the food reward). If 
subjects were attempting to reproduce this outcome for its own sake, they would be expected 
to continue to do so in the clear condition. However, the reproduction of irrelevant actions 
decreased significantly in the clear condition (see below). Moreover, subjects showed a 
significant tendency to use the obseiwed two-action method of door removal, indicating that 
imitation was employed at this detailed level. The behaviour of subjects from group A/B in 
the opaque condition, where causal information was unavailable is therefore most consistent 
with imitative learning.
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When the same subjects transferred to the clear box, there was a significant drop in 
the reproduction of irrelevant actions. This change in behaviour was not the result of prior 
exposure to the apparatus, as group C/D, who interacted first with the clear box, perfoimed in 
a similar way (see Fig. 6.5). Again, the only difference between the two conditions was the 
availability of causal information. It is therefore likely that when exposed to the clear box, 
both groups A/B and C/D were able to utilise the available causal information to differentiate 
the irrelevant parts of the demonstration, and selectively exclude these actions in favour of a 
more efficient teclmique. This finding corroborates the results of Nagell, Olguin & 
Tomasello (1993), who found that chimpanzees used emulation to solve a tool-use task 
insofar as they ignored the inelevant parts of a demonstration in favour of a more efficient 
technique, hi their study, chimpanzees observed a human demonstrator use a rake to retrieve 
a desirable, but out of reach object. Chimpanzees who observed the demonstrator retrieve the 
rewai'd performed significantly better than a control group who did not receive a 
demonstration. However, the chimpanzees did not always use the same teclmique as the 
demonstrator. They learned to flip the rake onto its flat edge rather than using the widely 
spaced teeth, increasing the efficiency of the tool. It seemed that “the chimpanzees were 
paying attention to the general functional relations in the task and to the results obtained by 
the demonstrator but not to the actual methods of tool use demonstrated” page 174. In the 
same sense, the perfoimance of subjects in the present study from group A/B and C/D in the 
clear condition (where causal infonnation was available), is most consistent with emulation, 
insofar as the chimpanzees ignored the actions of the demonstrator in favour of a more 
efficient technique.
When subjects from group C/D were then presented with the opaque box, they 
continued to selectively exclude the irrelevant actions, although the opportunity to monitor 
the causal role of the tool had been removed. This suggests that the chimpanzees may have 




The chimpanzees showed a significant tendency to use the observed two-action 
method of door defence removal (see Fig. 6.6). Since the method used to remove each 
defence was arbitrary, reproduction of the observed technique is viewed as an indicator of 
imitation (Whiten et al., 1996). Only five subjects successfully removed the bolt, but did not 
consistently use the obseiwed two-action method. The majority of subjects discovered that it 
was possible to insert the tool into the top hole through a small space behind the bolt, 
rendering the removal of the bolt redundant. It is therefore not siuprising that subjects did not 
consistently attend to this feature of the demonstration. Indeed, this observation provides 
additional evidence that subjects were sensitive to the causal relevance of the actions they 
observed. These conclusions are discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.
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S u m m ary of C h a p te r  7
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that chimpanzees were able to selectively ignore 
the irrelevant actions when the apparatus was presented in the clear condition, because they 
saw and understood that the tool did not make contact with the reward. However, Experiment 
1 did not directly demonstrate this understanding. Experiment 2 was designed to test the 
chimpanzee’s knowledge of the importance of contact between a tool and a reward when 
tested in a different context.
The same 12 chimpanzees who participated in Experiment 1 were presented with a 
pair of rakes that could be pulled in to potentially retrieve a food reward. However, only one 
of the rakes was in contact with the reward, or was in such a position so that if the rake were 
pulled, it would make contact with reward and drag it in. The other rake was not in contact 
with the reward, or was in such a position that even if the rake were pulled, it would not 
make contact with the reward, and therefore could not be used to retrieve it.
The chimpanzees were able to select the correct rake in each of ten pairs, significantly 
more often than would be expected by chance. There was no evidence of a learning effect, 
nor was the age of the subjects related to their performance. The chimpanzees may have 
performed so well because they came to the experiment with prior knowledge about contact 
that they had gained tluough previous experience with tools. Nevertheless, appreciating that a 
tool must make contact with a reward in order to bring about an effect, is all that is required 
to differentiate the causally relevant and irxelevant features of Experiment 1.
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CHAPTER 7
E x p e r im e n t  2: K n o w l e d g e  o f  t o o l - r e w a r d  c o n t a c t  in  c h im p a n z e e s
7.1 Introduction
One hypothesis that may explain the results of Experiment 1 is that the chimpanzees 
ignored the irrelevant actions in the clear condition because they saw, and understood that the 
tool could not make physical contact with the reward. However, Experiment 1 did not 
directly show that such an appreciation existed. The following experiment was designed to 
determine whether there was evidence that subjects showed causal knowledge of the 
significance of tool-reward contact, tested in a different context.
7.2 Methods
7.2.1 Subjects
Subjects were the same 12 chimpanzees who participated in the previous experiment. 
This experiment was conducted one week following the completion of Experiment 1.
7.2.2 Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of two identical rakes with wooden handles and metal 
raking-heads. Both rakes were 98cm in length with a raking-head width of 25cm (see Fig. 
7.1).
98cm




The rakes were placed on the ground, one metre from the holding facility for 24 hours 
prior to the start of the experiment. This allowed subjects to view the apparatus and reduce 
potential neophobic responses. During testing, the rakes were placed outside the research 
room (see Fig. 5.6) with the handle protiuding 10cm tlirough the bars into the room, so that 
subjects could pull the rakes toward them. The metal raking heads were sufficiently heavy 
that the rakes could not be freely manipulated or easily lifted off the ground, encouraging the 
chimpanzees to only pull the rakes towards them. One rake was in physical contact with a 
food reward, or in a configuration that would make contact with the reward if the rake were 
pulled. The other rake did not make contact with the reward, or was positioned so that if 
pulled, the raking-head would not contact the reward. Hence, in each trial there was only one 
correct choice of rake. The ability of subjects to select the correct rake was therefore 
dependent on recognition that the tool must make physical contact with the reward in order to 
have a salient effect. Each subject received ten trials, presented in one session, each with a 
different choice of rake/reward configuration (see Fig. 7.2). In every trial the position of the 
food reward, and side of correct choice was randomised. The food reward was always placed 
on the inside of the rake handle, as it would have been hidden from the subject’s line of sight 
if placed on the outside of the rake.
7.2.4 Data collection and statistical analysis
Data were collected concerning the first tool choice by subjects for each trial. 
Subjects were allowed to select one rake and pull it towards them. If the correct rake was 
selected first, the subject was allowed to pull it in and retrieve the reward. If the wrong rake 
was selected first, the subject was allowed to pull it in and fail. In both conditions, once one 
rake had been pulled, both rakes were removed and the trial was terminated. During each trial 
an experimenter was present in the research room with the subject. Trials began once the 
subject was comfortable, usually after a period of approximately five minutes of grooming 
and playing. During each trial the experimenter sat behind the subject exactly between the 
two rakes (see Fig. 7.3). A second experimenter, outside the research room was responsible 
for setting up the apparatus for each new trial. All trials were recorded on a Sony Hi8 video 
camera mounted on a tripod outside the room (see Figure 7.4).
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The data were analysed by comparing the number of coiTect tool choices that each 
subject made, to the number of conect choices that an individual would be expected to make 
by chance. A Chi Squared Goodness-of-fit test was used for this calculation because it does 
not malce restrictive assumptions about the normality of the data.
In order to detennine whether the chimpanzees showed evidence of a learning effect, 
a Speaiman’s Ranlc Correlation Coefficient was used to determine whether there was a 
significant relationship between the number of conect responses and the trial number. This 














Figure 7.2 Schema,k  diagram o f  tool/reward choices presented in Experiment 2 (vietved tfom above). The ftst 
experimenter sits behind the subject, exactly between the two rakes.
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Figure 7 3  Subject selects the correct tool to retrieve the food reward.
Experimenter 1
Subject
Experimenter 2 Video Camera
Figure 7.4 Experimental set-up for Experiment 2. The fist experimenter was present in the research room with 
the subject. A second experimenter outside the room was responsible for video recording, and setting up the 
apparatus between trails.
7.3 Results
The correct tool was chosen significantly more than would be expected by chance 
(median percentage correct = 80, median chance = 50; Wilcoxon test for matched pairs, z = - 
2.82, N-ties = 10, p = 0.01, two-tailed; see Fig. 7.5). Two subjects had a perfect score, and 
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Figure 7.5 Mean percentage o f correct and incorrect tool choices made by subjects for trials 1 to 10.
There was no evidence of a learning effect across the 10 trials. In fact, statistical 
analysis revealed that the chimpanzees found the last three trials more difficult that the rest 
(Spearmans rho = -0.78, N = 10, p = 0.008; see Fig. 7.6). There was also no discernible 
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Figure 7.6 Number of chimpanzees who chose the correct rake on each of tlie 10 trials. The line represents the 
line of ‘best fit’.
7,4 Discussion of Experiment 2
The primary purpose of this experiment was to determine whether chimpanzees 
recognised that a tool must contact an object before it can effect it. The results indicate that 
as a group, the chimpanzees could select the tool that was in contact, or had the potential to 
make contact with the reward, significantly more than the incorrect alternative. Two subjects 
chose correctly on every trial and three subjects made only one error. The results are 
consistent with Povinelli (2000) and Kdhler (1927), who reported that although chimpanzees 
found it difficult to discriminate between physically comiected objects and objects that were 
simply touching, they could correctly select tools that were in contact, or had the potential to 
make contact with a reward. The chimpanzees in the present study may have come to the 
experiment with prior knowledge about tool/reward contact gained from previous experience, 
and were able to adapt this knowledge to the new situation. Nevertheless, appreciating that a 
tool must make contact with a reward in a causally relevant way, is all that is required to 
differentiate the relevant and irrelevant features of Experiment 1. It seems likely that the 
ability of subjects in Experiment 1 to determine by obseiwation that actions to the top of the 
clear box were irrelevant, was based on recognition that if the tool did not contact the reward, 
it could not bring about a salient effect. These conclusions are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 10.
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Su m m a r y  of Ch a pt e r  8
In Experiment 1, actions to the top of the box were causally iiTclevant because a clear 
plastic barrier prevented the tool from making contact with the reward. Experiment 2 
indicated that the chimpanzees understood the importance of tool/reward contact, but did not 
show that they understood that contact was prevented by the barrier. Experiment 3 was 
designed to test the chimpanzees understanding of barriers in a different context.
The same chimpanzees who participated in the previous experiments were presented 
with a choice of eight pairs of boxes that contained a food reward. One of the boxes in each 
pair had a barrier across the front of the box so that access to the reward was prevented. The 
other box had an open front so that the reward could be retrieved with a tool.
Subjects were able to select the correct box significantly more often that the incoiTect 
alternative. There was no evidence of a learning effect, and the age of the subjects did not 
influence their perfomiance. Like Experiment 2, the chimpanzees may have had prior 
knowledge about the properties of baniers.
The combined results of Experiments 2 and 3 indicate that in Experiment 1, the 
chimpanzees were able to ignore the irrelevant actions because they recognised that the tool 
must make contact with the reward, and that contact was prevented by the clear barrier.
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CHAPTER 8
E x p e r im e n t  3: K n o w l e d g e  o f  b a r r ie r s  in  c h im p a n z e e s
8.1 Introduction
In Experiment 1, a clear polycarbonate barrier prevented contact between the tool and 
the reward. Experiment 2 indicates that subjects had knowledge about the necessity of tool- 
reward contact. The following experiment was designed to determine whether subjects 
recognised that clear barriers would prevent contact between a tool and reward.
8.2 Methods
8.2.1 Subjects
Subjects were the same 12 chimpanzees who participated in the previous 
experiments. This experiment was conducted one week after Experiment 2.
8.2.2 Apparatus
Two identical boxes were used to test subjects understanding of barriers. Each box 
was composed of a welded steel fi-ame with transparent Perspex panels on three of the four 
sides. The panels were scratched slightly so that they were visible, and a rake was placed in 
front of each box. The rakes were the same rakes as in Experiment 2, however, the handle 






Figure 8.1 Experimental apparatus used in Experiment 3. Subjects were presented simultaneously with two 
identical boxes and rakes.
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8.2.3 Procedure
The apparatus was left outside the holding facility for a period of 24 hours prior to the 
start of the experiment, to allow subjects to become familiar with the apparatus, and reduce 
the potential for neophobic responses. The procedure for this experiment was very similar to 
Experiment 2, in that subjects were presented with a choice of two configurations, only one 
of which could yield a reward. In this case, both boxes contained a visible piece of banana, 
but in one box access to the reward was prevented by a Perspex barrier. Subjects therefore 
had to select the rake in front of the correct box to retrieve the reward. Subjects were 
presented with 8 pairs of choices in one session. In some trials, one box was positioned with 
an open fi.*ont and the other with a Perspex front, so that only one box could yield a reward. In 
other trials, both boxes had Perspex baniers, but one box had food located outside. The 
position of the reward relative to the box was randomised (see Fig. 8.2). Subjects were tested 
individually within the research room (see Fig. 5.6).
8.2.4 Data collection and statistical analysis
Data were collected concerning the first tool choice by each subject for every trial. If 
the correct rake was selected first, the subject was allowed to use it to retrieve the reward (see 
Fig. 8.3). If the wrong rake was selected first, the subject was allowed to use it to hit the 
barrier and fail. Both rakes were then removed and the trial was tenninated.
In some cases, the younger subjects found that the smaller rakes were still too heavy 
to pick them up and manipulate inside the boxes. These individuals often indicated a choice 
by attempting but failing to use the correct rake. Subjects were not penalised for a lack of 
physical strength, and were rewarded for indicating the correct box, as this demonstrated an 
ability to discriminate whether the reward was accessible or not. An experimenter was 
present in the research room with each subject, and set behind the subject between the two 
boxes during every trial. A second experimenter was outside the room and was responsible 
for removing the rakes and setting up the apparatus between trials. Each trial was recorded on 
a Sony Hi8 video camera situated outside the room.
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The data were analysed by comparing the number of correct tool choices that each 
subject made, to the number of coiTect choices that an individual would be expected to make 
by chance. A Chi Squared Goodness-of-fit test was used for this calculation because it does 
not make restrictive assumptions about the normality of the data.
In order to detemiine whether the chimpanzees showed evidence of a learning effect, 
a Spearman’s Ranlc Conelation Coefficient was used to determine whether there was a 
significant relationship between the number of correct responses and the trial number. This 
non-parametric test was used because frequency data does not have a noiinal distribution 
pattern.
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Figure 8.2 Schematic representation o f  tool/reward choices viewed from subjects’ perspective in Experiment 3. 
The shaded boxes indicate conditions were a Perspex barrier prevented contact between the tool and the reward.
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Figure 8.3 Subject chooses the correct rake, and retrieve food reward from one o f the experimental boxes.
8.3 Results
Subjects chose the correct tool significantly more than would be expected by chance 
(median percentage correct = 75, median chance = 50; Wilcoxon test for matched pairs, z = - 
2.97, N-ties = 11, p < 0.01, two-tailed; see Fig. 8.4). Three subjects chose the correct box on 
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Figure 8.4 Mean percentage o f  correct and incorrect tool choices made by subjects for trials 1 to 8.
There was no evidence of a learning effect across the eight trials (Spearmans rho = 
0.08, N = 8, p = 0.86; see Fig. 8.5), nor was there a relationship between the age of the 
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Figure 8.5 Number o f chimpanzees who chose the correct rake on each o f the 8 trials. The line represents that 
‘best fit’.
97 }I8.4 Discussion of Experiment 3 j
The results of this experiment indicate that chimpanzees appreciated that the Perspex )
barrier would prevent access to the food reward and were able to select the coiTect box j
accordingly. Three subjects chose the correct box on every trial, suggesting that subjects may |!have come to the experiment with previous knowledge about the properties of the tool, and |
barriers. As with Experiment 2, they were able to use this knowledge to form rules specific to 
the task that enabled the group as a whole to choose the correct box significantly more often 
than chance.
The combined results of Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that in Experiment 1, subjects 
were able to determine by observation that actions to the top of the clear box were irrelevant, 
because they recognised that the tool must contact the reward in order to bring about a salient 
result, and that contact was prevented by the physical banier. These conclusions are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.
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S u m m ary of  C h a p te r  9
This experiment was carried out as a replication of Experiment 1, to determine 
whether, like chimpanzees, children could be influenced to switch between using imitation or 
emulation by altering the availability of causal information. However, the results indicate that 
3- to 4-year-old children reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant actions, irrespective of 
the clear or opaque condition of the apparatus. The inclusion of functionally iiTelevant 
actions, coupled with the high fidelity reproduction of the observed two-action method of 
bolt and door removal, suggest that children employed imitation to retrieve the reward in 
both conditions.
The condition of the apparatus, and hence the availability of causal information, did 
not influence the social learning strategy that children employed to solve this task. The 
results were not affected by either the age or the sex of the participants.
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CHAPTER 9
E x p e r i m e n t  4 : I m i t a t i o n  a n d  e m u l a t i o n  s w i t c h i n g  i n  c h i l d r e n
9.1 Introduction
The previous experiments suggest that causal infonnation may play an important role 
in chimpanzee social learning. The literature shows that children can learn socially and have 
a relatively sophisticated understanding of causality (see Chapter 4). However, there is little 
evidence that children can use this understanding to learn by emulation (Want & Hams, 
2001). The following experiment was conducted as a replication of Experiment 1, to assess 
whether, when tested under similar conditions to the chimpanzees, children could be 
influenced to switch between imitation and emulation to solve the same task.
9.2 Methods
9.2.1 Participants
Participants were 16 children, eight female, eight male, aged between 3 years 5 
months and 4 years 11 months old (mean: 4 years 1 month). The participants were African, 
Asian and Caucasian children recruited from St Andiews University Day Nursery, St 
Andrews, UK and Menzieshill Nursery School, Dundee, UK, following the completion of a 
letter of parental consent (see Appendix B). Children of this age were selected because 
previous studies have indicated that this age gioup can provide informative comparative data 
in relation to social learning (Whiten et al., 1996).
9.2.2 Apparatus
The boxes used in this experiment were identical to those used in Experiment 1 (see 
page 66). However, certain features were modified to make the task more suitable for 
children: (i) the reward was a Velcro-backed cartoon sticker, and (ii) the end of the tool was 




The experiment was conducted as far as possible following the same procedures as 
Experiment 1. The experimenter spent time at the playgroup prior to the investigation, so that 
the children would feel comfortable participating in the study. Children were tested 
individually in a separate room from the rest of the class. The apparatus was set up on a small 
table, and each child sat at the table on a chair beside the experimenter. Children and 
chimpanzees therefore obseiwed the demonstrations from the same perspective.
During a pilot study, children told the experimenter that they believed the game to be 
about copying the demonstrations, and were eager to show her how well they could copy 
what she did. It was felt that the presence of the demonstrator was influencing the children’s 
perception of tlie task, and hence two important differences in the procedure were introduced. 
Firstly, during each trial, the experimenter left the room while the subject interacted with the 
apparatus. This was thought to be the most effective way to reduce any tendency to copy the 
experimenter through social conforming, which may have masked any underlying 
appreciation of the causal features of the task.^
Secondly, children were told that they could do whatever they thought necessary to 
get the sticker, and that the experimenter would be outside the room and could not see what 
they did. When they had successfully retrieved the reward they were told to shout T’ve got 
it! ’ At this point the experimenter would return and give them their reward.
A video camera was set up at the back of the room behind toys and chairs so that it 
could not be easily seen. The camera stalled recording before each child entered the room, 
and continued to record tliroughout the experiment. At no point was the child’s attention 
drawn to the camera, and there was no reason to believe that the children Imew that their 
actions were being recorded. Indeed, after retrieving the reward, children typically replaced 
the bolt and door defences to their original position before calling the experimenter, thereby 
masking any visible evidence of their actions. The children were allocated to the same four
 ^ The pilot study also indicated that children tended to imitate regardless of whether (i) the experimenter was 
present or absent in the room, (ii) a glove puppet was used as the model, (iii) they were given no verbal 
instructions at all, or (iv) tliey were given limited verbal instmction.
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groups as the chimpanzees in Experiment 1, with four individuals in each (see Table 9.1). For 
ethical reasons the names of the participants have been omitted. The data was analysed using 
the same non-parametric statistics that were used in Experiment 1 with the chimpanzees (see 
section 6.2.5 for more details).
CZZZZ3>
Method 1
Female 3yrs Male 3yrs Female 4yrs Male 4yrs
B gR Method 2
Female 3yrs Male 3yrs Female 4yrs Male 4yrs
Method 1
Female 4yrs Male 3yrs Female 4yrs Male 4yrs
D Method 2
Female 2yrs Male 3yrs Female 4yrs Male 4yrs
Table 9.1 Experimental groups A to D. The names o f  the children have been omitted for ethical reasons.
9.3 Results
9.3.1 Experimental groups
There was no significant difference in the reproduction of irrelevant actions between 
subjects from groups A and B (median A = 77.5, median B = 72.92; Mann-Whitney U-test 
for unmatched samples, z = -2.08, Ni = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.06, two-tailed), or between groups C 
and D (median C = 78.33, median D = 77.5; Mann-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z 
= -0.3, Ni = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.87, two-tailed). Two collapsed groups, A/B (opaque > clear) and 
C/D (clear > opaque) have therefore been used for the following analysis.
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The reproduction of irrelevant actions was not influenced by age (median A/B 3-year- 
olds = 75, 4-year-olds = 74.17, Mann-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z = -0.6, Ni = 
4, N2 = 4, p = 0.69, two-tailed; median C/D 3-year-olds = 78.33, 4-year-olds = 77.5, z = - 
0.15, N] = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.39, two-tailed). Nor was perfomiance influenced by sex (median 
A/B female = 75, male = 76.25; Mami-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z = -0.74, N; 
= 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.49, two-tailed; median C/D female = 80, male = 75; z = -2.08, Ni = 4, N2 = 
4, p = 0.6, two-tailed).
9.3.2 Reproduction o f relevant and irrelevant actions
There was no significant difference in the reproduction of irrelevant actions by 
children from group A/B in the opaque and clear conditions (median A/B opaque = 70.84, 
median A/B clear = 80; Wilcoxon test for matched pairs, z -  -1.53, N-ties = 7, p = 0.13, two- 
tailed; see Fig. 9.1). Therefore the opaque or clear appearance of the apparatus (and hence the 
availability of causal information), did not effect the children’s behaviour.
There was no significant difference in the reproduction of irrelevant actions by 
children from group C/D with the clear box, when compared to group A/B in either condition 
(x  ^= 4.8, df = 2, p = 0.09 two-tailed; see Fig. 9.1). Therefore, children from group A/B did 
not alter their behaviour between experimental conditions, and this was not influenced by 
previous experience with the opaque apparatus. When children from group C/D then 
transferred to the opaque apparatus there was no significant change in their behaviour 
(median C/D clear = 75, median C/D opaque = 80; Wilcoxon test for matched pairs z = -1.83, 
N-ties = 4, p = 0.07, two-tailed). Therefore, like gi'oup A/B, the opaque or clear appearance 







Figure 9.1 The median percentage of tool insertions into the top, irrelevant hole by subjects from groups A/B 
and C/D in both the opaque and clear conditions. Error bars represent the inter-quartile range.
9.3.3 Reproduction o f two-action method o f bolt removal
Children from groups A and C (A/C), who observed method 1 (push bolt), employed 
this technique significantly more than children from groups B and D (B/D) who observed 
method 2 (median A/C = 100, median B/D = 0, Mann-Whitney [/-test for unmatched 
samples, z = -3.57, Ni = 8, N2 = 8, p < 0.001, two-tailed; see Fig. 9.2). Similarly, children 
from group B/D who observed method 2, employed this technique significantly more than 
subjects in group A/C who saw method 1 (median B/D = 91.66, median A/C = 0; z = -3.57, 
Ni = 8, N2 = 8, p < 0.001, two-tailed).
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Figure 9.2 Median percentage of method / (push bolt), use by subjects from groups A and C who observed 
method /, and groups B and D who observed method 2.
9.3.4 Reproduction o f two-action door removal
Children from group A/C, who observed method 1 (lift door), employed this 
technique significantly more than children from group B/D who observed method 2 (median 
A/C = 100, median B/D = 0; z = -3.65, Ni = 8, N2 = 7, p < 0.001, two-tailed). Similarly, 
children from group B/D who observed method 2, employed this technique significantly 
more than subjects in group A/C who saw method 1 (median B/D = 91.66, median A/C = 0; z 
= -3.65, N| = 8, N2 = 8, p < 0.001, two-tailed). Children therefore used the observed method 
of both bolt and door removal significantly more than the alternative.
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9.4 Discussion of Experiment 4
The results of this experiment indicate that 3- and 4-year-old children reproduced 
both the irrelevant and relevant actions, irrespective of whether the apparatus was opaque or 
clear, or the order in which the apparatus was presented (see Fig 9.1). This suggests that the 
availability of causal information did not influence the social learning strategy that children 
employed. The inclusion of functionally inelevant actions, coupled with the high fidelity 
reproduction of the observed two-action methods of both bolt and door defence removal (see 
Fig. 9.2), suggest that children relied strongly on imitation to retrieve the reward in both 
conditions. The tendency to imitate was not influenced by either the age or the sex of the 
childien. These conclusions are discussed more fully in Chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 10
G e n e r a l  d is c u s s io n  o f  E x p e r im e n t s  1 t o  4
10.1 Causal information and chimpanzee social learning
Experiment 1 suggests that chimpanzees who interacted first with the opaque box, in 
which causal information was unavailable, typically used imitation to retrieve the reward. 
Chimpanzees performed a more complete copy of the model’s behaviour by including the 
irrelevant parts of the demonstration. These subjects tended to switch to emulation when 
presented with the clear apparatus, in the sense defined by Nagell, Olguin and Tomasello 
(1993), insofar as “the chimpanzees were paying attention to the general functional relations 
in the task and to the results obtained by the demonstrator but not to the actual methods of 
tool use demonstrated” page 174. See section 6.4.1 for more details. Chimpanzees, who 
interacted with the clear apparatus first, also used emulation to retrieve the reward, and 
continued to do so when presented with the opaque apparatus, although the opportunity to 
monitor the effect of the tool inside the apparatus had been removed. This suggests that they 
may have been able to generalise the information gained tlnough experience with the clear 
box to the new experimental condition.
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that in Experiment 1, the chimpanzees 
were able to determine that actions to the top of the box were inelevant, because they 
recognised that the tool must make contact with the reward, and that contact was prevented 
by the barrier. These studies do not provide evidence about the source of this Imowledge. 
However, even if this knowledge is the result of associative learning gained thi'ough previous 
experience, it does not diminish the potentially important role of causal infonnation in 
chimpanzee social learning. Appreciating that the tool must make some relevant contact with 
a reward is all that is required to differentiate the relevant and irrelevant aspects of the 
observed behaviour in Experiment 1.
Therefore, the notion that commonly arises in the literature, which suggests that the 
predominant use of emulation by chimpanzees indicates a deficit of imitation, may be 
misleading. The results of these experiments suggest more generally that when chimpanzees
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have access to causal information, they may use this infonnation to develop the most 
efficient teclmique, in accord with emulation. Furthemiore, they may be able to generalise 
their existing causal Imowledge to new situations. However, when causal information is 
restricted, and they are prevented from using alternative, more flexible forms of social 
learning, they can employ imitation to solve all, or part of a problem. Therefore causal 
infonnation may play an important role in chimpanzee social learning by allowing 
individuals to identify the relevant aspects of a demonstration, which in turn determines the 
strategy that is employed, and ultimately the degree of behavioural fidelity which is achieved.
One of the recent criticisms of the concept of emulation in the literature is that it has 
been defined almost as a null hypothesis. Emulation is often claimed when apes show no 
evidence of imitation, but seem to learn more than would be expected through enhancement. 
Hence, emulation has not been empirically demonstrated in its own right (Byiiie, 2002). 
These experiments offer the first empirical evidence for the existence of emulation as a 
viable social learning strategy in chimpanzees, and show that the occurrence of emulation 
can be determined by the use of information about causal relationships.
The ability of chimpanzees to switch from a strategy of imitation to emulation 
contrasts with the findings of a study by Call & Tomasello (1995). Orangutans obseiwed both 
a human and conspecific demonstrator perform a number of actions to retrieve a food reward 
from an opaque box. As with the opaque box in the present study, the causal role of these 
actions on the reward could not be perceived. However, it was found that subjects failed to 
solve tliis task. Since emulation could not be used to retrieve the reward, and imitation was 
the only viable strategy, the failure of subjects to retrieve the rewai'd was interpreted as a lack 
of imitative ability. However, the retrieval of the reward relied on the reproduction of small 
movements of a lever to release and retrieve the reward. It is possible that the demonstrated 
movements were too small or too similar to be effectively differentiated or reproduced by the 
apes. The actions required for the present study were perhaps clearer and therefore easier to 
discriminate between and execute. Although this seems to be the most likely explanation, the 
potential influence of species differences between the two studies cannot be ruled out.
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10.2 Chimpanzees and children compared
In contrast to the chimpanzees, children tended to recreate the actions they observed 
without appearing to consider the causal efficiency of their behaviour. Yet the literature 
suggests that children of this age may have more sophisticated causal Imowledge than 
chimpanzees (see Chapter 4). Why then did the children, unlike the chimpanzees, not utilise 
this knowledge to develop the most efficient teclmique to retrieve the reward?
A first possibility is that children’s knowledge of causality is unavailable to other 
cognitive functions such as social learning. However, a number of studies have found that 
children could selectively ignore irrelevant actions in an observed sequence (Harnick, 1978; 
Sibulkin & Uzgiris, 1978; Want & Harris, 2001; Bauer & Kleinknecht, 2002). Similarly, 
Bullock et al., (1982) found that 3- to 5-year-old children could correctly predict which 
physical changes to a piece of apparatus were functionally relevant or irrelevant. It is 
therefore unlikely that the failure of children to differentiate between the iiTelevant and 
relevant actions in the present study was the result of limitations in their causal knowledge.
A second possibility is that the children’s tendency to imitate was related to the 
difficulty of the task. It has been shown that irrelevant actions are more likely to be ignored 
as the difficulty of a task decreases (Harnick, 1978; Sibulkin & Uzgiris, 1978; Bauer & 
Kleinknecht, 2002). However, pilot work indicated that children continued to reproduce both 
irrelevant and relevant actions when the defences of the box were removed, thereby making 
the task simpler. Hence, it is unlikely that children’s homogenous behaviour was a function 
of task difficulty.
Thirdly, the difference in performance of chimpanzees and children may result from a 
differential focus of attention. Imitation may predominate in children because they attend 
more to the actions of others than the results of their behaviour (Bellagamba & Tomasello, 
1999; Bekkering et al., 2000). Call & Caipenter (2002) have suggested that in contrast, 
chimpanzees attend preferentially to goals and results, and this may account for the observed 
tendency of chimpanzees and children to use different social learning strategies.
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Finally, it is possible that the divergent results for children and chimpanzees are due 
to differences in inferring ‘intention’. With regard to chimpanzees, although few studies have 
been carried out, there is conflicting evidence about whether they are able to interpret actions 
in the framework of intentions (Call & Tomasello, 1998; Povinelli et al., 1998). In contrast, 
in some situations children can differentiate between intended and accidental actions, and can 
use this infonnation to complete intended but failed demonstrations (Meltzoff, 1995; 
Caipenter et al., 1998; Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999; but see also Heyes & Ray, 2002; and 
Chapter 4), In the present study children, but not chimpanzees, may have reproduced the 
iiTelevant actions of the demonstrator in all conditions because they viewed the actions of the 
demonstrator as intentional. Indeed, Gergely et al., (2002) have shown that children will 
imitate strange behaviours, such as using their head to work a light switch, as long as they 
view the actions of the demonstrator as rational.
The children’s reproduction of irrelevant actions in this study contrasts with the 
findings of Want & Harris (2001), who found that 3-year-old children could benefit from, but 
selectively exclude, iiTelevant actions from an observed sequence. This difference may be 
due to the fact that in the Want and Hands study, the accidental irrelevant actions were 
followed by the demonstrator saying ‘Oops’. Subjects also received only one demonstration 
before they were given an opportunity to interact with the apparatus. Children may have 
reproduced the irrelevant actions in the present study because the demonstration was repeated 
tliree times before subjects could interact with the apparatus, and the demonstrator did not 
verbally identify the iiTelevant actions as either accidental or undesirable. Children may 
therefore have included all the observed actions because they saw the behaviour of the 
demonstrator as purposeful, even if they did appreciate that some paits of the demonstration 
were causally iiTelevant.
It may be that differences in the behaviour of chimpanzees and children can best be 
explained by a combination of a differential focus of attention on actions, results and goals, 
with the latter possibly influencing the interpretation of the actions of the demonstrator as 
intentional.
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Su m m a r y  of  Ch a pt e r  11
The results of Experiments 1 to 3 suggest that chimpanzees are sensitive to the causal 
relevance of observed actions, as they are able to selectively exclude actions that are not 
related to task solution. An alternative way to test whether an individual understands the 
causal relevance of actions is to determine what is learned by observing mistakes. If 
chimpanzees are able to learn causal relationships by observation, they should benefit from 
observing eiTors as well as successes, as observing eiTors provides additional causal 
information about what not to do.
The trap-tube task was used to determine whether chimpanzees who observed errors 
and successes could learn to solve the task faster that those who only saw successes. Both 
gi'oups were compared to a control group who saw the apparatus manipulated in the same 
direction and to the same extent as the experimental groups. The critical difference was that 
in the control demonstrations, the tool was not inserted into the tube, and therefore did not 
effect the reward.
Chimpanzees who observed the demonstrator use a tool to bring about an effect were 
more likely to use the tool themselves than subjects who observed the same movement with 
no effect on the reward. This result suggests that chimpanzees are able to learn the causal 
relevance of tool-reward contact. However, the performance of subjects in the experimental 
groups was not significantly influenced by the observation of errors. The two subjects who 
perfonned significantly better than chance learned to avoid the ti*ap after approximately 50 
trials. However, this strategy was dependent on an incomplete set of anticipatory rules. It 
seems that the demonstrations contained elements that the chimpanzees found conceptually 




E x p e r i m e n t  5 : T h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  e r r o r s  -  c h i m p a n z e e s
11.1 Introduction
The results of Experiments 1 to 3 suggest that chimpanzees are sensitive to the causal 
relevance of obseiwed actions, and are able to selectively include or exclude parts of a 
demonstration in accordance with their relevance to the task. Another way to detemiine 
whether an observer monitors the causal significance of a demonstrator’s behaviour is to 
determine what is learned from the observation of mistakes (Want & Harris, 2001). It would 
be expected that if chimpanzees are able to extract causal information by observation, they 
might benefit more fi*om observing both the incorrect and conect way to solve a task, than 
from observing only the correct solution. This is because seeing both correct and incorrect 
responses might enable an individual to learn what not to do by providing additional visual 
information from which causal relationships could potentially be inferred. If chimpanzees are 
able to learn about causal relationships by social learning, they should benefit from observing 
mistakes. The following study employed a trap-tube task to test this hypothesis.
Successful completion of the trap-tube task requires insertion of a tool into the con ect 
end of a tube so as to push out a reward. An unsuccessful response pushes the reward into the 
trapping-hole located in the centre (see Fig. 11.1). The food reward can be placed on either 
side of the trapping hole, so that the correct end of tool insertion is dependent on the position 
of the food relative to the trap. An individual can perfoim at chance by either inserting the 
tool randomly into each end, or by consistently inserting the tool into the same end of the 
tube. However, performing significantly above chance levels can only be achieved by 
avoiding the trap.
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Figure 11.1 Trap-tube apparatus. In the top diagram insertion o f the tool into the side nearest the reward results 
in the reward being pushed into the trap and lost. In the bottom diagram insertion o f  the tool into the side 
farthest from the reward results in the food being pushed away from the trap and retrieved.
This task was originally used to investigate problem solving by individual learning in 
monkeys and apes (see section 3.2.3). However, tube tasks have also been used in studies of 
social learning. Visalberghi (1993) found that capuchin monkeys who observed a conspecific 
demonstrator use a tool to retrieve a reward from a horizontal tube (without a trap), interacted 
more with the apparatus, but did not learn to insert the tool into the apparatus. However, Bard 
et al., (1995) found that 3- and 4-year-old chimpanzees who observed a conspecific 
demonstrator retrieve a reward, solved the task in fewer trials than controls. In addition, these 
subjects were able to generalise what they had learned to new problems in which tools had to 
be modified into an appropriate configuration before they could be used. Chimpanzees’ 
mastery of the tube-tasks can therefore be aided by social learning.
Want & Harris, (2001) were one of the first to suggest that an individual may benefit 
from observing both errors and successes. They found that 3-year-old children who witnessed 
an adult demonstrator fail, then succeed, at the trap-tube task, were better able to solve the 
task than those who observed only the correct response. However, the methodology and 
apparatus used by Want & Harris may have allowed children to solve the task by individual 
learning.
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Firstly, children observed only one demonstration followed by a block of ten trials. 
With only one demonstration there was a limited opportunity for social learning, making it 
difficult to determine whether the children’s performance after trial 1 was governed more by 
social or individual learning. Secondly, the position of the reward was not randomised across 
the block of ten trials. The position of the reward, and hence the correct side of tool insertion 
was alternated between the left and right side on every trial, making it potentially easy to 
learn the pattern of correct response without understanding the causal properties of the task. 
This is particularly because the trap was located at one end of the tube (see Fig. 11.2), and the 















Figure 11.2 Trap-tube apparatus used by Want & Harris (2001), page 433.
The difference in position of the trap, coupled with the predictable sequence of 
presentation, may have made solution relatively easy by greatly elevating the potential to 
discover how to solve the task by associative learning. The methodology and apparatus used 
in the following study were designed to examine how chimpanzees would perform when 
tested under stricter experimental conditions. This was achieved by positioning the trap in the 
centre of the tube, so that the correct side of tool insertion was dependent on the position of 
the reward relative to the trap (see Fig. 11.1). The location of the reward was presented in a
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randomised order, and subjects observed multiple demonstrations thioughout the experiment. 
These modifications will be described in more detail below.
11.2 Methods
11.2.1 Participants
The chimpanzees who participated in this study were 15 members of the juvenile 
group at Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary, Uganda. Subjects ranged in age from 2- to 
7-years-old, and were of both sexes. This experiment was conducted 5 months after the 
completion of Experiment 3. Although 15 chimpanzees were initially included in the study, 
six did not complete the task as they became fmstrated after the first block of trials and 
refused to enter the testing room. A similar response to frustration was reported by Reaux & 
Povinelli (2000), who found that two chimpanzees (Mindy and Apollo) also refused to 
participate in a trap-tube experiment and were subsequently dropped from the study. The 
nine individuals whose data will be reported were tln*ee females (Ikuru, Yoyo and Pasa, aged 
7, 4 and 3 years old respectively), and six males (Kalema, Asega, Baluku, Kisembo, Indi and 
Okech, aged 6, 4, 4, 4, 3 and 2 years old respectively). The remainder of this chapter will 
focus only on these individuals.
11.2.2 Apparatus
The trap-tube was constructed from a horizontally mounted transparent polycarbonate 
tube, 60 cm in length with an internal diameter of 4 cm. The tube had a rectangular trap (6 
cm X 6 cm X 12 cm) in the centre (see Fig. 11.1). The trap had a small lockable door located 
on the side so that trapped rewards could be easily removed by the experimenter. The tube 
was mounted 15 cm above the ground on a wooden board that was bolted to the centre of the 
floor in a the reseaich room (see Fig. 5.6). This allowed subjects to move freely around the 
apparatus and insert the tool into either side of the tube with equal ease.
The tool was a section of wooden broom-handle, 60 cm long and 3 cm in diameter. 
Both the trap-tube and the tool were placed outside the holding facility for 24 hours prior to 
the start of the experiment. This was done to familiarise subjects with the apparatus and
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reduce the potential for neophobic responses during testing. The tliree youngest subjects, 
Okech, Pasa and Indi, found the tool too heavy to manipulate. They were therefore given a 
lighter, hollow, aluminium tool with a slightly smaller diameter (2cm) that was easier to 
insert.
11.2.3 Procedure
A food reward, placed on either the left or right side of the central trap, could only be 
obtained by inserting the tool into the end of the tube furthest from the reward. Insertion of 
the tool into the end nearest the reward would result in pushing it into the trap where the 
subject could not retrieve it (see Fig. 11.1). The chimpanzees were divided into three groups, 
each with 3 subjects of approximately equal age. The groups obseiwed one of the following 
demonstrations (see Table 11.1):
G r o u p D e m o n s t r a t i o n O u t c o m e
Correct only
(C-only)
( E x p e r im e n ta l  g r o u p  1)
Subjects observed a human demonstrator insert 
the tool into the correct end of the tube (farthest 
from the reward) and retrieve the reward.
Success only
Incorrect + correct 
(I+C )
(E x p e r im e n ta l  g r o u p  2 )
Subjects observed the demonstrator insert the 
tool into the incoirect end of the tube (nearest to 
the food), pushing the reward into the trap. The 
tube was then re-baited while the subject was 
distracted. The demonstrator then inserted the 
tool into the coiTect end of the tube to 




( C o n tr o l  g r o u p )
The purpose of this group was to control for the 
potential effects of enhancement. The tool was 
moved along the top of the apparatus so that it 
had no effect on die reward inside the tube. 
During half the demonstrations the tool was 
moved in the same direction as the (C-only) 
demonstration, and on the other half it was 
moved in the same direction as the (I+C) 
demonstration.
No outcome
Table 11.1 Groups and demonstrations observed by chimpanzees in Experiment 5.
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The trap-tube task can be solved using one simple procedural rule: Always insert the 
tool into the end o f the tube farthest from the reward. Individuals who observe errors and 
successes might be able to extract this rule in fewer trials than individuals who observe only 
success. In addition, individuals in both experimental groups (C-only and I+C) would be 
expected to learn the rule in fewer trials than controls.
During demonstrations the experimenter took and ate the majority of the rewards. 
However, during a few demonstrations the subject monopolised the end of the apparatus and 
was able to scrounge the reward. Under natural foraging conditions it is not unusual for 
young chimpanzees to scrounge food from older conspecifics. For example Boesch (1993), 
found that young chimpanzees were able to scrounge up to 1000 calories per day from their 
mothers during bouts of nut-cracking. Scromiging was therefore kept to a minimum during 
demonstrations, but was not completely prevented, as limited scrounging was thought to be 
more naturalistic. Indeed, scrounging may be important for emphasising the relevance of the 
demonstrated behaviour to the obsei*ver.
The correct only group (C-only) and the incorrect + correct group (I+C) initially 
received 2 blocks of 12 trials with a demonstiation before each trial. However, subjects 
became bored and uninterested, so the number of trials and demonstrations per block was 
reduced. Subjects received eight further blocks of ten trials with only four demonstrations 
spread over the block (see Fig. 11.3). Demonstrations occurred before trials 1 ,3 ,6  and 8. For 
two of these demonstrations (before trials 1 and 6), the correct side of tool insertion was the 
right, and for the other two demonstiations (before trials 3 and 8), the correct side was the left 
to control for stimulus enhancement. Each subject received one block of trials per day, 
presented as far as possible on 10 consecutive days. The control gioup received eight blocks 
of ten trials also with four demonstrations, presented as far as possible on 8 consecutive days.
The number of trials in which the food was on the left or right was counterbalanced 
within each block and presented in a randomised order, insofar as the reward was never 






Figure 11.3 Schematic representation o f  the reward location during a block o f  ten trials. The order o f  
presentation was randomised insofar as there was no obvious pattern, and the reward was never placed on the 
same side for more than two consecutive trials. Circles indicate trials that were preceded by a demonstration.
Subjects were tested individually in the research room. Before the very first 
demonstration, subjects were allowed a two minute familiarisation period to explore the 
apparatus. Subjects then observed a demonstration in accord with their group allocation (see 
Fig. 11.4). During demonstrations, the experimenter first pointed to the reward inside the 
tube and gave food grunts before using the tool to either retrieve or trap the reward.
Following an incorrect demonstration in which the food was trapped in the case of the 
I+C group, (or the tool was moved in the incorrect direction in the case of the control group) 
the experimenter said ‘uhh ooh’ to express disappointment. Following a successful 
demonstration, in the case of both experimental groups, (or in the case of the control group 
when the tool was moved in the correct direction) the experimenter said ‘yay’. These 
vocalisations, with their characteristic intonations, were used to enhance the social
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significance of demonsti'ated actions, as is common in studies with human children. These 
particular sounds were chosen because the chimpanzees were familiar with humans making 
similar vocalisations in conditions of disappointment and pleasure, and it was felt that these 
sounds would be more appropriate than the English words (‘woops’ and ‘there’) used in 
human studies (Carpenter et al., 1998; Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999; Want & Harris, 2001; 
discussed in Chapter 4).
The experimenter then distracted the subject while the apparatus was re-baited by a 
second experimenter, also present in the room. Before each trial the tool was placed on the 
floor near the centre of the apparatus, perpendicular to the tube. A trial lasted for four 
minutes, or until the reward was retrieved or trapped, whichever occurred first. All 
demonstrations and trials were recorded on a hand-held video recorder by the second 
experimenter.
11.2.4 Video coding and data analysis
Behavioural data was collected for each subject by coding the total number of tool- 
insertions, the side of tool insertion for each trial, and the number of conect tool insertions. 
This data was analysed using non-parametric statistics because frequency data is not 
normally distributed. The behaviour of subjects from each experimental group was analysed 
by comparing the median percentage of responses for subjects from each group using a 
Mann-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples. Evidence for learning effects were analysed 
using a Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient test. The occunence of instinctive 
qualitative data was also noted along with any behaviour that was not related to task solution.
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Figure 11.4 Asega, a member o f the i n c o r r e c t  + c o r r e c t  group, observes the demonstrator insert the tool into 
the correct end o f  the tube and retrieves the reward.
11.3 Results
11.3.1 Recognition o f fail ure
All subjects reacted to the loss of the reward into the trap, hitting the tube with their 
hands or with the tool in an apparent attempt to recover the reward. By this criterion, all 
subjects recognised the conditions of failure. This behaviour was seen to decrease across 
blocks, although it was not quantified.
11.3.2 Control group - Use o f tool
Subjects in the control group generally performed very few activities that were related 
to task solution. Only one subject, Ikuru, inserted the tool into the apparatus. She used the 
tool in only 10 out of 80 trials; on nine occasions inserting the tool into the end of the tube 
nearest the reward, pushing it into the trap. In each trial she reacted to the loss of the reward, 
biting the trap and hitting it with the tool. The remaining two subjects, Indi and Kisembo, 
were also highly motivated to retrieve the reward, spending the majority of the four-minute 
trial period unsuccessfully trying to squeeze their hand into the tube to reach the reward.
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They also tried to bite the tube or hit it with the tool. However, they did not attempt to insert 
the tool into the tube.
11.3.3 Experimental groups — Use o f tool
Irrespective of whether the chimpanzees chose the correct side of tool insertion, 
subjects in the C-only and I+C groups inserted the tool on significantly more trials than 
subjects in the control group (median C-only = 92.3, median controls = 0; Mann-Whitney IT- 
test for unmatched samples, z = -1.99, Ni = 3, N2 = 3, p = 0.046, two-tailed; median I+C = 
92.3; Mann-Whitney [/-test for umnatched samples, z = -1.99, N% = 3, N% = 3, p = 0.046, 
two-tailed). However there was no significant difference in the number of tool insertions 
performed by the C-only and I+C groups (Mann-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z = 
-0.44, N] = 3, N2 = 3, p = 0.658, two-tailed; see Table 11.2).
Subjects in the control group observed the tool being moved in the same direction and 
to the same extent as the C-only and I+C groups. The major difference was that during the 
control demonstrations the tool did not bring about an effect on the reward located inside the 
tube. It seems that subjects in the experimental groups, who observed the tool make contact 
with the reward, learned the causal relevance of tool-reward contact. They learned by 
observation that by inserting the tool it could be used to push the reward along the tube 
(regardless of retrieving or trapping the food). However, subjects in the control group, who 
did not observed tool-reward contact, did not learn the causal significance of this 
relationship.
Group Name % of tool insertions
C-only Yoyo 96 (100/104)
Pasa 92 (96 / 104)
Baluku TU 27 (28 / 104)
I+C Asega 92 (96 / 104)
Kalema 98 (102/104)
Okech 74 (77 / 80)
Control Ikuru 10 (10/80)
Indi 0 (0 / 80)
Kisembo 0 (0 / 80)
Table 11.2 Percentage o f  tool insertion performed by subjects from each group, irrespective o f  whether the tool 
was inserted into the correct or incorrect end o f  tire tube.
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11.3.4 Alternative strategies
One of the members of the C-only group, Baluku, developed an alternative non tool- 
use strategy to retrieve the reward. Baluku’s left hand was badly injured during a figlit with 
an adult male, leaving him with only an index finger and thumb. His manipulation of the tool 
was relatively awkward and after 24 trials he developed a strategy of vigorously shaking the 
apparatus to dislodge the reward. This procedure resulted in the reward being shaken towards 
him on approximately half the trials, increasing his success from 32% with the tool, to 56% 
by combining tool-use and shaking. The following statistical analysis refers only to Baluku’s 
tool-using attempts, since the original purpose of the study was to assess chimpanzees’ causal 
knowledge of a tool-using task.
11.3.5 Number o f correct responses
Figure 11.5(a) suggests a trend in the predicted direction, in that subjects in the I+C 
group succeeded more frequently than individuals in the C-only group, and both groups 
succeeded more than controls. However, there was much overlap in the variance between the 
C-only and I+C groups (see Fig 11.5b), and the success of chimpanzees who obserwed both 
correct and inconect responses was not significantly different from subjects who obseiwed 
only the correct solution (median C-only =10,  median I+C = 26.78; Mann-Whitney [/-test 
for unmatched samples, z = -1.09, Ni = 3, N% = 3, p = 0.275, two-tailed).
There was no significant difference between the success of the C-only gr oup and the 
controls (median C-only =10,  median controls = 0; Mami-Whitney [/-test for umnatched 
samples, z = -1.55, N] = 6, N2 = 6, p = 0.121, two-tailed). However, there was a significant 
difference in the perfonnance of the I+C group and controls (median I+C = 26.78, median 
controls = 0; Mann-Whitney [/-test for umnatched samples, z = -2.09, Ni = 6, N2 = 6, p = 
0.037, two-tailed). Therefore, although the trend goes in the predicted direction, statistical 
analysis dictates that subjects were not significantly influenced by the observation of errors. 
However, subjects in the experimental groups did seem to learn the causal relevance of tool- 
reward contact by seeing the tool being inserted into the tube.
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When the results for the C-only and I+C groups are taken together, the chimpanzees 
did not perform significantly better than would be expected by chance (Wilcoxon test for 





























Controls C-onlv 1+ C
Figure 11.5 Percentage o f correct responses: (a) medians for each group; (b) medians for each individual. Error 
bars represent the inter-quartile range.
11.3.6 Individual performances - Unsuccessful subjects
Only two of the chimpanzees were able to solve the task above chance levels (see Fig.
11.6 and Table 11.3). None of the remaining chimpanzees performed better than chance, and 
indeed, three of the unsuccessful subjects performed at levels significantly lower than chance 
(see Table 11.3 and Fig. 11.6). Unsuccessful subjects showed no evidence of a side bias (see 
Fig. 11.7). In order to perform significantly below chance levels, unsuccessful subjects must 
have been trapping the reward on the majority of trials. This poor performance, coupled with 
the lack of side bias, suggests that the unsuccessful subjects were inserting the tool into the 
end of the tube nearest the reward, pushing it into the trap.
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S u b j e c t G r o u p P e r c e n t a g e  c o r r e c t %  LEFT
Overall Blocks 1-5 Blocks 6-10 INSERTIONS
Yoyo C-only 58 50 67* Ç 2 * *
Pasa 21** 12** 44
Baluku (TU) 32 38 0 41
(shake + TU) 56 41 58
Asega I+C 55 43 8 6 * * 33**
Kalema 18** 17** 18** 52
Okech 23** 19** 31 55
Ikuru Control /j ** Q * * 10* 61
Indi - - - -
Kisembo - - - -
Table 11.3 Percentage o f correct responses by subjects from the C-only, I+C, and contiol groups. The 
symbol represents a significant deviation from chance performance based on a binomial test ( * p <  0.05, ** p <  
0.001). For results less than 50% correct, significance indicates a performance worse than chance. ‘% left 
insertions’ is a measure o f side bias.
In addition, many of the unsuccessful subjects performed idiosyncratic behaviours, 
such as attempting to insert non-functional objects, or objects with inappropriate dimensions 
to fit into the tube (see Table 11.4). This indicates that the unsuccessful subjects did not 
clearly gi asp the requirements of the trap-tube task.
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Figure 11.6 The percentage o f correct responses made by subjects in each block o f  trials. The symbol 
represents a trial where subjects performed significantly better than chance (p<0.05).
11.3.7 Successful subjects
Only two subjects. Yoyo (C-only) and Asega (I+C), performed at levels exceeding 
chance, and this occurred only during the second half of the experiment, during blocks 6 to 
10 (see Table 11.3 and Fig. 11.6). Yoyo and Asega were also the only two subjects to have a 
significant side bias. Yoyo had a significant preference for the left side of the tube, and 
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Figure 11.7 The percentage o f tool insertions into each end o f  the apparatus by subjects from the C-only and 
l+C groups. The black line represents the mean percentage o f insertions into the left side o f  the apparatus. 
Yoyo and Asega were the only two chimpanzees to show evidence o f  a significant side bias
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How could Yoyo and Asega perform significantly better than chance when both 
chimpanzees had a side bias? The answer is that in the second half of the experiment they 
learned to correct their mistakes. Once the tool had been inserted into the apparatus in accord 
with their respective side biases, on a number of occasions both subjects withdrew the tool 
and reinserted it into the correct side of the tube. This rule seems to have been learned over 
the course of the experiment, as there was a significantly positive relationship between 
increasing block number and success (Spearman’s rho: Yoyo = 0.825, p = 0.003; Asega = 
0.83, p = 0.003; see Fig 11.8). However, this seemingly insightfiil behaviour was interspersed 
with errors. Having corrected a mistake on one trial. Yoyo and Asega were just as likely not 
to correct a mistake and trap the reward on a subsequent trial. Once they had discovered how 
to correct their biases they did not consistently use this information to maximise their 
success. Thus, this rule was incomplete.
100100
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Figure 11.8 Percentage o f correct trials performed by Yoyo (C-only) and Asega (l+C) for each block. The line 
represents the line o f best-fit.
In addition, neither Yoyo nor Asega used single fluid movements to retrieve or trap 
the reward. They both used several small pushes of the tool on almost every trial, coupled 
with constant monitoring of the position of the reward. A single push was defined as 
contacting the reward with the tool and moving it through the tube then pausing before 
moving the reward again. Yoyo used a mean of 5.6 pushes per trial, and Asega used a mean 
of 5.8 pushes per trial. Interestingly, there was no significant difference between the number 
of pushes on successful trails compared to failed trials (Yoyo -  median pushes on failed trials
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= 2, median on successful trials = 3; Wilcoxon test for matched-pairs, N-ties = 29, z = -1.27, 
p = 0.204; Asega -  median pushes on failed trials = 3, median on successful trials = 2; 
Wilcoxon test for matched pairs, N-ties = 21, z = -1.51, p = 0.130).
Yoyo and Asega were both seen to hold their hands under the food as it moved 
through the tube in an apparent attempt to catch it should it fall (see Figure 11.9). Even when 
the correct end of tool insertion had been chosen and the reward was moving away from the 
trap, they continued to use small tool insertions as if the reward could fall at any time.
Figure 11.9 Asega moves his hand under the reward as he pushes it along the tube in an apparent attempt to 
catch it should it fall.
11.3.8 Insertions on same side as previous demonstration
One of the major concerns about using the trap-tube task in a social learning study 
was that success could be achieved by simply inserting the tool into the same side as the 
previous successful demonstration. However, the side of correct demonstration was 
coimterbalanced within each block, therefore the side bias of Yoyo and Asega meant that 
they chose the same side as the demonstrator on approximately half the trials (see Table 
11.5). Therefore they did not adopt a strategy of inserting the tool into the same side as the
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previous successful demonstration, and hence their success cannot be attributed simply to 
enliancement. Since the remaining subjects usually inserted the tool into the end of the tube 
closest to the reward, they chose to insert the tool on the opposite side from the previous 
demonstration significantly more than on the same side (see Table 11.5).
S u b j e c t G r o u p P e r c e n t a g e  o f  l e f t  s id e
INSERTIONS
Yoyo C-oiily 58 (31/53)
Pasa (9/52)
Baluku No TU after demo
Asega I+C 52 (27/52)
Kalema 31 * (16/52)
Okech 20** (8/40)
Ikuru Control Q ** (0/13)
Indi -
Kisembo -
Table 11.5 Percentage of trials in which tool insertion following a demonstration occurred on the same side as 
that demonstration. The symbol represents a significant deviation from chance based on a binomial test (* p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.001). All significant values indicate a preference for the side opposite  from the demonstration. 
Baluku used his shaking strategy on all trials following a demonstration. Therefore there were no tool-using 
episodes to analyse.
11.4 Discussion of Experiment 5
11.4.1 Control group versus experimental groups
Subjects from both the correct only and the incorrect + correct groups inserted the 
tool into the apparatus (iiTespective of whether the correct side had been chosen), on 
significantly more trials than subjects in the control group. The difference in performance 
between the control and experimental groups cannot be explained by differential 
enhancement, insofar as both groups observed the demonstrator using the tool in the same 
direction and to the same extent. The major difference between groups was that both 
experimental groups obseiwed the tool make contact with the reward and push it along the 
tube. In contrast, control subjects observed the demonstrator move the tool along the top of 
the tube so that it did not make contact with the reward inside, and therefore did not bring 
about an effect. It seems that subjects in the experimental groups were able to learn the causal 
relevance of tool-reward contact by observation. However, control subjects did not see this
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regularity, and therefore did not learn this relationship. It is possible that the control subjects 
may have ignored the ‘demonstrations’ because they viewed them as irrelevant, since the tool 
did not bring about a significant outcome on the reward.
11.4.2 Number o f correct responses
There was no significant difference in the performance of subjects who had observed 
only the conect solution and those who had additional infonnation about the production of 
errors. Nevertheless, Figure 11.5 indicates that there was a trend in the predicted direction, in 
that subjects from the I+C group tended to retrieve the reward more frequently than subjects 
in the C-only group, and both groups succeeded more frequently than controls. The 
difference between the experimental groups and the controls was significant for the I+C, but 
not the C-only group, indicating that the obseiwation of enors may have been beneficial. 
However, without statistical evidence, this trend is unsubstantiated, and it must be concluded 
that chimpanzees do not significantly benefit from observing errors in addition to successes.
The difference in perfonnance between the control and experimental groups suggests 
that subjects benefited at a general level fi'om observing the causal relationship between the 
tool and the reward, but not fr om the specific details of the demonstration. Subjects in both 
the C-only and I+C groups learned that the tool could be inserted into the tube in order to 
affect the position of the reward. However, as a group they did not appreciate that the 
passage of the reward into the trap was related to the side of tool insertion.
11.4.3 Unsuccessful individuals
Pasa (C-only), Kalema and Okech (I+C) continuously failed to avoid the trap, despite 
repeated opportunity to investigate an alternative strategy. On almost every trial, they 
inserted the tool into the end of the tube nearest the reward, pushing it into the trap. 
Nevertheless, all subjects seemed to recognise the conditions of failure. During both 
demonstrations and trials the chimpanzees were outwardly distressed by the loss of the 
reward, but despite recognising failure, they seemed unable to use this information to modify 
their behavioiu in later attempts. Similar observations have been reported (Limongelli, 
Boysen, & Visalberghi, 1995; Reaux & Povinelli, 2000).
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One explanation is that the subjects learned that once the reward dropped into the trap 
it could not be retrieved, but were unable to understand the conditions that led to this 
outcome. However, on a number of occasions subjects showed distress as the reward 
approached the trap. They therefore seemed to be able to anticipate the conditions of failure, 
but not use this information in their own later efforts. This may have been because they were 
able to predict and react to failure because they gained implicit Imowledge about the 
observed sequence of events, but were unable to transfer tliis information into explicit 
knowledge that was available to higher processing systems required for planning and 
executing actions (Kaimiloff-Smith, 1992; Povinelli, 2000).
Baluku's imiovative strategy deserves special attention. Due to his injined left hand, 
he found it exceedingly difficult to manipulate the tool, and therefore developed an 
alternative non-tool-using strategy of shaking the reward out of the tube. There have been a 
number of studies of the effects of hand injury on food acquisition in wild chimpanzees with 
snare injuries. The results suggest that in the context of manual food processing, feeding 
efficiency may not be significantly effected (Stokes & Byrne, 2001). hijured individuals 
seem to compensate for disability by finding novel ways to achieve specific details of the 
‘iionnaT technique of conspecifics, but maintain the same overall method used by able- 
bodied peers (Stokes & Byrne, 2001; Byi*ne & Stokes, 2002). From this data, it might be 
expected that Baluku would adopt the same technique as the demonstrator, by inserting the 
tool with either his feet, or his mouth. However, he developed a totally novel non tool-use 
technique. This may have been because the size of the tool made it difficult to manipulate 
with another body part, leaving him no option but to develop a shaking strategy. 
Alternatively, he may have developed an individual teclmique because he was not strongly 
influenced by social learning. However, without comparative data about tooî-use for wild 
populations with injuries it is not possible to offer more informed explanations.
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11.4.4 Successful individuals
Yoyo and Asega were the only two chimpanzees who learned to successfully avoid 
the trap. Yoyo was a member of the correct only group, and Asega was a member of the 
incorrect + correct gi*oup. However despite observing different demonstrations their 
perfoimances did not differ greatly. During the first half of the experiment, both subjects 
performed at chance levels because they each had a side bias. However, they were able to 
perform significantly better than chance during the second half of the study because they 
learned to collect their initial mistakes. After inserting the tool in accordance with their 
respective side biases, on a number of trials they withdrew the tool and reinserted it into the 
correct side of the apparatus. It is possible that because both chimpanzees had a side bias, the 
constancy of their behaviour (in that only the position of the reward altered between trials) 
allowed then to identify the conditions of success and failure where the other subjects could 
not.
The ability to correct mistakes appears at first to rely on a sophisticated understanding 
of the task and of the conditions of success and failure. However, for both subjects this 
seemingly insightful behaviour was interspersed with errors. Having coiTected a mistake on 
one trial, it was possible that they would trap the reward on the following trial. In addition, 
both subjects did not seem to appreciate that once the conect side of tool insertion had been 
chosen, the tool could be pushed through the tube in one movement without endangering the 
reward. Both chimpanzees used several small pushes per trial to move the reward. There was 
no significant difference in the number of pushes that were used for successful or failed 
trials. This indicates that they regarded the whole tube area as a ‘danger zone’, and did not 
appreciate that if the reward was moving away from the trap it was safe.
On a number of occasions they both moved their hand underneath the reward as it 
moved tlnough the tube, in what appeared to be an attempt to catch it should it fall, and gave 
distress vocalisations as they pushed the reward into the trap. Once the reward had dropped 
into the trap, they continued to push the tool back and forth in the tube in a vain attempt to 
retrieve the food. Visalberghi & Limongelli (1994) distinguished between representational 
task solution and anticipatory task solution. A representational strategy predicts that an
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individual has a mental representation of the requirements of the task, enabling them to 
succeed in any given trial by deciding a priori which is the coirect response without trial and 
error. In contrast, an anticipatory strategy predicts that an individual constantly monitors the 
outcome of their actions and uses this information to determine the next manoeuvre. Yoyo 
and Asega’s multiple push strategy, coupled with the idiosyncratic tendency to move their 
hand under the reward, indicated that they were constantly monitoring the outcome of each 
action before performing the next movement. Hence, their behaviour confomis most closely 
to an anticipatory mle-based strategy.
Before the experiment started, it was predicted that successful subjects would solve 
the task using the procedural rule ‘always insert the tool into the end o f the tube furthers from  
the reward'. Instead both the successful subjects seemed to rely on an incomplete set of rules 
that were deployed in some, but not all appropriate conditions. For example, both Yoyo and 
Asega appear to have used the mle ‘always insert the tool into the same side o f the tube, but 
i f  it gets too close to the trap tiy the other end'. However, on a number of trials where this 
rule would have been appropriate, they trapped the reward. This behaviour suggests that there 
were elements of the task that they found conceptually difficult. Both chimpanzees seemed to 
learn about the relevance of tool-reward contact by observation. However, they were unable 
to learn about the other causal relationships involved in the task. The direction in which the 
reward moved was dependent on the force applied by the tool, and passage of the reward into 
the trap was mediated by gravity. A  number of authors have suggested that chimpanzees 
camiot learn about causal principles that are unobservable (Kohler, 1927; Tomasello & Call, 
1997; Povinelli, 2000). The chimpanzees may therefore have been unable to form a 
comprehensive set of rules because they were unable to learn about the unobservable 
principles of force and gravity. However, this will be discussed in more detain in Chapter 14.
It is likely that the side biases of both Yoyo and Asega imposed a level of constancy 
to their behavioiu’ that led them to uncover these rules where other subjects did not. By 
always inserting the tool into the same side, so that their behaviour was constant, and only 
the location of the reward altered, they may have been better able to learn that if the reward 
moved towards the trap, it would be lost.
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Nevertheless, both Yoyo and Asega did develop a strategy, however incomplete, that 
allowed them to avoid the trap on significantly more trials than chance. Control subjects, who 
observed the stimulus enliancement demonstration, saw the tool moved in the same direction 
and to the same extent, and were given the same opportunity to interact with the apparatus, 
but did not learn such rules. The only difference between the demonstrations that were 
obseiwed by Yoyo and Asega and the controls was that in the stimulus enliancement 
demonstration the tool did not contact the reward. It seems likely that the causal infonnation 
that was available in the experimental group’s demonstrations helped Yoyo and Asega to 
fomi their strategy. It therefore remains a possibility that chimpanzees benefit from observing 
causal relationships. However, the causal relationships that are involved in successful 
completion of the trap-tube task may be too cognitively demanding to clearly demonstrate 
this.
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S u m m a r y  o f  C h a p t e r  12
The trap-tube task was used to determine whether 3- to 4-year-old children, unlike 
chimpanzees, could benefit from the observation of errors. This experiment was therefore 
conducted as a replication of Experiment 5. Children in the control group observed the tool 
being manipulated in the same direction, and to the same extent as children in the 
experimental groups. However, the tool was moved across the top of the apparatus, and 
therefore had no effect on the reward. Children in the experimental groups who observed the 
tool make contact with the reward were significantly more likely to insert the tool into the 
apparatus than the control gi'oup. However, like the chimpanzees, 3- to 4-year-old children 
were not significantly influenced by the obseiwation of enors.
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CHAPTER 12
E x p e r i m e n t  6: T h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  e r r o r s  -  3- t o  4-y e a r - o l d  c h i l d r e n
12.1 Introduction
Experiment 5 indicated that in the context of the trap-tube task, chimpanzees did not 
seem to benefit from obsei*ving errors. However, they were able to extract causal information 
about the causal relevance of tool reward contact by observation. Previous studies have 
shown that 3-year-old children who observed an adult perform eiTors and successes in a 
similar, but not identical study, performed significantly better than children who observed 
only successes (Want & Hanis, 2001). However, for the reasons discussed in the previous 
chapter, the methodology and apparatus of that experiment may have made the children’s 
task relatively easy. The following study was designed to examine how children would 
perfoiin when tested on the same task as the chimpanzees.
12.2 Methodology
12.2.1 Participants
The participants for this study were 12 children aged 3-years-old (mean = 3:5, range = 
3:0 -  3:11) and 18 children aged 4-years-old (mean = 4:3, range = 4:0 -  4:6) of both sexes 
(16 male; 14 female). The children were recruited from St Andrews Nursery School, UK 
following the completion of a letter of parental consent (see Appendix B).
12.2.2 Apparatus
The experimental apparatus was the same trap-tube that was used to test chimpanzees 
in Experiment 5. However, there were a number of minor alterations that made the apparatus 
more appropriate for children. Firstly, the tube was mounted on legs so that it could stand on 
a table 10 cm from the surface. Secondly, the tool was a smooth plastic tube 3.5 cm in 
diameter and 60 cm in length instead of a piece of wood, as it was felt that this would be 
more hygienic. Finally, the rewards were 10 brightly coloured plastic dinosaur eggs instead 
of food rewards, as a number of the children were known to have food allergies.
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12.2.3 Procedure
The children were split into the same three groups as the chimpanzees, with an 
approximately equal number of males and females of each age and sex (see Table 12.1). Each 
group observed the same demonstrations as the chimpanzees in Experiment 5. However, the 
children were only presented with one block of ten trials. The positiorr of the reward relative 
to the trap, and hence the con*ect side of tool insertion was randomised throughout the block, 
in that there was no discernible pattern, and the reward was never placed in the same location 
for more than two consecutive trials. There were four demonstrations spread tliroughout the 
block that were counter-balanced for the correct side of tool insertion, as in Experiment 5 
with chimpanzees.
A pilot investigation revealed that children were reluctant to interact with the apparatus 
during the two-minute familiarisation period received by the chimpanzees. Therefore in order 
to ensure that both species had equivalent information about the apparatus before the first 
experiment began, the experimenter drew the children’s’ attention to specific feature of the 
apparatus that would be discovered by physical exploration. Each participant was told:
‘This is the dinosaur game. This a long plastic tube, it has a hole at this end 
(demonstrate by inserting finger), and a hole at that end (demonstrate by inserting 
finger), and in the middle is the trap. The idea is to get the dinosaur egg out o f the 
tube without it going into the trap. '
The children were then told that there were 10 ‘goes’ and they were to retrieve as many 
eggs as possible from the tube in order to win a plastic toy dinosaur. At the end of the 
session, each participant was praised for their participation and given a toy irrespective of 
their performance. During demonstrations the experimenter used the same vocalisations 
following successfril and unsuccessful trials as the chimpanzee study.
Each child was tested individually in a separate room within the nursery. The 
apparatus was placed on a small table and the child was asked to sit on a chair in front of the 
apparatus for the initial explanation and the first demonstration. Following the first trial, the
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majority of subjects chose to stand up and were allowed to move freely around the apparatus, 
as was the case for chimpanzee paificipants. In addition, the children were not prevented 
from interacting with the apparatus or walking around during demonstrations. The 
chimpanzees were free to observe the demonstration from any angle, as well as participating 
in co-action in some cases, and it was felt that the best comparative data would be collected 
under testing conditions that were as similar as possible. The video coding and data analysis 
were the same as in experiment 5 (see section 11.2.4).
12.3 Results
12.3.1 Control group
The majority of subjects in the control group perfomied very few actions that were 
related to task solution. Only four subjects inserted the tool into the apparatus (see Table 
12.1). None were able to succeed better than would be expected by chance (see Table 12.2). 
Of the remaining six children, one, (JL) did not interact with the apparatus at all during either 
demonstrations or trials. Another, (CB) inserted his fingers into the end of the tube nearest 
the reward in a vain attempt to reach the reward, on every trial. The remaining four children 
picked up the tool and moved it back and forth along the top of the apparatus in a similar 
manner to the control ‘demonstrations’. Indeed, one subject (JW) repeated the sounds that the 
experimenter had made (‘uuh ooh’ and ‘yay’).
12.3.2 Experimental groups
Subjects in the C-only and I+C groups inserted the tool into the tube (irrespective of 
whether the correct side of insertion had been chosen) on significantly more trials than 
subjects in the control group (median C-only =10, median controls = 0; Mann-Whitney 17- 
test for unmatched samples, z = -3.28, Ni = 10, N2 = 10, p = 0.001, two-tailed; median I+C = 
10; Mann-Whitney (7-test for unmatched samples, z = -3.12, Ni = 10, N2 = 10, p = 0.002, 
two-tailed). However there was no significant difference in the number of tool insertions 
perfonned by either the C-only or I+C groups (median C-only =10, median I+C =10; Mann- 
Whitney (7-test for unmatched samples, z = -0.61, Ni = 10, N2 = 10, p = 0.542, two-tailed; 
see Table 12.1).
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Subjects in the control group observed the tool being moved in the same direction and 
to the same extent as the C-only and I+C groups. The major difference was that during the 
control demonstrations the tool did not bring about an effect on the reward located inside the 
tube. It seems that subjects in the experimental groups, who observed the tool make contact 
with the reward, like the chimpanzees, learned the causal significance of tool-reward contact. 
However, control subjects did not.
In contrast, the majority of children in the control group seem to have learned to 
reproduce the in-elevant actions (and in some cases sounds) that they observed during the 
first demonstration. Control subjects who did insert the tool were not able to perfonn 
significantly better than would be expected by chance (see Table 12.2).
CONTROLS C-ONLY I + C
Subject Age/Sex Trials Subject Age/Sex Trials Subject Age/Sex Trails
KL 3M 8 BB 3M 10 DC 3M 10
JW 3M 0 CG 3M 10 MH 3M 10
RR 3F 0 KE 3F 10 JJ 3M 10
EC 3F 8 RG 3F 10 AB 3F 10
IP 4M 10 IT 4M 10 MO 4M 9
CB 4M 0 CM 4M 10 RC 4M 10
JL 4M 0 BL 4M 10 L 4M 10
IT 4F 10 SA 4F 10 HP 4F 10
CG 4F 0 SD 4F 9 CA 4F 9
C 4F 0 ER 4F 10 ML 4F 10
Median 0 Median 10 Median 10
Table 12.1 Number of tiials in which subjects inserted the tool into the apparatus, irrespective of whether the 
correct side of tool insertion was chosen.
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12.3.3 Number o f correct responses
There was no significant difference between the number of correct response 
performed by children in the C-only versus the I+C groups (median C-only = 50, median I+C 
= 55; Mann-Whitney [/-test for unmatched samples, z = -0.27, Ni = 10, N2 = 10, p = 0.798, 
two-tailed). Neither of these groups retrieved the reward significantly more often that would 
be expected by chance (Wilcoxon test for matched samples, C-only v. chance, z = -0.51, N- 
ties = 7, p = 0.611, two-tailed; I+C v. chance, z = -1.55, N-ties = 8, p = 0.121, two-tailed). 
However, both experimental groups performed significantly better than controls (median 
control = 0, median C-only = 50; Mann-Whitney U-test for unmatched samples, z = -2.36, Ni 
= 10, N2  = 10, p = 0.018, two-tailed; median control = 0, median 1+C = 55; Mann-Whitney 
U-test for unmatched samples, z = -2.84, Ni = 10, N2 = 10, p = 0.005, two-tailed; see Fig.
12.1 and Table 12.2). This result was not effected by the age of the participants (controls - 
median 3yr = 68.75, median 4yr = 40; Mann-Whitney U-test for unmatched samples, z = - 
1.55, Ni = 4, N2 = 6, p = 0.121, two-tailed: C-only -  median 3yr = 50, median 4yr = 48.33; 
Ni = 4, N2 = 6, p = 0.515; two-tailed: I+C -  median 3yrs = 55, median 4yrs = 47.22; Ni = 4, 
N2  = 6, p = 0.747). The results therefore suggest that 3- and 4-year-old children, like the 











Figure 12.1 Median percentage o f correct responses by subjects from each experimental group. Error bars 
represent the inter-quartile range.
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CONTROLS C-ONLY I + C
Subject Age/Sex Success Subject Age/Sex Success Subject Age/Sex Success
KL 3M 62.5 BB 3M 100* DC 3M 40
JW 3M - CG 3M 50 MH 3M 50
RR 3F - KE 3F 50 JJ 3M 60
EC 3F 75 RG 3F 50 AB 3F 70
JP 4M 30 JT 4M 80 MO 4M 44.44
CB 4M - CM 4M 30 RC 4M 90*
JL 4M - BL 4M 80 L 4M 40
JT 4F 50 SA 4F 30 HP 4F 50
CG 4F - SD 4F 66.67 CA 4F 66.67
C 4F - ER 4F 10* ML 4F 70
Median 0 Median 50 Median 55
Table 12.2 Percentage o f successful trials. The symbol represents a significant result based on a binomial 
test (* p < 0.05). For results less than 50% correct, significance indicates a performance significantly below 
chance.
12.3.4 Patterns o f success
There was a positive correlation between increasing trial number and group 
performance. However, this relationship was not significant for any of the experimental 
groups, and hence the children did not show a progressive learning effect (Spearman’s rho\ 
controls = 0.39, p = 0.253; C-only = 0.44, p = 0.199; I+C == 0.451, p = 0.191; See Fig. 12.2).
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Figure 12.2 Percentage o f children from 
each group who chose the correct side of 
too insertion on each trial. The line 
represents the linear best-fit, and suggests 
that there is a positive relationship 
between trial number and group 
performance. However this relationship is 
not significant for any o f  the groups.
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12.3.5 Side biases
A greater number of subjects in the C-only gi'oup showed a significant tendency to 
insert the tool into the same side of the apparatus. However, when analysed as a group there 
was no significant difference in the side bias of children from the C-only and I+C groups 
(median C-only = 50, median I+C = 52.22; Mann-Whitney U-test for unmatched samples, z 
= -0.53, Ni = 10, N2 = 10, p = 0.593, two-tailed; see Table 12.3). Interestingly, each child 
who showed evidence of a side bias had a preference for the left side of the tube, which was 
the con*ect side of tool insertion for the first demonstration and trial. In addition, the majority 
of the remaining subjects tended to insert the tool more frequently into the left side of the 
tube. Tliis suggests that children tended to reproduce the same behaviour that they observed 
during the first successful trial, rather than taking account of the causal properties of the task 
that determined the correct side of insertion on subsequent trials.
CONTROLS C-ONLY I + C
Subject Age/Sex % Left Subject Age/Sex % Left Subject Age/Sex %  Left
KL 3M 37.5 BB 3M 50 DC 3M 40
JW 3M - CG 3M 50 MH 3M 100* 1
RR 3F - KE 3F 100* JJ 3M 90
EC 3F 50 RG 3F 100* AB 3F 20
JP 4M SO JT 4M 50 MO 4M 44.44 :
CB 4M - CM 4M 100* RC 4M 60
JL 4M - BL 4M 50 L 4M 70
JT 4F 100* SA 4F 60 HP 4F 80
CG 4F - SD 4F 30 CA 4F 44.44 .1
C 4F - ER 4F 40 ML 4F 40
Median 50 Median 52.22 ;
Table 12.3 The percentage o f trials in which the tool was inserted into the left-hand side o f  the tube. 
Percentage o f left insertions is used as a measure o f side bias.
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12.4 Discussion of Experiment 6
The results suggest that like chimpanzees, 3- and 4-year-old children did not 
significantly benefit from the observation of errors in the context of this study. Subjects who 
obseiwed both success and failure were unable to utilise this additional infonnation to extract 
the causal relationships involved in task solution, and perfoim significantly better than 
children who observed only solutions. However, children in the experimental gi'oups who 
observed the tool being inserted into the apparatus seemed to learn the causal relevance of 
tool-reward contact. Children in the control group saw the tool being manipulated in the same 
direction and to the same extent as the other groups. The major difference was that in the 
control demonstiation the tool was moved along the top of the apparatus and therefore had no 
significant effect on the reward located inside the tube. Observing that the tool could 
potentially be used to effect the position of the reward helped children to learn about contact. 
However they did not learn that the coiTect side of tool insertion was related to the position of 
the reward relative to the trap.
Children from each group showed a tendency to insert the tool more frequently into 
the left-hand side of the tube. Indeed, a number of children showed a significant left side bias 
(see Table 12.3). The left side was the conect side of insertion for each group during the first 
demonstration and trial. It therefore seems that children were more influenced to reproduce 
the behaviour that they observed during the first successful trial, than take account of the 
causal properties of the task that deteimined the correct side on subsequent trials. In addition, 
a number of the children in the control group were seen to reproduce the irrelevant actions 
and in some cases vocalisations of the demonstrator.
The results of this study contrast with the findings of Want & Harris (2001), who 
found that 3- year-old children were able to benefit horn observing mistakes. However, there 
are a number of important ways in which the cunent study differs from theirs. Firstly, 
subjects received four demonstrations throughout the block of ten trials that were counter­
balanced for the correct side of tool insertion. The increased number of demonstrations meant 
that subjects had a greater opportunity to learn by social, rather than individual learning. 
Secondly, the position of the reward was presented in a randomised sequence tlnoughout the
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block of ten trials. It was therefore not possible to solve the task by learning to reverse 
responses on alternate trials. Finally, the trap was located in the middle of the tube so that the 
apparatus did not have to be rotated between trials.
The methodology of the present experiment was designed to test children under the 
same level of control that would be expected for work with any non-human species. When 
the same strict controls were applied, the results were not radically different from the 
chimpanzee subjects in the previous chapter. Both chimpanzees and children were able to 
learn the causal relevance of contact. However, control subjects who could not learn this mle 
behaved differently in each case. Chimpanzee control subjects responded by ignoring the 
demonstrations, and trying to reach the reward with their fingers. However, children in the 
control group responded by reproducing the inelevant actions and vocalisations of the 
demonstrator. This finding is in accord with several studies that have demonstrated that 
young children have a tendency to reproduce observed actions at the expense of efficiency 
(Nagell et al., 1993; Whiten et al., 2003; Whiten et al., hi press; see Chapter 4).
However, it is possible that the differences in experimental design meant that 
although the task was conceptually difficult for children of tliis age, it may be solved by older 
children. The following chapter will discuss whether the ability to solve the trap-tube task is 
related to the age of the participants.
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Su m m a r y  of  C h a pt e r  13
Experiment 7 was designed to determine whether cliildren’s ability to benefit from 
the observation of eiTors is related to age. The previous experiment showed that like 
chimpanzees, 3- to 4-year-old children do not benefit from the obseiwation of errors in the 
context of the trap-tube task. This experiment was therefore conducted with 5- to 6-year-old 
children, to investigate whether older children would perform differently.
The results show that there was no difference in the perfomiance of children from any 
of the three experimental groups, and that all groups perfonned significantly better than 
would be expected by chance. It seems that by the age of 5- to 6-years-old, children 




E x p e r i m e n t  7: T h e  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  e r r o r s  -  5- t o  6 - y e a r - o l d  c h i l d r e n
13.1 In trod u ction
The results of the previous chapter indicate that 3- and 4-year-old children, like 
chimpanzees, were unable to significantly benefit from the observation of errors. The design 
of the cunent methodology may have made the task conceptually more difficult than 
previous studies which have tested children of this age (Want & Hands, 2001). It is possible 
that the ability to solve the trap-tube task is related to the age of the participants. The 
following study was designed to investigate the potential effect o f  age on task solution.
13.2 M eth ods
13.2.1 Participants
The participants for this study were 9 children aged between 5- and 6-years-old (mean 
= 5:6, range = 5:0 -  6:3) of both sexes (4 males and 5 females). The children were recruited 
from Kilrymont Primary School, UK, following completion of a letter of parental consent 
(see Appendix B).
13.2.2 Apparatus
This study used the same apparatus and rewards that were used in Experiment 6 (see 
Chapter 12).
13.2.3 Procedure
The children were divided into the same experimental groups as Experiment 6, with 
approximately equal numbers of males and females of each age (see Table 13.1). The 
children were tested in a separate room within the school, following the same procedure as 





There was no significant difference in the performance of children from the control 
group and either of the experimental groups. This was true for the number of tool insertions 
(see Table 13.1), the niunber of successful trials (median controls = 90, median C-only = 90; 
Maim-Whitney U-test for unmatched samples, z = -0.47, Ni = 3, N2 = 3, p = 0.637, two- 
tailed; median I+C = 90; Mann-Whitney U-test for umnatched samples, z = -0.471, Ni = 3, 
N2 = 3, p = 0.637, two-tailed; see Fig. 1), and the tendency to develop a side bias (median 
controls = 50, median C-only = 50; Maim-Wintney U-test for umnatched samples, z = -0.69, 
Ni = 3, N2 = 3, p = 0.487, two-tailed; median I+C = 40; Mann-Whitney U-test for unmatched 
samples, z = -0.94, Ni = 3, N2 = 3, p = 0.346, two-tailed). Therefore children from all tlnee 
experimental groups performed in a similar way.
S u b j e c t
A g e /S e x G r o u p No. Tool
INSERTIONS
%  CORRECT 
TRIALS
%  L e f t  s i d e
INSERTIONS
JW 6M Control 10 90* 40
DS 6F Control 10 90* 60
EG 5F Control 10 100* 50
SC 6M C-only 10 100* 50
SR 5M C-only 10 90* 50
AW 5F C-only 10 80 30
G 6F I+C 10 100* 50
DN 5M I+C 10 90* 40
LM 5F I+C 10 70 40
Table 13.1 The niunber of tool insertions, percentage o f  correct tool insertions and percentage of left-hand side 
insertions performed by subjects from each group. The symbol represents children who were able to solve 
the task significantly better than would be expected by chance (binomial test p < 0.05).
Since there were only tliree children in each group, it was not possible to determine 
whether each group performed above chance levels. However, when the perfomiances of all 
the children were analysed together, they solved the task significantly more often than would 












□  C-only 
I I+C
Controls C-cmly RC
Figure 13.1 Median percentage o f  successful trials performed by children for each experimental group. The 
error bars represent the inter-quartile range.
13.3.2 The success o f the control group
The control group observed demonstrations that were designed to eliminate the 
potential effects of stimulus enhancement. It is unlikely that their success was the result of 
emulation, since the actions of the demonstrator provided no information about the causal 
relationship between the tool and the reward. Similarly, the performance of this group cannot 
be explained by imitation, as the children inserted the tool into the apparatus on every trial 
despite never having been shown how to do this. If imitation were involved, the children 
would be expected to reproduce the irrelevant actions of the demonstrator, as was the case for 
the younger children in the previous chapter.
The performance of the control group did not improve across the block of trials, and 
hence was not influenced by a learning effect (Spearman’s rho: controls = 0, p = 1; see Fig.
13.2). It seems most likely that children in the control group were able to perform above 
chance because they came to the experiment with a prior understanding of the causal 
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Figure 13.2 Percentage o f children from the control group who chose the correct side o f tool insertion on each 
trial. The line represents the line o f  best-fit.
13.3.3 The success o f the experimental groups
The performance of children in both the control group and the experimental groups, 
suggests that 5- and 6-year-old children had prior knowledge about the causal principles that 
were required to solve the trap-tube task. It is therefore unsurprising that there was no 
significant difference in the performance of subjects from the C-only and the I+C groups. 
This was true for the number of tool insertions (see Table 13.1), the number of successful 
trials (median C-only = 90, median I+C = 90; Mann-Whitney U-test for unmatched samples, 
z = -0.25, Ni = 3, N2 = 3, p = 0.822, two-tailed), and the tendency to develop a side bias 
(median C-only = 50, median I+C = 40; Mann-Whitney U-test for unmatched samples, z = - 
0.24, Ni = 3, N2 = 3, p = 0.814, two-tailed). It seems likely that the children did not benefit 
from the observation of errors because they already knew how to solve the task.
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The only difference in the performance of children in the C-only and I+C groups was 
in the pattern of success. Children in the C-only group showed no evidence of a learning 
effect across the block of ten trials (Spearman’s rho: C-only = -0.114, p = 0.754; see Fig
13.3). However, in contrast, subjects in the I+C group did show a significant improvement in 
performance across trials (Spearman’s rho: I+C = 0.742, p = 0.014; see Fig. 13.3). This effect 
was brought about because the majority of children in this group chose the incorrect side of 
tool insertion on the first trial (but chose correctly on subsequent trials).
The failure of the I+C group on the first trial is unlikely to have resulted fi*om a lack 
of understanding of the task, since children in the control group were able to perform above 
chance on trial 1. Instead, it seems more plausible that the children’s tendency to reproduce 
the actions of the demonstrator (incorrect side first), on the first trial over-shadowed their 
ability to take account of the causal properties of the task. In other words, they went for the 
same side as had the demonstrator, but this was now incorrect. However, once they had 
experienced failure themselves, their own understanding of the task took over.
I 100 5%Ë
Y = 5.56X + 55.56Y = -0.61X + 93.33 ■ I+C•  C-only
5 7 8 91 2 3 4 6 1001'
T rial num ber Trail number
Figure 13.3 Percentage o f subjects from the C-only and I+C groups who chose the correct side o f tool insertion 
on each trial. The line represents the line o f best-fit.
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13.4 Discussion of Experiment 7
The successful performance of children in the control group indicates that 5- and 6- 
year-old children understood the causal principles that were involved in the trap-tube task, 
and were able to use this knowledge to perform significantly better than chance. Since 
children of this age already knew how to solve the task before the first trial, or were able to 
use the demonstrations to infer how to solve the task, there was no significant difference in 
the behaviour of children irrespective of which demonstration they obseiwed. The slight 
difference in the performance of the I+C group on the first trial provides fuiiher evidence that 
the behaviour of children can be influenced by their tendency to reproduce obseiwed actions 
at the expense of efficiency (Nagell et al., 1993; Whiten et al., 1996; see Chapter 4).
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CHAPTER 14
G e n e r a l  d is c u s s io n  o f  E x p e r im e n t s  5  t o  7
The results of Experiments 1 to 3 suggested that chimpanzees are sensitive to the 
causal relevance of observed actions, as they can differentiate and selectively exclude the 
inelevant pai'ts of a demonstration. If chimpanzees are able to learn causal infoimation by 
obsei*vation, it follows that they could benefit more from obseiwing errors and success, than 
just success, since errors provide additional information about what not to do. The trap-tube 
task was employed to test this hypothesis with chimpanzees and children aged 3- to 6-years- 
old.
14.1 The trap-tube task: Summary
The trap-tube is a clear, plastic, horizontal tube with a trapping hole located in the 
centi'e. When a food reward is placed in the tube it can only be retrieved by dislodging the 
reward with a thick tool. However, because of the trap, the end in which the tool is inserted 
deteiinines whether the food is pushed into the trap, or out of the opposite end of the tube. 
The reward can only be successfully retrieved by always inserting the tool into the end of the 
tube farthest from the reward, thereby passing over the trap and pushing the food out of the 
opposite side. In Experiments 5 to 7, the food reward was placed on different sides of the trap 
during each trial in a randomised sequence.
Subjects were divided into three gi'oups. The correct only group (C-only) obseiwed a 
human experimenter always succeed in retrieving the food reward from the trap-tube. The 
incorrect + correct group (I+C) obseiwed the demonstrator first fail by trapping the food, 
then succeed and retrieve the reward. Both these experimental groups were compared to a 
control group, who observed the demonstrator move the tool in the same direction, and to the 
same extent as the experimental group. The major difference was that the tool was moved 




Chimpanzees who observed either success alone (C-only), or successes and failure 
(I+C) perfonned better than the control subjects. It seems that by observing the tool make 
contact with the reward, chimpanzees in the experimental groups learned the causal relevance 
of tool-reward contact. However, there was no significant difference in the perfomiance of 
the C-only or I+C groups, and therefore the chimpanzees did not seem to benefit specifically 
from the observation of errors.
Two subjects learned to avoid the trap. However, this strategy only emerged during 
the second half of the study, and was based on an incomplete set of rules that revealed many 
of their misconceptions. For example, their tendency to use multiple tool insertions, and 
place their hands under the reward as it moved along the tube, revealed that they did not fully 
understand the properties of the trap, or the relationship between the direction in which the 
reward moved and whether it would be trapped or retrieved. It seems that the chimpanzees 
understood the relevance of contact, as subjects in the experimental groups learned by 
observation to insert the tool into the apparatus. However, they did not fully understand the 
other causal principles involved in the task.
14.2.2 Multiple causal relationships
Visalberghi & Tomasello (1998) and Povinelli (2000) have argued that the tiap-tube 
task may be conceptually difficult, as it involves a number of specific causal principles, 
which together may overwhelm chimpanzees. For example, it involves contact between the 
tool and reward, force exerted by the tool in order to move the reward, and gravity which 
mediates the passage of the reward into the trap. The literature indicates that chimpanzees 
have little Imowledge of unobseiwable causal principles such as force and gi*avity. They may 
be able to form mles about the regularities imposed by these principles, but do not interpret 
this in a framework of abstract concepts. Povinelli (2000) has argued that chimpanzees may 
be able to learn mles of action in order to cope with miobservable principles, and may 
therefore perfomi better if these principles are tested individually. However, in the current
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study, the combination of causal relationships involved in the trap-tube task may have been 
too great for them to integrate.
Other studies have shown that chimpanzees are able to successfully solve the trap- 
tube task. For example, Visalberghi et al., (1995) and Reaux & Povinelli (2000) found that 
chimpanzees could form rules that allowed them to avoid the trap, even when the difficulty 
of the task was increased by altering the position of the trap (see Chapter 3). However, the 
current task may have made it more difficult for the chimpanzees to extract patterns of 
regularity because it involved social learning. Bard et al., (1995) found that chimpanzees 
could benefit from observing a model solve a tube task. However, the tube did not contain a 
trap, and therefore only one causal relationship was involved in solution; contact between the 
tool and the reward. The findings of the present study support the finding of Bard et al., 
(1995) that chimpanzees can learn the relevance of contact by obseiwation. However, the 
additional causal relationships involved in the trap-tube task may have made the 
demonstrations confusing for the chimpanzees, and hindered their ability to extract patterns 
of regularity that involved multiple causal relationships.
In the wild, chimpanzees are able to learn tool-use tasks such as nut-cracking that 
involve multiple causal relationships. However, it takes many years for a young chimpanzee 
to become proficient. Longitudinal studies have shown that youngsters learn to nut-crack in 
stages, first combining nuts and anvils, then hammers and anvils, only later combining all 
tliree relationships to successfully crack nuts (Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997). This 
observation supports the hypothesis that chimpanzees learn single causal relationships first, 
and then with experience learn to combine these relationships to solve tasks involving 
multiple principles.
14.2.3 Presenting simultaneous choices
Povinelli (2000) has argued that when multiple causal relationships are involved, 
chimpanzees may perform better if alternative solutions to a problem are presented 
simultaneously and the chimpanzees are required to choose between then. For example, he 
found that chimpanzees were able to solve the ‘trap-table task’ more frequently than the
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‘trap-tube task’. In the trap-table task, chimpanzees are presented with two tables; on each 
table is a food reward and a tool, that can be used to rake the reward towards the subject. 
However, one of the tables contains a trap in front of the reward, so that if the reward is 
pulled over the trap, it will fall and be lost. On the other table, in the same position as the 
trap, is a painted square, mimicking the trap (see Fig. 14.1). Povinelli argued that 
chimpanzees perform better at this task, although it taps the same knowledge as the trap-tube 
task, because each alternative can be seen. The chimpanzees therefore do not have to imagine 
and hold in mind both outcomes at the same time. He argued that the trap-tube task is 
difficult because subjects must imagine two outcomes (inserting tool into the left or the right 
side of the tube), in order to determine which action will lead to success. Thus, if the trap- 
tube task does overwhelm chimpanzees in this way, it may be too demanding a paradigm to 






Figure 14.1 Trap-table apparatus used by Povinelli et al (2000), page 133.
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14.3 3- to 4-year-old children
14.3.1 Experimental results
When the same experiment was conducted with 3- to 4-year-old children, they also 
did not benefit from the observation of errors. However, their mistakes revealed a different 
set of misconceptions. Children from the control group, like the chimpanzees, rarely inserted 
the tool into the apparatus. However, instead of trying in vain to insert their hands into the 
tube (as the chimpanzee controls had done), they tended to reproduce the irrelevant actions of 
the demonstrator. Many of the children fi'om the control group recreated the irrelevant 
movements of the tool across the top of the tube, and in some cases repeated the inelevant 
vocalisations of the demonstrator. It seems that when the children did not understand the 
principles of the task, they did not ignore the demonstration like the chimpanzees, but opted 
to include a greater proportion of what they saw.
Children from the experimental groups also showed a tendency to recreate the 
actions of the demonstrator, as they each showed a bias tliroughout the experiment for 
inserting the tool into the same side of the tube as the demonstrator had done on the first trial. 
However, they inserted the tool significantly more frequently than the control group. 
Therefore, like the chimpanzees, they seemed to benefit from observing the tool make 
contact with the reward, but did not significantly benefit from the observation of errors.
14.3.2 Comparisons with published studies
The literature suggests that by the age of 3-years-old, children have knowledge of the 
causal principles that are involved in successful completion of the trap-tube task, such as 
contact, force and gravity (see Chapter 4). However, in the majority of these studies, 
Imowledge of each of these principles is tested individually, and it could be that children do 
not learn to combine this knowledge until later. Bullock et al., (1982) showed that 3-year-old 
children were able to combine their knowledge of these principles to correctly predict the 
outcome of an observed sequence of events (see section 4.3.2). However, the children were 
required to deteimine the only possible outcome, and did not have to choose between 
alternative solutions. It is therefore possible that the children could solve that task at age 3-
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years because there was only one alternative. The trap-tube task may present a more difficult 
problem, as there are two potential outcomes; success and failure.
14.4 5- to 6-year-old children
14.4.1 Experimental results
hi contrast, 5- to 6-year old children performed better than the younger children and 
the chimpanzees. Subjects from all three groups, including the control group, were able to 
perfomi significantly better than chance. The successful performance of children in the 
control group indicates that 5- to 6-year-old children understood the causal principles 
involved in the trap-tube task. They may have understood how to solve the task before the 
experiment began, or were able to use their causal knowledge to deduce how to solve the task 
once their attention had been drawn to the movements of the tool. Therefore it is not 
surprising that they did not benefit from observing errors.
The results suggest that although younger children (and possibly chimpanzees), may 
have knowledge about the principles involved in the trap-tube task, they are not able to 
combine this knowledge until the age of 5- to 6-years-old.
14.5 Developmental sequence
The findings of this set of studies contrast with the results of Want & Hands (2001), 
who found that 3-year-old children benefited from observing errors in a similar, yet not 
identical task. However, the methodology used by Want and Hams may have made the task 
easier than the present design by increasing the potential for children to solve the task by 
association (see Chapter 12).
hi the present set of experiments, the observation of errors did not significantly 
benefit children from either age group. Want & Harris (2002) have suggested that children go 
through a developmental progression, from mimicry at birth, tin^ough imitation and finally to 
emulation by the age of 3 years. The results of this study agree with the order of the 
developmental sequence, but cast doubts over the age at wliich children are able to emulate. 
All studies to date (Brown, 1990; Bauer, 1992; Chen, Sanches, & Campbell, 1997; Bauer &
157
Kleinknecht, 2002) have failed to provide convincing evidence for emulation in children. For 
example, many of these studies involve children obseiwing the solution to one task and then 
being asked to transfer the causal relationships inherent in the solution of the first task to a 
second task. However, the children aie given the opportunity to interact with the first set of 
apparatus before transferring the causal relationships to the second task. Therefore individual 
learning, rather than social learning may underlie children’s appreciation of the causal 
relationships (Want & Harris, 2002).
14.6 Comparative conclusions
The performance of the children and chimpanzees in the control groups reveals 
interesting species differences. It seems that when chimpanzees have an incomplete 
understanding of a task, they respond by ignoring the démonstration and trying their own 
alternative strategy, such as trying to retrieve the reward with their fingers. In the context of 
the trap-tube task, this was manifested in an incomplete set of associations, combined with 
learning the general relevance of inserting the tool into the apparatus, hi contrast, when 
human children have an incomplete understanding of the causal relationsliips in an observed 
sequence, they tend to copy a large proportion of the actions that they see, irrespective of 
their causal relevance. In the context of the trap-tube task this was seen in the 3- to 4-year-old 
children’s tendency to develop a side bias that was probably influenced by copying the first 
successful action of the demonstrator. In addition, children in the control group were seen to 
reproduce the irrelevant actions and vocalisations of the demonstrator. However, by the age 
of 5- to 6-years-old, children were able to combine their loiowledge of contact, force and 
gravity to succeed at the trap-tube task. Nevertheless, they did not benefit from the 
observation of errors, and the current study does not provide any additional evidence that 
children of this age are able to emulate. This finding fits with other studies that have found 
children to imitate in situations where a task could be solved more efficiently by emulation 
(Nagell et al., 1993; Whiten et al., 1996).
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CHAPTER 15
O v e r a l l  d isc u s sio n
The results of each experiment have been discussed in some detail in Chapters 10 and 
14. The purpose of this final chapter is to give a summary of the conclusions that were drawn 
fr om the literature review, and the key findings of each empirical chapter. The results of each 
experiment will be discussed in tenns of their general implications for chimpanzee and child 
cognition.
15.1 Review of the literature: Chimpanzees
15.1.1 Causal Imowledge
The literature suggests that chimpanzee causal knowledge can best be characterised 
by an ability to rapidly detect patterns of regularity in the events that they obseiwe, and use 
these patterns to form associations that link causes to effects (Kohler, 1927; Tomasello & 
Call, 1997; Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998; Povinelli, 2000). It seems that chimpanzees can 
fbnn mles about many regularities that they can see, such as event A is always followed by 
event B. However, there is little evidence that chimpanzees learn about unobservable causal 
principles that bind a cause and effect, such as force and gravity. While chimpanzees may be 
able to rapidly foim mles about these principles, such as dropping an object causes it to fall, 
or that pushing an object causes it to move, they do not inteipret these regularities in a 
framework of abstract concepts.
It seems that chimpanzees can form mles about many different events, however they 
may be cognitively overwhelmed when presented with tasks that involve more than one 
causal relationship (for example in an experimental setting). Many of the natinal behaviours 
of chimpanzees do involve multiple causal relationships, such as nut-cracking. However, it 
takes chimpanzees many years to become proficient nut-crackers. Observational studies 
suggest that young chimpanzees first learn individual mles about the relationship between the 
hammer and anvil, hammer and nut, and anvil and nut, which are then combined together 
over many years to accomplish the final behaviour (Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997).
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Thus, complex tool-use behaviours that involve many causal interactions may be 
conceptually difficult for chimpanzees.
Nevertheless, the ability of chimpanzees to extract patterns of regularity is impressive 
in comparison to other non-human primates, and sufficient for their way of life. Their mle- 
based causal knowledge allows them to use tools, and interact with a diverse variety of 
objects (see Chapter 3). Indeed, Povinelli (2000) has suggested that rule foimation is such a 
successful adaptive strategy in chimpanzees, that they are able to extract rules with 
impressive speed. It has been argued that chimpanzees may outperform monkeys in causal 
tasks, not because they have a deeper understanding of the tasks, but because they are so 
good at fonning rapid associations (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998; Povinelli, 2000).
As long as chimpanzees can observe the regularities inherent in the solution to a 
particular problem (causal information), they are able to extract adaptive rules which can 
then be used to solve the task in their own later efforts. Hence, chimpanzees do have causal 
knowledge, and it is possible that they can identify relevant regularities by observation. The 
causal knowledge of chimpanzees is therefore sufficient to potentially be involved in social 
learning.
15.1.2 Social learning
The social learning literature indicates that chimpanzees employ different social 
learning strategies under different experimental conditions. Specifically, it seems that 
chimpanzees employ imitation more readily in non tool-use tasks, such as those involving the 
reproduction of gestures or single object manipulations. In contrast, they seem to employ 
emulation more readily to solve tasks that involve tool-use. However, rather than assuming 
that it is the task domain which dictates the social learning strategy which chimpanzees 
employ, Chapter 2 suggests more generally that chimpanzees might be influenced by the 
availability of causal information.
Studies that have found evidence for emulation have typically involved tool-use, and 
thus have involved causal relationships between objects, such as a tool and a reward. In these
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situations, chimpanzees may employ emulation because they have access to information 
about the causal relationships of the objects involved. They are able to use this information to J
detect the relevant parts of a behaviour, and form associative rules about cause and effect. 
Chimpanzees may preferentially employ emulation because it is a highly flexible strategy. I
Learning rules of action allows socially learned information to be generalised to different j
situations (Tomasello et a l, 1987; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1994; Want & Harris, 2001, j
2002). )
In contrast, studies that have found evidence for imitation, such as the ‘Do-as-I-dol’ j
paradigm used by Hayes & Hayes (1952) and Custance et a l, (1995), do not involve I1environmental components, and thus no causal information is available to the subjects. |
Similarly, in studies that have involved object manipulation, such as the ‘artificial fruit’ ]
I(Whiten et a l, 1996; Whiten, 1999; Marshall-Pescini, 2002), the tasks involved the |
1manipulation of a single object with the hands, and did not involve causal relationships 4
between objects. Causal information was therefore either relatively restricted or difficult to j
infer, and the chimpanzees may have employed imitation to solve each task because j
emulation could not be so readily implemented. Thus, the trend for imitation in non tool-use j
tasks, and emulation in tool-use tasks may be related to the availability of causal information, I
and not the task domain per s q . I
I15.2 Experimental predictions j
(i) If this interpretation of the literature is correct, it follows that chimpanzees could j
be influenced to switch between imitation and emulation to solve the same task by altering j
the availability of causal information. It was predicted that if chimpanzees had access to ;j
Irelevant information about the causal relationships involved in a task, they could use this Jj
information to solve the task by emulation. However, if access to causal information is j
restricted, it was predicted that chimpanzees would be able to switch to imitation to solve the |
same problem. |
■1(ii) Similarly, if chimpanzees are able to learn causal relationships by observation, '1they should benefit more from watching en*ors and successes and successes alone. This is I1because observing eiTors provides additional causal infoimation about what not to do. i
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15.3 Experimental results
15.3.1 (i) Imitation and emulation switching in chimpanzees
Young chimpanzees observed a human demonstrate a tool-use task that involved both
. irelevant and irrelevant actions. When the apparatus was presented in an opaque condition, in ]
which access to information about the causal relationship between the tool and the reward {
1was restricted, the chimpanzees reproduced a more complete copy of the model’s behaviour. t
They reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant parts of the demonstration, in accordance j
with imitation. However, when the same task was presented in a transparent condition, so |
that the causal relationship between the tool and the reward was visible, the chimpanzees |
switched to emulation, insofar as they reproduced only the results of the model’s actions, ‘
while ignoring the irrelevant parts of the observed behaviour. This ability to switch between 
imitation and emulation was not the result of increasing experience with the apparatus, as 
subjects who interacted with the transparent box first also excluded the irrelevant actions, in 
accord with emulation. When these individuals were then given access to the opaque 
apparatus, they continued to exclude the iiTelevant action, although the opportunity to 
monitor the causal relationships between the tool and reward had been removed. This 
suggests that the chimpanzees were able to transfer some of what they had learned about the 
causal relevance of their actions from the transparent apparatus to the new experimental 
condition.
Thus, the notion that commonly arises in the literature that the prevalence of evidence 
for emulation in social learning indicates a deficit of imitative capacity in chmipanzees may 
be misleading. The results of Experiment 1 suggest more generally that when causal 
information is available, chimpanzees tend to use emulation. This may be because emulation 
is a highly flexible strategy, which allows socially learned infonnation to be generalised to 
different situations. It seems that chimpanzees are able to imitate, but do so mainly in 
situations were emulation is not possible. Thus, the availability of causal information plays 
an important role in chimpanzee social learning, by detennining which learning strategy is 
employed, and ultimately the degree of behavioural fidelity that is achieved.
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15.3.2 (ii) Observation o f errors
The trap-tube task was included in this study to determine whether chimpanzees 
could learn about causal relationships by observing errors. However, with the benefit of 
hindsight, it appears that the trap-tube task may have presented the chimpanzees with too 
complex a problem to tap their ability to learn from mistakes, hi order to successfully solve 
the task, rules must be formed about the regularities of the task. However, some of these 
regularities are mediated by unobservable phenomena, such as force and giavity. Hence the 
multiple causal relationships involved in the task may have overwhelmed the chimpanzees. 
However, the trap-tube task did provide some interesting data about the types of causal 
information that can be learned by observation.
15.3.3 Types o f causal information that can be learned by observation
In the trap-tube task, chimpanzees from both experimental groups who observed tool- 
reward contact, inserted the tool into the tube significantly more than the control group who 
did not see tool-reward contact. Thus, as in Experiment 1, the chimpanzees seemed to learn a 
rule about the causal relevance of tool-reward contact by observation. Contact is an 
observable regularity that is basic to many, if not all, tool-use activities. The causal relevance 
of contact between a tool and a reward can be easily recognised, and it is therefore 
unsurprising that the chimpanzees were able to learn this rule by observation.
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 confinned that chimpanzees were able to leam 
about contact, as it seems they were able to detemiine that actions to the top of the box in 
Experiment 1 were causally in elevant, because the tool did not contact the reward.
The central feature of chimpanzee knowledge is that it is based on rules that are not 
embedded in a framework of concepts. Therefore, although the chimpanzees were able to 
generalise the mles of contact learned in Experiment 1 from the transparent box to the 
opaque box, and later to solve Experiments 2 and 3, they did not understand the conditions of 
contact at a deeper level. Therefore, when presented with the trap-tube task (a completely 
different task), the chimpanzees had to leam new rules. Hence, only subjects who observed 
tool-reward contact in the context of the trap-tube task, were able to fbnn useful rules.
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Subjects from the control group, who did not see tool-reward contact, behaved as if they had 
no knowledge of the requirements of the task, although the same subjects had successfully 
learned contact rules that were specific to the previous experiments.
The ability to fonn rules about the relevance of contact accounts for only one of the 
causal principles involved in the trap-tube task. Successful completion of the trap-tube task 
involves contact between the tool and the reward, as well as force which must be exerted to 
move the reward along the tube, and gravity which mediates the passage of the reward into 
the trap. Hence, rules must be formed about each of these principles in order to perform 
significantly better than chance.
Two subjects from the experimental groups learned to avoid the trap. However, the 
rules that they formed to retrieve the reward were incomplete. Both chimpanzees used 
multiple pushes of the tool to move the reward along the tube, constantly pausing to monitor 
its passage. In addition, they both held their hand under the reward as it moved, indicating 
that they expected it to drop at any time, even when it was moving away from the trap. These 
obseiwations suggest that, although the chimpanzees had knowledge about contact, they did 
not hilly recognise certain other causal relationships involved in the task, i.e. force and 
gravity. Their incomplete knowledge of these unobservable principles seems to have 
hindered their performance.
The results of this set of experiments support the theory that chimpanzees are able to 
learn about certain causal features of the world by obseiwation. They are able to rapidly 
detect patterns of regularity in the events that they observe, and differentiate between 
relevant and irrelevant actions. They use this infonnation to form mles that link a cause to an 
effect. However, these mles can only be fonned about events that can be directly observed. 
Chimpanzees show little, if any, Imowledge of imobservable phenomena such as gi*avity. 
Chimpanzee’s ability to emulate seems to be based on their ability to rapidly fomi such rules, 
and be able to generalise previous mles to similar problems. In some situations these rules 
can be generalised, as in Experiments 1 to 3. However, in other situations they can not, as in
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Experiment 5. This is because chimpanzees do not interpret the Imowledge that they have in 
a framework of abstract principles.
If a subject were able to represent causal relationships in a framework of abstract 
principles, it would be expected that they could generalise knowledge gained tlnough 
experience with one problem to a completely novel situation that involved the same causal 
principle. In the scenario above, it would be expected that if the chimpanzee had an abstract 
concept of contact, they would be able to solve all contact problems, including the trap-tube 
task, and perhaps detemiine the solution to such problems a priori. An additional way to test 
this hypothesis would be to present specific generalisation tests. For example, a subject could 
observe a demonstrator use a rake to retrieve an out of reach reward. Before the observer was 
allowed to interact with the appaiatus, they would then be presented with a different task in 
which the reward itself, the location of the reward and the configuration of the tool was 
different. The ability to generalise knowledge gained through observation to this novel 
situation would indicate that the subject had knowledge of the general principle of contact. If 
the subject was able to generalise in this way when presented with a variety of problems that 
tested different causal principles (such as contact, force and gravity tasks), it would suggest 
that they were able to represent causal relationships in framework of abstract principles.
15.3.4 Causal information and emulation
The ability to emulate suggests that chimpanzees ar e able to remember rules that have 
proved useful in the past, since they are able to find efficient solutions to novel problems. 
Studies have shown that chimpanzees are able to remember a diverse range of infonnation. 
For example, they are able to remember the spatial location of nut-cracking sites (Boesch & 
Boesch, 1984) and temiite mounds (Goodall, 1986). They are also able to recall social 
infonnation about previous acts of support from individual group members, which can be 
used to determine coalition formation, and differential levels of reconciliation (de Waal, 
1990, 1991, 1992). It is therefore possible that chimpanzees can also remember specific 
causal rules.
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Chimpanzee causal knowledge may therefore not be based on a transient ability to 
form dyadic links between events. Rather, it may be based on a ‘store’ of rules formed from 
previous experience with their environment. Therefore, when faced with a task, such as the 
raking experiment of Tomasello et al., (1987), they are able to either quickly identify 
regularities and form new task-specific rules, or draw on rules from memory in order to solve 
the same task in a different, more efficient way. However, when causal information is not 
available, such rules are ineffective, and chimpanzees therefore switch to a strategy of 
imitation if an appropriate model has been obseived.
15.4 Conclusions from the literature; Children
15.4.1 Causal Imowledge
The developmental literature indicates that children develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of the world than do chimpanzees. Unlike chimpanzees, they do seem to have 
knowledge of unobservable causal principles, which they can use to form abstract concepts. 
A number of authors have suggested that children may be sensitive to phenomena such as 
force and gravity from birth (Spelke et al., 1995; hi-Kyeong & Spelke, 1999). By the age of 
3-years-old children are able to combine different forms of causal Imowledge to solve tasks 
that involve prediction and action, and thus rely on more than simple association (Bullock et 
al, 1982; Shultz et a l, 1982; Krist et al, 1993; Hood, 1995; von Hofsten et al, 1998). This 
would suggests that children would also be inclined to employ emulation in similar situations 
to chimpanzees.
15.4.1 Social learning
Comparative studies, which have tested chimpanzees and children under similar 
experimental conditions, have found that children tend to employ imitation in the same 
situations in which chimpanzees tend to emulate (Nagell et a l, 1993; Whiten et al, 1996). 
Imitation is known to play an important role in early language acquisition (Meltzoff, 1988) 
and object Imowledge (Abravanel & Gingold, 1985; BarT et al, 1996), and some authors 
have argued that the capacity for imitation may be present from birth (Meltzoff & Moore, 
1977, 1983, 1989, 1994). Indeed, it has been suggested that it is because imitation is such an 
adaptive learning strategy in child development, that it is routinely employed in situations
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where alternative learning strategies would be more efficient (Whiten et a l, 1996). Children 
may employ imitation more readily because, unlike the chimpanzees, they preferentially 
focus on the actions, rather than results and goals of a demonstrator. They may also 
reproduce a high fidelity copy of a demonstrator’s behaviour because they have a greater 
tendency to infer intentions, and are more influenced by social confonnity.
15.5 Experimental predictions
(i) From the review of the literature on causal knowledge, it would be expected that, 
like the chimpanzees, children would be able to learn about causal relationships by 
observation. However, the social learning literature provides no conclusive evidence that 
children use emulation to solve experimental tasks (Want & Harris, 2002). Therefore the 
appropriate predictions for this set of experiments was unclear. The comparative studies in 
this thesis were therefore conducted fi*om a neutral perspective, in order to determine whether 
children would perform differently in a tool-use task that was conducted with the same level 
of control as a study with a non-human primate.
15.6 Experimental results
15.6.1 Imitation and emulation switching in children
In contrast to the chimpanzees, children tended to recreate the actions that they 
obseiwed without appearing to consider the causal efficiency of their behaviour. The 
inclusion of functionally irrelevant actions, coupled with the high fidelity reproduction of the 
observed two-action methods of defence removal, strongly suggest that children relied on 
imitation to retrieve the reward in both conditions. The tendency to imitate was not
influenced by either the age or the sex of the children.
Yet the literature (see Chapter 4) suggests that children of this age may have more 
sophisticated causal knowledge than chimpanzees. Why then did the children not utilise this 
knowledge to develop the most efficient technique to retrieve the reward? It seems most
likely that, although the children may have appreciated that some of their actions were not
necessary to solve the task, they reproduced them because the demonstrator did not indicate
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that they were either accidental or undesirable. Therefore differences in the behaviour of 
chimpanzees and children can perhaps best be explained by a differential focus of attention 
on actions, results and goals, with the latter possibly influencing the interpretation of the 
actions of the demonstrator as intentional.
The results of this experiment are therefore consistent with other studies that have 
foimd children to imitate in situations were emulation would lead to a more efficient solution.
15.6.2 Observation o f errors: 3- to 4-year-old children
Like chimpanzees, the young childien did not seem to benefit from observing enors. 
However, the performance of children in the control group revealed interesting species 
differences. The 3- to 4-year-old children from the control group performed much like the 
chimpanzees, in that they rarely inserted the tool into the tube. However, unlike the 
chimpanzees (who typically hit the apparatus with the tool or tried in vain to reach the reward 
with their fingers), the children tended to recreate the actions of the demonstrator. For 
example, they moved the tool across the top of the apparatus, and in some cases reproduced 
the vocalisations that the demonstiator had used. Again, as in Experiment 4, the children 
were reproducing the causally in'elevant behaviour that they had observed.
The 3- to 4-year-old children from the experimental groups, like the chimpanzees, 
learned the causal relevance of tool-reward contact, since they inserted the tool into the tube 
significantly more often that the control group. However, they did not significantly benefit 
from observing errors. Instead, they showed a tendency to reproduce the first successful 
action of the demonstrator. Thus, in the majority of trials the children showed a bias for the 
left side of the tube, which was the side used by the experimenter during the first 
demonstration. Again, it seems that they were more influenced by the actions of the 
demonstrator, rather than the causal relevance of their behaviour.
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15.6.3 Observation o f errors: 5~ to 6-year-old children
Children approximately one year older behaved differently from both the younger 
children and the chimpanzees. Children from all three experimental groups (including the 
control group) were able to solve the task significantly more frequently than would be 
expected by chance. The children did not seem to benefit from the observation of eiTors, but 
they did seem to take account of the causal relevance of their behaviour. The fact that the 
control subjects were also able to solve the task suggests that by the age of 5-years-old, 
children have knowledge of the causal relationships involved in the trap-tube task. In 
addition, this knowledge does not seem to take the form of associative rules, as the children 
could solve the task in the majority of trials, and used neither the multiple push strategy, nor 
the hand moving strategy used by the chimpanzees. Therefore the children seemed to have 
some understanding of the unobservable causal relationships inlierent in solution; force and 
gi'avity.
The literature indicates that 3- to 4-year-old children may also have Imowledge of 
these principles. However, for the same reasons as with the chimpanzees, the multiple causal 
relationships that were presented in the trap-tube task may have oveiwhelmed them. 
Therefore, although they may be able to solve a trap-tube task at this age when it is not 
presented as a social learning paradigm (Limongelli, 1995; cited in Visalberghi & Tomasello, 
1998), they found the demonstrations in the present study confusing.
Indeed, this study highlights the importance of age as a variable in child cognition. At 
the age of 3- to 4-years-old the children appeared to be overwhelmed by the multiple causal 
relationships presented in the trap-tube task, and relied strongly on imitation to retrieve the 
reward. However, 5- to 6-year-old children did not seem to imitate the actions of the 
demonstrator. It appears that as the children’s individual understanding of the causal 
relationships they observed increased, their reliance on imitation decreased. In the context of 
the present study, it seems that a critical level of understanding was reached by the children 
between the ages of 5- and 6-years-old when their reliance on individual learning outweighed 
their reliance on social learning.
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15.7 Species differences
When the chimpanzees were ovei*whelmed by the trap-tube task, they responded by 
ignoring the demonstrations, and trying their own method of reaching the reward, consistent 
with emulation. In contrast, when the younger children were overwhelmed by the 
demonstrations, they opted for a strategy of including a gieater proportion of the 
demonstrator’s actions and vocalisations. Thus, although the experiments with the 
opaque/clear box and the trap-tube were designed to investigate different hypotheses, the 
results of both experiments support comparative studies which have found children to 
employ imitation in situations where alternative social learning strategies may be more 
efficient (Nagell et ah, 1993; Whiten et al., 1996).
The predominance of imitation in children, and the important role that it plays in the 
acquisition of language and motor skills, has lead some authors to suggest that imitation may 
be such an adaptive human strategy, that it is often employed at the expense of efficiency 
(Whiten et al., 1996). Likewise, it may also be true that emulation is such an adaptive 
strategy in chimpanzees that it is often employed at the expense of copying fidelity.
15.8 The question of culture
Chapter 2 uncovered some of the disagieements in the literature about the claim for 
chimpanzee culture. Some authors have argued that only particular social learning 
mechanisms, such as imitation, can guarantee that a behaviour is transmitted accurately 
enough for a cultural variant to be maintained (Galef, 1992; Heyes, 1993; Tomasello, Kruger 
et al., 1993; Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993). They ai*gue that other forms of 
social learning are too inaccurate for variants to remain distinct over time. The results of this 
study indicate that different social learning processes may predominate in acquiring different 
types of behaviour. For example, tasks such as nut-cracking, which involve obseiwable causal 
relationships between objects may rely more heavily on emulation than tasks such as termite 
fishing. In termite fishing, the causal relationship between the tool and the reward cannot be 
viewed inside the opaque termite moimd, and thus chimpanzees may rely more heavily on 
imitation. However, in both situations, other learning strategies such as enliancement are 
likely to be incorporated into the chimpanzee’s experience. It is therefore more realistic to
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acknowledge that cultural behaviours are probably acquired tlirough a mixture of different 
social learning processes (McGrew, 1992; Whiten & Ham, 1992; Boesch, 1993; McGrew, 
1993; Boesch, 1996b; Boesch, 1998; McGrew, 1998). The results of this set of studies 
suggest that chimpanzees are able to learn by both imitation and emulation, depending on the 
type of task. The key feature of emulation is that an observer recreates the results of a 
model’s behaviour. Thus, as long as chimpanzees are able to reproduce the final product of 
an observed behaviour, either by emulation or imitation, a cultural variant may be 
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APPENDIX A
N g a m b a  C h i m p a n z e e s : H i s t o r i e s  b e f o r e  a r r i v a l  a t  N g a m b a
Ju v en ile  G roup
N a m e S e x -  D a t e  o f  B i r t h C o n f i s c a t i o n  l o c a t i o n
Ajore F 1996 ( t  June 2001) Arua, Northern Uganda
Asega* M 1998 Ariia, Northern Uganda
Born in the bush - Lubara 
Baluku* M 1998 Mponde, QENP
Name o f  ranger rescued him
Bili* F 1997 DRC
Town in D RC  
Ikum* F 1995 Ama, Northern Uganda
H appy one - Lubara 
Indi* M 1999 Bwera, QENP
Independent one
Kalema* M 1996 Aimy border-post, Kampala
D r Gladys Kalema 
Kisembo M 1998 Arua, Northern Uganda
Mawa* M 1996 Arua, Northern Uganda
Has fa ced  problem s - Lubara 
Mukisa* F 1998 Bwera, QENP
Nkuniwa* F 1996 Cook at US Marine HQ, Kampala
/  am pro tected  - Luganda 
Pasa* F 1999 Ama, Northern Uganda
Named after PASA 
Umugenzi* M 1997 Bumndi
Friend - Kirundi 
Umutama* M 1996 Burundi
O ld one - Kirundi
Yiki* M 1998 ( t  June 2002) Bwera, QENP
Suiwivor - Lubara 
Yoyo* F 1998 Kasese
* Took part in one or more experiments. 
Italics: How the chimpanzees were named
A d u l t  G r o u p
N a m e S e x -  D a t e  o f  B i r t h C o n f i s c a t i o n  l o c a t i o n
Bahati F 1990 Kibale area, Western Uganda
Becky F 1991 Kampala area
Cindy* F 1993 Masindi, Western Uganda
Connie F 1989 Aimy raod-block near Mbarara
Eddy M 1989 Akefs Egyptian Circus, Kampala
Katie F 1987 Entebbe airport
Kidogo F 1984 Entebbe airport
Maisko M 1984 Entebbe airport
Megan F 1984 Entebbe airport
Mika M 1992 Akefs Egyptian Circus, Kampala
Nagoti F 1986 Kampala area
Natasha F 1990 Ai'ua, Northern Uganda
Peace F 1986 Colleen Hotel, Mukono, Uganda
Robbie M 1986 Kyambura village
Sally F 1991 Kampala area
Sophie F 1986 Malaba, Kenya borber
Sunday M 1987 Entebbe airport (Ex-circus chimpanzee)
Tumbo M 1989 Entebbe airport
APPENDIX B: L e t t e r  o f  p a r e n t a l  c o n c e n t
0 ^ 0
u n iv er sity  of ST ANDREWS
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY
ST ANDREWS, FIFE, SCOTLAND, U.K., KYI6 9JU
Victoria Horner Switchboard: (+44) 1334 462072
Direct line: (+44) 1334 462096 
Fax: (+44) 1334 463042 
E-mail: vkhl@st-and.ac.uk
Dear Parent /  Guardian
I  am a PhD student at S t Andrews University studying some aspects of normal 
development in young children. My work focuses on how children learn to solve a 
puzzle-game by watching someone else.
I  am writing to ask if you would permit your child to participate in this study.
The game involves using a tool to retrieve a cartoon-sticker from a plastic box. Each 
child would be shown how to solve the puzzle, and then allowed to retrieve the  
sticker 6 times. I  am interested in the exten t to which children copy the  
demonstrated technique, in comparison to exploring alternative methods. There is no 
wrong or right answer.
The study is designed to look at the development o f children as a group, and 
therefore not to single out individual d ifferences between children. Your child will 
be allowed to choose on a daily basis whether they participate or not. However, in 
the past it has been more problematic to persuade children that they can only 
participate 6 times!
The game would be video recorded, but the camera would focus mainly on the hands, 
and the tape would remain within the School of Psychology, and be viewed only for 
scientific analysis. In the event of the findings being published, no child will be 
identifiable from the rest of the group.
I  would be extremely grateful if you would permit you child to participate in this 




Please tick the relevant box:
I  give permission for my child to participate in this study [2 ]
I  do not wish my child to participate in this study O
Name o f child...............................................  Date o f birth.
Signature of parent /  guardian......................................................
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O  0 UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS 
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY
ST ANDREWS, FIFE, SCOTLAND, U.K., KY16 9JU
Victoria Horner Switchboard: (+44) 1334 462072
Direct line: (+44) 1334 462096 
Fax: (+44) 1334 463042 
E-mail: vklil@st-and.ac.uk
Dear Parent /  Guardian
I  am a psychology student studying intelligence in chimpanzees. Chimps are the most 
closely related animal to humans, and many scientists believe that by studying 
chimpanzees, we may learn a lot about why we are the way we are.
My work involves giving puzzle games to infant chimps to seeing how well they can 
solve them. To decide how cleaver the chimps are, I  then compare them to children 
of the same age. I  am th erefore writing to ask if you would permit your child to 
participate in a puzzle game study. The children would be part o f a group against 
which chimpanzees can be compared.
The puzzle game involves using a stick  to push a toy out of a plastic tube that is open 
at both ends. Each child will be shown how to solve th e task, then encouraged to  
retrieve the toy. I  am interested  in how children try to get the toy, not whether 
they succeed or fail, so there is no wrong or right answer.
The study is designed to look at children as a group, and not to single out individual 
d ifferences between children. Your child will be asked to choose on a daily basis 
whether they wish to participate or not. The game would be video recorded, but 
the tapes will be locked inside the university and viewed only as part of this study. 
No child will be identifiable by name. Many scientific journals require that 
researchers keep raw data for 5 years a fter  the study is published. The tapes will 
th erefore be destroyed 5 years a fter  the f ir s t  publication.
Having undergone a Fife Police background check, I  have been cleared to work with 
children.
I f  you wish your child to participate in this study, please could you fill out the form  




Please tick the relevant box:
I  give permission for my child to participate in this study 
I  do not wish my child to participate in this study \H \
Name of child...............................................  Date of birth.
Signature of parent /  guardian......................................................
i i il UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY ETHICS 
COMMITTEE
PROPOSAL FOR RESEARCH
Please submit 8 copies of the completed Proposal Form, which must include 
(if applicable) Participant Information Sheets, Debriefing Form, Consent 
Forms and any Advertisements for subjects to: Tracy Niven, Committee 
Secretary. Alternatively submit 1 copy by email attachment to tlml@ st“ 
and.ac.uk, clearly labeled ‘Ethics Application’ (you must however submit 1 
paper copy of the signed signature sheet).
Name and Status o f Proposer:
Victoria Homer, Postgraduate Student
Name o f Supervisor:
Prof. Andrew Whiten
Title o f Proposed Project:
Observational Learning about Causality in Tool-use
Does this Study involve the participation o f children and/or vulnerable adults?
YES
Please give a summary o f the proposed project, including the questions to he answered, 
fu ll details o f the participants, the procedures to be used, and how the data will be 
analysed. Explain in plain words why this particular investigation is important: what is it 
going to contribute to our Imowledge in the field? Use this page, and not more than one 
additional page.
The proposed study will use a trap-tube task to assess whether children are able to 
extract causal information about a tool-using problem by observing an adult demonstrator. 
It seems likely that the way in which an individual learns to use a tool by social learning 
will be directly related to his/her understanding of the causal relationships that they 
observe. One way to determine whether an observer monitors the causal significance of a 
demonstrator’s behaviour is to detennine what is learned fi'oni the observation of 
mistakes. It would be expected that if children are able to extract causal information by 
observation, they might benefit more from observing both the incorrect and coiTcct way to 
solve a task, than from observing only the coiTect solution. Seeing both correct and 
inconect responses might enable an individual to avoid making the same mistake as the 
demonstrator as well as providing additional visual infomiation from which causal 
relationships could potentially be inferred. The aim of the trap-tube task is to insert a tool
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into the correct end of the tube so as to retrieve the reward (a plastic dinosaur) without 
pushing it into the trapping-hole located in the center of the tube. The reward is placed 
either on the left or right side of the trapping hole; therefore the correct end of tool 
insertion is dependent on the position of the food relative to the trap (see Fig. 1). This 
experiment has recently been mn with juvenile chimpanzees in Uganda using food 
rewards. The purpose of the proposed study is to repeat this experiment with children of 
approximately the same age.
The proposed participants are 20 children aged between 3- and 4-years-old. The 
children will be divided into four groups. The correct only group will obseiwe the 
demonstrator successfully retrieve a plastic dinosaur from the trap-tube. The incorrect + 
correct group will see the demonstrator fail by trapping the dinosaur then succeed. The 
remaining two groups will act as controls. They will observe the demonstrator move the 
tool along the top of the apparatus in the same direction as the demonstration groups, but 
without the tool having a causal effect on the reward inside the tube. Each child will 
receive a block of 10 trials with a demonstration before each trial in accord with which 
group they are in. Children will be asked to retrieve as many of the 10 dinosaurs as 
possible over the block of 10 trials. At the end of the block, regardless of whether the child 
has succeeded, they will be asked to choose their favourite dinosaur toy, which they can 
take home.
If children are able to learn causal relationships by observation, it would be 
expected that the demonstration groups will retrieve significantly more dinosaurs than the 
control groups. Additionally, it would be expected that children in the incorrect + correct 
group will be more successful than the correct only group.
Each child will be asked individually if they wish to participate in the study, and 
no child will be made to feel obliged to take part. Children can withdraw from the study at 
any point. All demonstrations and trials will be video recorded. The tapes will be analysed 
later to determine the number of successes and failures, the side of tool insertion and any 
occunence of interesting qualitative data, such as particular strategies.
6. Please describe how the participants will be selected, and how informed consent 
will be obtained.
Participants will be selected on the basis of age from St Andrews Nursery School, St 
Andrews. Infoixned consent has already been obtained horn the head teacher, Mrs 
Edwards. Infomied consent foims have already been distributed to parents, and a 
poster giving infonnation about some of the comparative research earned out with 
chimpanzees has been put up in the nursery foyer for parents to read.
7. Will there be difficulty in obtaining informed consent due to participants’ age, 
mental illness or communication dijficulties?
YES
The participants are too young to give informed consent. Therefore a letter has 
been circulated to the children’s parents to ask for informed consent on their 
behalf.
8. Will the participants receive the standard payment o f £4 per hour NO
v il
The children will not receive payment for their participation in the study. Instead 
children will be given a toy dinosaur at the end of the experiment, regardless of their 
perfoimance.
9. Starting date o f project:
The project is ready to start, pending the return of parental consent fonns and ethical 
approval.
Duration o f project:
The project will hopefully be completed over a period of 3 to 4 weeks.
Duration o f involvement for individual participant:
Each participant will be involved in the study for no more than 20 minutes.
Location o f testing ofparticipants:
Children will be tested in a playroom at the nursery that is not used during the 
afternoons. The child will be separated from the rest of the class, but the door will 
be left open so that children can hear their classmates in the adjoining room and do 
not feel isolated.
10. Please state who will have access to the data, and what steps will be taken to keep 
data confidential.
The data tapes will be kept in the School of Psychology, and viewed only for the 
purposes of the current study. Written reports of the results will not contain any 
infomiation about the participants except for their age and sex. No child will be 
identifiable by name or by any other means.
11. a. Are there any potential hazards to either the investigator(s) or
participant(s). I f  YES, please explain what these are.
NO
b. Will the procedures cause discomfort or distress? I f  Yes, please explain 
what these are, and what steps will be taken to minimize them.
NO
c. What training has the investigator received in order to o f set any negative 
consequences resulting from the experiment?
The investigator has no formal training to off-set any negative consequences. 
However, the investigator does have history of working with young children in both a 
professional and research setting.
12. Are any o f the participants in a dependent relationship with the Investigator, (e.g. 
student). I f  YES, explain why this is necessary.
NO
13. a. Will participants be kept naïve to the purpose o f the experiment? NO
b. I f  YES, why is participant naivety necessary for achieving the aims o f the
research ? Please justify your answer.
Vlll
c. I f  NO, how will the participants be debriefed?
Participants will be told that they are playing the same game as the 
chimpanzees in the poster. The participants are thought to be too young to
be
fully debriefed about the results. However, a poster of the results of the 
study will be put up on the notice board at the school, so that teachers and 
parents can be debriefed in full. The poster will also contain contact 
information if parents have any particular questions or concerns.
14. Please note and justify any other aspect o f the research that in your view requires 
special ethical consideration.
All trials will be recorded on video camera. The children will not be specifically alerted to 
the presence of the camera, as this may change their behaviour. However, the camera will 
not be hidden, and its presence will not be denied if a child asks about it. Most journals 
requite that raw data is available for 5 years following publication. Tapes will therefore be 
destroyed 5 years after the date of first publication.
15. Where in the application have the following key points been addresses?
Confidentiality: 10 
Withdrawal: 5 
Infot'tned Consent: 6 
Debriefing: 13
I have had a Fife police check, which is clear and finds no reason to question my ability to 
work with children
For Undergraduate Supervisors (only)
Why do you consider this project requires special ethical consideration?
For All Supervisors
Please specify the particular aspects of the project you wish the committee to consider. 
Have you read the statement by the British Psychological Society on Code of Conduct and 
Ethical Principles
YES/NO
Applicant’s Signature.................................................................... Date.............. ..................
Supervisor’s Signature................................................................... Date................................
APPENDIX C
P il o t  s t u d y : I m it a t io n  a n d  e m u l a t io n  s w it c h in g  in  c h im p a n z e e s  
Introduction




Data collection took place at Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary, Uganda. See 
Chapters 5 and 6 for more details.
Participants
Subjects were 15 members of the juvenile group at Ngamba Island. Subjects 
ranged in age from 2- to 8-years-old and were of both sexes (see Table 1).
Apparatus
The experimental apparatus was a 16cnf polycarbonate box, that was presented in 
either an opaque or clear condition (see Figure 1). On the top of the box was a square hole 
3cm X  3cm, covered by a sliding lid. The hole could be opened by sliding the lid back 
using a protruding handle. On the front face of the box was a circular opening to a sloping 
tube concealed inside the box. A food reward, in the fomi of raisins, was placed at the 
bottom of this tube. The reward could be obtained by inserting the aluminium tool (22cm 
X 1cm) in the front hole and pulling the raisins out. hisertion of the tool into the top hole 
was not necessary to retrieve the rewai'd. Manipulation of the box could therefore be 
divided into irrelevant actions directed at the top of the box, and relevant actions directed 
at the front. The appar atus was secured onto a wooded board that was bolted to a bench 
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Figure 1. (a, c, d) Opaque Box - Subjects cannot see the location o f the reward inside the tube, and 
therefore cannot determine which actions are relevant to task solution, (b, d, e) Clear box - Subjects can see 
the location o f  the reward, and can therefore have the potential to detennine that the first action is 
irrelevant, (d) Clear box viewed from the side. Subjects can determine the location o f the reward.
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Subjects observed a human demonstrator use the tool to retrieve a food reward 
from one of the boxes. Each demonstration always involved two parts: (i) irrelevant 
actions -  slide back top lid, insert tool and move up and down three times, and (ii) 
relevant actions -  insert tool into front hole, retrieve reward. This can be seen more 







C o d e  D e s c r ip t io n
Put - pick up tool
OL - open lid on top with index finger
IT - insert tool into opened top hole
M 3X - move up and down to hit bottom 3 times
CL - close lid
IF - insert tool in front hole




Figure 2. Schematic representation o f  demonstration.
The apparatus was presented in two conditions, opaque and clear (see Fig 6.1). In 
the opaque condition, causal information was unavailable since the surfaces of the box 
were black so that subjects could not see the location of the food tube, or the effect of the 
tool within the apparatus. It was predicted that when the causal information was restricted 
in this way, subjects would selectively include both irrelevant and relevant actions in their 
own later efforts, consistent with imitation.
In the clear condition, causal information was available, as the effect of the tool 
inside the box could be viewed. It was therefore possible to perceive that actions in the 
top of the box had no causal link with the reward. It was predicted that when causal 
information was available in this way, subjects would be inclined to develop an 




Subjects observed a human experimenter demonstrate how to retrieve the reward 
from the box in either the opaque or clear condition. Subjects were tested individually 
within the holding facility (see Chapter 5). Prior to each trial the experimenter would 
enter the research room and play with or groom the subject for approximately five 
minutes to reaffirm the relationship with the experimenter. Testing would begin as soon 
as the subject was calm. The experimenter would then move to the apparatus, which was 
bolted to a bench in the room, and demonstrate how to retrieve the reward (see Fig. 3). 
The chimpanzee would typically sit close beside or on the lap of the experimenter. In this 
respect the methodology was naturalistic in that the subject observed the demonstration 
from the same perspective as it was performed, and the proximity of the experimenter and 
subject was analogous to a mother infant pair.
During the majority of demonstrations, the experimenter would eat rewards which 
she had retrieved, but on some occasions tolerated scrounging, as would be typical of a 
mother infant pair. Following a demonstration, the chimpanzee could interact with the 
apparatus for approximately four minutes. The actions of the subject were recorded on a 
Sony Hi-8 hand-held video camera operated by the experimenter (see Figure 3). This 
cycle of demonstrations and trials was repeated every four minutes for 30 minutes. Each 
subject received 30 demonstrations and trial periods in total. For subjects in the Opaque > 
Clear group, the black card was then removed from the apparatus, and they received a 
further 30 trials in the clear condition.
Figure 4. (a) The experimenter demonstrates how to retrieve the food reward using both the irrelevant and 
relevant act. (b) The subjects can then interact with the apparatus freely for four minutes.
Subjects were divided into 3 groups, Group A - 6 individuals, Group B - 5 
individuals and Controls - 4 individuals (see Table 1). Unfortunately subjects were not 
allocated to 3 equal groups, as 2 potential subjects, one from Group B and one from the 
control group, broke into the enclosure during testing, and interacted with the apparatus. 
They therefore had to be excluded from the study, due to possible knowledge gained from 
this prior experience.
G r o u p  A  Opaque > Clear G r o u p  B Clear box only C o n t r o l s  Opaque & Clear
Name Age Sex Name Age Sex Name Age Sex
Indi 2 M Kisembo 2 M Billy 3 F
Yiki 2 M Asega 2 M Umugezi 3 M
Baluku 2 M Yoyo 2 F Nkumwa 5 F
Pasa 2 F Mukisa 2 F Mawa 5 M
Kalema 5 M Cindy 8 F
Ikuru 6 F
Table 1. Name, age and sex of subjects who took part in the experiment. Subjects were divided into 3 
groups which were age and sex matched as much as possible.
(i) Group A
Group A received 30 demonstrations and trials with the opaque box, then an 
additional 30 demonstrations and trials with the clear box. The purpose of this contrast 
was to detennine whether different social learning strategies were employed by the same 
individual depending on the availability of causal information.
(ii) Group B
It is possible that the actions of subjects from Group A with the clear apparatus 
would be influenced by prior experience with the opaque condition. Group B therefore 
received 30 demonstrations with only the clear box to control for learning or perseverance 
effects from the opaque box phase.
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(iii) Controls
Control subjects received no demonstration in order to investigate the influence of 
individual learning alone. Each subject was allowed to interact with the apparatus for 30 
minutes. Two subjects were given the opaque box, and two subjects the cleai' box.
In order to keep the experimental and the control conditions the same, without a 
demonstration every four minutes to break up each trial, control subjects would have to be 
presented with the apparatus 30 separate times in four minute blocks. This would involve 
either removing the apparatus or the subjects from the research room every four minutes. 
As the experimenter was working alone, this was logistically impossible. Alternatively, 
the apparatus would have to be presented to the control subjects for a four minute block 
on 30 consecutive days. Unfortunately, the time frame of the pilot study did not allow for 
this methodology to be employed. However, this method may have had a deleterious 
effect on the motivation of the subjects and therefore affected the results.
Experimental Hypotheses
(i) GroMjp rt -  Opaque box
Subjects cannot perceive the causal mechanisms, so are therefore more likely to 
imitate the demonstrated teclmique, reproducing the iiTelevant act more than controls.
(ii) Group A -  Clear box
When the same subjects are transferred to the clear apparatus they can perceive the 
causal role of the tool and are therefore more likely to ignore the irrelevant act than 
controls, developing their own technique by emulation.
(iii) Group B -  Clear box only
The perfoimance of Group A with the clear box will not affected by prior experience 
with the opaque apparatus; there will therefore be no significant difference in the 
performances of Group A and B with the clear box.
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Data analysis
The performance of each subject was recorded using a hand held video-camera. 
The tapes were later analysed, and the behaviour of the subject was recorded using the 
following categories taken from Figure 2:
Code Description 
Put - pick up tool
OL - open lid on top with index finger
IT - insert tool into opened top hole
M3X - move up and down to hit bottom 3 times 
CL - close lid
IF - insert tool in front hole
- Retrieve reward
Irrelevant actions
j -  Reward actions
In addition to the demonstrated actions, it was necessary to create a number of 
new codes which corresponded to behaviours that were not included in the demonstration. 
These were as follows:
H -  hit outside of box around hole (top or front), but not insertion of tool into hole, 
h -  insert digit into hole (top or front), 
m -  use mouth to explore hole / open lid (top or front).
The coded behaviour of each subject was then entered into SPSS for analysis. The 
very first action has been omitted from the analysis, as none of the subjects performed 
experimental actions to the box. Instead, they were extremely excited by the new objects, 
and all first actions involved playing with the tool (biting, trying to snap it, using it to hit 
the bars), or trying to pull the box off the wooded board.
V lll
Results
The behaviour of subjects was coded for all actions performed within each 4- 
minute trial. However, analysis focused on the first action that was performed by a 
subject following each of the 30 demonstrations.
Group A (Opaque box) versus controls
The results suggests that subjects from group A in the opaque condition performed 
the irrelevant act following a demonstration more than controls, although as yet there are 
too few control subjects to perform a statistical test (see Fig. 5). An ‘emulative’ 
understanding of the causal features involved in task solution would predict that subjects 
should ignore the irrelevant act. Reproduction of the irrelevant act is therefore most 
consisted with imitative learning.





Figure 5. First actions o f Group A following a demonstration with the opaque box averaged over 30 trials, 
in comparison to the total number o f actions directed to the irrelevant hole by non-observing controls.
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Group A: Opaque > Clear
With the exception of Baluku, all subjects in Group A ignored the irrelevant 
action following a demonstration with the clear box significantly more than with the 
opaque box (t = 3.051, df = 5, p = 0.028, two-tailed, see Fig. 6). This result was 
significant even with the inclusion of Baluku. Although Baluku’s actions go in the 
opposite direction, his continued reproduction of the irrelevant actions, even when given 
the opportunity to perceive that such actions are causally irrelevant to task solution, 




■  Group A (Opaque) 
□  Group A (Clear)
Baluku Pasa Kalem a Y k Indi Ikuru
Figure 6. Percentage o f  first actions performed following a demonstration by subjects from Group A with 
the opaque box and then the clear box.
Figure 7, illustrates that when the subject was presented with the opaque 
apparatus, he showed a preference to reproduce the demonstrated strategy, performing the 
irrelevant action first, following a demonstration. However, when the same subject was 
tested with the clear box, he soon came to demonstrate a preference to reproduce only the 
reward action, therefore using his own technique and ignoring the irrelevant act. This 
strategy is most consistent with emulative learning. It is important to note that the subjects 
had ample opportunity with the opaque apparatus to learn that actions to the top were 






-1— I— I— I— I— I— I— I— I— I— I— I— 1— I— r




0 2 4 8 8 10 12 14 18 18 20 22 24 28 28 30
Figure 7. Target o f first action following a demonstration for Kalema, a 5-year-old male. ‘T’ indicates 
actions to the top, irrelevant hole. ‘F’ indicates actions to the front reward hole, (a) Opaque box. (b) Clear 
box.
The performance of subjects from Group A and B was not significantly different 
with the clear box (t = 0.239, df = 10, p = 0.819, two-tailed, see Fig. 8). The performance 
of Group B with the clear box was significantly different from Group A with the opaque 
box (t = 2.641, df = 10, p = 0.032, two-tailed, see Fig. 8). The data therefore suggest that 
the chimpanzees changed their social learning strategies when interacting with the opaque 
and clear boxes, and was not a result of prior experience with the opaque apparatus.
100
% 60
■ Group A (Opaque)
□ Group A (Clear)
□ Group B (Clear)
n mn
m2-m2 f2-f2 m5-f6 m2-f2 m2/m2 f6-f8
Subjects from Groups A and B matched by age/sex
Figure 8. Subjects from Groups A and B were matched as much as possible for age and sex. The x-axis 
refers to subjects from group A and B respectively (e.g. ‘m 5-f6’ corresponds to a male aged 5 from Group 
A, paired with a female aged 6 from Group B).
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Degree o f copy fidelity
The best copy of the demonstrated actions was chosen for each subject. This set of 
actions was judged for the match of (i) the sequential structure, and (ii) the details of the 
observed actions. These scores were then compared to the demonstration to get an overall 
measure of fidelity using the following criteria:
(i) Sequence structure 
Action in same order as demonstration: +1 
Action in wrong order to demonstration: -1 
Incomplete, but attempted action in same order: +1 













+ 1 + 1
The demonstrated strategy would therefore score a maximum of +7
(ii) Detail o f  behaviour 
Complete action: +1
Incomplete actions (e.g. ‘hit top’ but not ‘insert top’): + 0.5 
Hit bottom of box 3 times: +3 
Hit bottom multiple times (excluding 3 times): +2 
Use of hands or mouth: 0
/ lUfl
put OL IT 3X
+1 +1 +1 +3
n
CL IF y
+ 1 + 1 + 1
The demonstrated strategy would therefore score a maximum of +9. These scores 
do not represent a linear interval measurement of fidelity, but are intended to provide 
approximate measures, which can be used for comparative analysis.
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Figure 10. The closest behavioural match to the demonstration during a single trial for subjects from 
Group A - opaque box: Kalema trial 16; Ikuru trial 2; Baluku trail 17; Pasa trial 6; Indi trial 4; Yiki trial 14.
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(i) Sequence structure -  maximum score = 7
Kalema: l + l + l + l + 0 + (-l) + l + l —5 (71.43% )
Ikum: l + l + l +  O + O+ l + l — 5 (71.43% )
Baluku: (-l) + l + l + 0  + 0 + l  + l = 3 (42.86% )
Pasa: l+ O  + O + O + l + 1+ 0 = 3 (42.86% )
Indi: l + l + l + 0 + Q + l + 0 = 4 (57.14% )
Yiki: l + l + l + 0 + 0 + l + 0 = 4 (57.14% )
(ii) Detail o f behaviour -  maximum score = 9
Kalema: l + l + l + 2 + l + l = 7 (77.78% )
Ikum: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 5 (55.56% )
Baluku: 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 +  0.5 = 5.5 (61.11% )
Pasa: 1 + 0 .5+  0.5 = 2 (22.22% )
Indi: 1 + 1 = 2 (22.22% )
Yiki: 1 + 1 = 2 (22.22% )
(iii) Total fidelity’
The total fidelity can be calculated by combining the score for sequence and detail. The 
maximum score possible for a perfect replication of the demonstration is 7 + 9 = 16.
Kalema: 5 + 7 = 12 (75%)
Ikum: 5 + 5 = 10 (62.5%)
Baluku: 3+  5.5 = 8.5 (53.12%)
Pasa: 3 + 2 = 5 (31.25%)
Indi: 4 + 2 = 6 (37.5%)
Yiki: 4 + 2 = 6 (37.5%)
XV
During the first 5 trials with the opaque apparatus, subjects from Group A tended 
to perform the irrelevant top action following a demonstration from the very first trial (see 
Fig. 11). This, in conjunction with the irrelevant nature of the top action, makes it highly 








□ Actions to the front 
■ Action to the top
2 3 4 5
Trial number
Figure 11. The percentage o f  subjects from Group A performing actions to the top or front o f the box 
following a demonstration, during trial 1 to 5, with the opaque box.
Discussion
Subjects from Group A who observed demonstrations with the opaque box, tended 
to perform the irrelevant actions more than controls who had received no demonstration 
(see Figure 5). This would suggest that reproduction of the irrelevant action was directly 
influenced by social learning. When the same subjects from Group A then transferred to 
the clear apparatus, they ignored the irrelevant actions significantly more than with the 
opaque apparatus. The exception to this trend is Baluku, a 2-year-old male. Baluku 
showed the greatest tendency to reproduce the irrelevant action following a demonstration 
with the opaque box. This tendency increased with the clear apparatus. Although 
Baluku’s actions go against the predicted trend, his continued reproduction of the 
irrelevant act, even when he can potentially perceive that this action is having no causal 
effect on the reward, strongly suggests social learning.
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It may be argued that the behavioural change of subjects from Group A between 
the opaque and clear apparatus was the result of prior experience with the opaque box. It 
might be possible that subjects had learned specific features of the task during the 
previous 30 trials. Group B therefore received demonstrations only with the clear box to 
control for any carry-over effects. The results indicate that there was no significant 
difference in the performances of Group A and B with the clear box. This suggests that 
subjects employed two different social learning strategies in each experimental condition.
Dijferent social learning strategies
When presented with the opaque box, subjects from Group A showed a tendency 
to reproduce the iiTelevant actions more than controls who received no demonstration (see 
Figui'e 5). Subjects from Group A also reproduced the irrelevant action significantly more 
with the opaque box than with the clear box, or than Group B with the clear box.
Figures 9 and 10, illustrate the most faithful behavioural match to the 
demonstration by subjects from Group A, with the opaque box, during a single trial. 
Although the individual performance of each subject is varied, every subject reproduced 
at least one element of the irrelevant action. Kalema, Ikuru and Baluku appear to have 
reproduced a number of the irrelevant actions to the top part of the box, including opening 
the lid by hand, inserting the tool, and moving it up and down. These subjects reproduced 
over 50% of the detail of the demonstration. The remaining 3 subjects, Pasa, Indi and 
Yiki, although they did not produce a very faithful reproduction of the demonstration, did 
include at least one element of the irrelevant action, including opening the lid and actions 
to the top of the box.
It is difficult to explain the reproduction of a causally irrelevant action following a 
demonstration by any other means than imitation. It could be argued that since the 
apparatus did not incorporate a two-action design (Dawson & Foss, 1965), stimulus 
enliancement may be responsible for the results. Stimulus enhancement would draw the 
attention of subjects to specific areas of the box. However, attention should be equally 
drawn to both the top and front holes. Therefore stimulus enhancement camiot account for 
the preference to select the top hole over the front hole. Furthermore, tlnee of the 
subjects, Kalema, Ikuru and Baluku showed fidelity of both the sequence and detail that 
exceeded 50%. It is difficult to see how stimulus enliancement could account for the order
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of actions, and detailed replication of specific elements of the demonstration. The 
behaviour of chimpanzees with the opaque apparatus therefore seems to be most 
consistent with imitative learning.
Once the black plastic cover had been removed from the apparatus, the box was 
completely transparent (see Fig. 1). Subjects could therefore potentially perceive that 
demonstrated actions to the top of the box were causally irrelevant to task solution. 
Subjects from both Group A and Group B ignored the irrelevant action significantly more 
than subjects who were tested with the opaque apparatus. The omission of the irrelevant 
action was not the result of prior experience with the opaque box (see Figure 8).
An objection to this interpretation might be that the attention of the subjects was 
perhaps simply drawn to the reward (which was now visible inside the box), and that they 
therefore did not attend to the demonstration, and retrieved the reward in the most direct 
way. However, although the reward was located at the end of the transparent tube, from 
the outside the reward looked as if it was located in the middle of the box, equidistant 
from all six sides (see Figure 12).
Figure 12. Viewed from the outside, the reward is equidistant from all 6 sides. It is therefore not apparent 
whether the insertion o f the tool into the top or front will retrieve the reward.
The distance from the top and reward hole was therefore equal, and it was not 
obvious which hole would result in the retrieval of the reward. The omission of the 
irrelevant action must therefore have been influenced by social learning. The results 
therefore suggest that when the box was clear, subjects learned by observation the causal
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features of the task, and therefore that only the front action was necessary. The results 
therefore suggest that subjects switched to a strategy of emulation learning.
Causal reasoning
The ability of chimpanzees to employ different social learning strategies in the 
conditions described above, hinges on an ability to understand the causally relevant 
features of the task. Data from the present study suggest that chimpanzees are able to 
differentiate causally relevant and irrelevant features. These results are in accordance with 
recent publications by Daniel Povinelli and colleagues at Louisiana State University, who 
have performed a series of experiments with chimpanzees designed to investigate causal 
understanding. They concluded that although chimpanzees are capable of extracting 
patterns of regularity in a task, and generalising these to different enviromnental 
conditions, they are not capable of representing unobservable variables that mediate a 
causal sequence. Their understanding of the environment is based on directly perceivable 
action sequences, such as ‘contact’ (Povinelli & Reaux, 2000; Povinelli, et al., 2000).
Conclusions
The results from Experiment 1 suggest that when chimpanzees camiot perceive the 
causal features of a task, they employ a social learning strategy that is most consistent 
with imitative learning. However, when the causal mechanisms can be perceived, and the 
individual can potentially bring about the same result using their own teclmique, 
chimpanzees change to a strategy that is most consistent with emulation.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of 
imitative learning, but that they do so only when emulation is not possible. However, 
further data will be required from control subjects before more confident conclusions can 
be drawn.
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PILOT STUDY: I m i t a t i o n  a n d  e m u l a t i o n  s w i t c h i n g  in  c h i l d r e n  
Introduction
This experiment was carried out as a direct replication of the previous study.
Methodology
Participants
Subjects were 16 human children of mixed sex, aged between 2 and 3 years old 
(mean; 2 yrs 10 mo; range: 2 yrs 1 mo - 3 yrs 11 mo). All subjects were recruited from St 
Andrews Under Fives day-care nursery, UK. Parental consent was sought before a child 
was included in the investigation (see Chapter 5). Although 21 children participated when 
the investigation began, only 15 children completed the experiment over a three-week 
period, due to illness or irregular attendance at the playgroup.
Apparatus
The apparatus used in this experiment was the same as the previous study. However, 
certain features were modified to make the task more suitable for children (see Fig. 13):
i. The end of the tool was covered in Velcro
ii. The reward was a Velcro-backed cartoon sticker
The reward could therefore be retrieved by inserting the Velcro-tip of the tool into the 







Figure 13. (a) Aluminium tool with Velcro tip, which can be used to retrieve the sticker reward, (b) Velcro- 
backed sticker concealed within the apparatus.
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Procedure
The experiment was conducted following the same procedure as the previous 
experiment. Subjects were tested individually in a separate room within the nursery. The 
experimenter spent time at the playgroup for three weeks prior to the investigation, so that 
the children would feel comfortable participating in the experiment. The apparatus was 
set up on a small table, and the children sat in a chair behind the table to observe the 
demonstration.










Put- pick up tool; OL - open lid on top; IT- insert tool in top hole; 3X- hit bottom 3 
times; CL- close lid; IF- insert tool in front hole; ^  - Retrieve reward
Figure 14. The method used by the demonstrator to retrieve the sticker reward. The demonstration has been 
divided into 7 actions for coding.
In order to remain consistent with the methodology used with chimpanzees, 
minimal verbal information was given to the children about the task. They were told that 
the experimenter had a ‘special box’ that contained a cartoon sticker. The experimenter 
then retrieved the sticker using the same technique as the previous study. The children 
were then asked if they would like to try to retrieve the sticker. They were not asked to 
reproduce the method of the experimenter, or given any other indication of what they 
should do in order to obtain the reward.
XXI
Romy Fini Lewi Josf Ande Ryan Conn Ëmma Thom Megn
Age 2.1 f 2.11 f 3.5 ra 3.9 m 3.11 f 2.9 m 2.9 m 2.10 f 2.10 m 2U8f
O p a q u e  B o x
1 T T T T T T T T F F
2 T T T T T F F F T F
3 T T T T F F F F T F
C l e a r  B o x
4 T T T T T F T F T F
5 T T T F F F F F T F
6 T T T F T F F F T F
Table 2. The first action performed by subjects from Group A  following a demonstration. T ’ = irrelevant 
actions to the top o f the box. ‘F ’ =  reward actions to the front o f the box. ‘m ’ and ‘f  indicate male/female.
The children were divided into 2 gi*oups. Group A received demonstrations with 
the opaque box and then the clear box. As with the previous experiment, there was a 
danger that the actions of subjects from group A with the clear apparatus would be 
influenced by prior experience with the opaque apparatus. Group B therefore received 
demonstrations only with the clear box.
This study was conducted within a three-week time window before commencing 
data collection in Uganda for the previous study. Therefore in contrast to the chimpanzee 
data, time constraints prevented 30 demonstrations and trails with each child. Each 
subject received thiee demonstrations and trial sessions. Childien succeeded in retrieving 
the sticker in every trial. Subjects were therefore rewarded regardless of the teclmique 
that was used.
Group A - Variance is not age/sex related
Trial 1,8/10 children used irrelevant act following demonstration. x^=3.6, df==l, p=0.058 
9/10 children performed irrelevant act during trials 1-6. x^=6.4, df=l, p=0.011 
Trails 1-3, 6/10 children maintained the same strategy, x  ^= 0.4, df = 1, p = 0.527 
Trials 4-6, 7/10 children maintained the same strategy, x  ^= 1.6, df = 1, p == 0.206 
Trials 1-6, 5/10 children maintained the same strategy, x^  = 0.0, df = 1, p = 1.00 
Irrelevant act trial 1 > ignore by trial 6, 3/10 children, x  ^= 1.6, df = 1, p = 2.06 
Ignored iiTelevant act trial 1 > gained by trial 6, 1/10 children x  ^= 0.0002, d f=1, p=0.989
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Sam Claire Lucy Erien Lois
4.4 m 4.6 f 2 .10  f 2.5 f 3.3 f
C le a r BOX ONLY
1 T T T F F
2 T T T F F
3 T T T F F
Table 3. The first action performed by subjects from Group B following a demonstration. ‘T ’ = irrelevant 
action to the top o f  the box. ‘F ’ = reward actions to the front o f the box. ‘m ’ and T  indicate male/female.
3/5 children used irrelevant action x^  = 0.2, df = 1, p = 0.655 
2/5 children ignored the irrelevant action x^  = 0.2, df = 1, p = 0.655 





□ Actions to front 
■ Actions to top
Trial number
Figure 15. Percentage o f subjects from Group A who performed action to the top or front o f the box 
following a demonstration with the opaque apparatus.
Children initially tended to reproduce the irrelevant action following a 
demonstration with the opaque apparatus, but that this tendency decreased to 50% by trial 
3 (see Fig. 15). Children therefore seemed able to both reproduce the irrelevant action and 
ignore it when the causal role of the tool could not be directly perceived. However, 
repeated trials would be required before comparisons can be made with chimpanzees.
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Degree of copy fidelity
The fidelity of the closest behavioural match to the demonstrated strategy was 
analysed for subjects from Group A. The behavioural responses illustrated in Figure 18, 
were categorised using the following criteria:
(i) Sequence structure 
Action in same order as demonstration: +1 
Action in wrong order to demonstration: -1 
Incomplete, but attempted action in same order: +1 
Incomplete, but attempted action in wrong order: -1 
Action omitted: 0
/ I S O , 1---- ^
put OL IT 3X CL
+1 +1 +1 +1 +1
n \ \ n
IF
+ 1
The demonstrated strategy would therefore score a maximum of +7
+1
(ii) Detail o f behaviour 
Complete action: +1
Incomplete actions (e.g. ‘hit top’ but not ‘insert top’): +0.5 
Hit bottom of box 3 times: +3 
Hit bottom multiple times (excluding 3 times): +2 
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Figure 16. The closest behavioural reproduction o f the demonstration during a single trial for each subject 
from Group A with the opaque apparatus.
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(I) Sequence structure -  maximum score = 7
Romy: 1 + 1 + 1 + 14-0 + 1 + 1 = 6 (85.71%)
Finlay: l + l + l + l + 0 + l + l = 6 (85.71%)
Lewis: 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 7 (100%)
Joseph: l + l + l + l + O+ l + l — 6 (85.71%)
Andrea: l + l + l + l + 0 + l + l = 6 (85.71%)
Ryan: l + l + l + l + Q + 1 + 1 - 6 (85.71%)
Thomas: l + l + l + l + 0 + l + l = 6 (85.71%)
Connor: l + 0 + l + l + Q + l + l = 5 (71.43%)
Enuna: l + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + l + l = 3 (42.86%)
Megan: l + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + l + l = 3 (42.86%)
(ii) Detail o f behaviour -  maximum score = 9
Romy: 1 + 1 + 1 + 3 + 1 + 1 = 8 (88.89%)
Finlay: l + l + l +  2 +  l + l= 7 (77.78%)
Lewis: l + l + l + 2 + l + l + l = 8 (88.89%)
Joseph: l + l + l + 2 + l + l = 7 (77.78%)
Andrea: l + l + l + 2 + l + l = 7 (77.78%)
Ryan: 1 + 1 + 1 + 3 + 1 + 1 = 8 (88.89%)
Thomas: 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + l + l = 7 (77.78%)
Connor: 1 + (0.5) + 3 + 1 + 1 =6.5 (72.22%)
Emma: 1 + (0.5) + 1 +1 = 3.5 (38.89%)
Megan: 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 (33.33%)
(iii) Total fidelity
The total fidelity can be calculated by combining the score for sequence and detail. The 
maximum score possible for a perfect replication of the demonstration is 7 + 9 = 16.
Romy: 6 + 8 = 14 (87.5%) Ryan: 6 + 8 = 14 (87.5%)
Finlay: 6 + 7 =  13 (81.25%) Thomas: 6 + 7 = 13 (81.25%)
Lewis: 7 + 8 = 15 (93.75%) Connor: 5 + 6.5 = 11.5 (71.87%)
Joseph 6 + 7 = 13 (81.25%) Emma: 3 + 5 = 8 (50%)
Andrea: 6 + 7 = 13 (81.25%) Megan: 3 + 3 = 6 (37.5%)
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Discussion
Variability in performance
The performance of subjects was extremely varied. Variability in the data may be 
the result of social factors that were not relevant with chimpanzees, i.e. differences in the 
way in which subjects perceived the task. It is possible that some children perceived the 
task as a game whereby they were supposed to reproduce the actions of the experimenter. 
In contrast, other children may have thought that they should retrieve the reward in the 
quickest possible way. As children never failed to retrieve the reward, their actions were 
reinforced irrespective of the teclmique that was used. In addition, the expression of 
imitation may be a function of task difficulty. Children have been shown to preferentially 
imitate actions that are similar to, or just beyond their own abilities (Hamick, 1978). 
Actions that are too easy are attempted by emulation or trial and enor (Russon & Waite, 
1991). Therefore the perceived difficulty of the task may have varied between subjects.
Social learning strategies
Figure 16, indicates that on at least one occasion, following a demonstration with 
the opaque box, 9/10 subjects performed a recognisable attempt to replicate some aspects 
of the iiTelevant actions of the demonstration. As discussed in the previous experiment, 
imitation is the most likely explanation for the replication of iiTelevant behaviour, as 
alternative forms of social learning cannot account for the order, and detail of tlie 
behaviour. This conclusion is consistent with previous investigations which suggest that 
children of this age are capable of imitating novel object actions (Nagell, et al,. 1993; 
Tomasello, et al,. 1993; Meltzoff & Moore, 1994; Meltzoff, 1995; Call & Tomasello, 
1995; Carpenter, et al,. 1998; Whiten, 1999; Whiten, in press). However, non-obseiwing 
controls would be required before confident conclusions could be diawn.
Subjects also demonstrated an ability to ignore the irrelevant action. As with the 
previous experiment, emulation appears to be the most likely explanation. However, 
inclusion or exclusion of the iiTelevant action during trials 1 to 6 does not appear to be 
related to the opaque or clear condition of the box. Therefore children’s ability to ignore 




The continued reproduction of the irrelevant action with the clear apparatus would 
suggest that subjects had a poor understanding of the causal mechanisms which were 
involved in task solution. However, social differences in the way subject perceived the 
task (i.e. whether it was to imitate the demonstrator, or retrieve the reward with the most 
efficient technique), may mask any underlying trend in the results. Six out of ten children 
ignored the iiTelevant action during at least one trial with the opaque apparatus. Children 
therefore seem able to extract causally relevant features of a task on the basis of 
unobservable elements. The literature supports the conclusion that 2-year-old children are 
capable of understanding causal relationships between objects (Shultz, et al,. 1986; Bates, 
et al,. 1980; Hauser, 1997; Carpenter, et al,. 1998; Want & Harris, 2001; Want & Harris, 
in press). It therefore seems likely that although children understood that there was an 
alternative, more efficient way to retrieve the reward, they continued to imitate the 
demonstrated teclmique for social reasons.
At the end of each block of 3 trials, the children were asked why they performed 
the top irrelevant action. The answers ranged from arbitrary explanations like ‘because 
you have to’ to ‘because that’s what you did’. It was not therefore possible to use verbal 
explanations to analyse the behaviour of subjects, as it was felt they were giving answers 
which they thought the experimenter wanted to hear, or they felt like they were being 
criticised and refused to co-operate. Future experiments should incorporate a less 
ambiguous questioning method.
Conclusions
The data therefore suggest that children aged between 2 and 3 years of age have 
the ability to imitate and emulate, but which strategy they chose to employ may be 
dependant on their perception of the task.
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General discussion
The results from the first experiment suggest that chimpanzees have the ability to 
alter their social learning strategy from emulation to imitation depending on the 
availability of causal information. As subjects reproduced the irrelevant act significantly 
more with the opaque box than with the clear box, although the outcome was the same, 
the data also suggest that the ability to differentiate causally relevant features is dependant 
on directly observable elements. The ability to differentiate relevant and iiTelevant actions 
has important implication for chimpanzee cultures, as only selective reproduction of the 
intentional actions of others can support cultural proliferation (Carpenter, et al,. 1998).
The results from the second experiment indicate that children also have the ability 
to alternate between emulation and imitation. However, the choice of strategy does not 
seem to be linked to the availability of causal information, as children were able to ignore 
the irrelevant act equally with the opaque and clear boxes, hi contrast to chimpanzees, 
children therefore seem able to extract the causal mechanisms of a task on the basis of 
unobservable elements. Children were also influenced by social factors, which may not 
have been applicable to chimpanzees.
The data are consistent with a study by Nagell, et al (1993), who found that in a 
tool using task, chimpanzees used emulation to achieve the most efficient solution to the 
task, in contrast, 2-year-old children continued to imitate the less efficient demonstrated 
technique.
Conclusions
The combined results of experiments of these two studies suggest that both 
chimpanzees, and 2 to 3 year old children are capable of altering the social learning 
strategy that is used to solve a task. However, the conditions under which each ability is 
expressed are different. Chimpanzees appear, where possible to use the most efficient 
technique. If chimpanzees can perceive the causal mechanisms involved in a task, they 
will seek to use their own teclmique to bring about the same causal outcome. This may be 
an extremely adaptive strategy, as it allows socially learned behaviours to be generalised 
to different enviromnental conditions. However, in contrast, children may continue to 
imitate even when emulation may be more efficient. This may be the result of social 
factors that are not relevant to chimpanzees.
i
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Those subjects who took part in the first experiment were wild born chimpanzees, 
raised with conspecifics, but who had considerable human contact, and a close affiliation 
with the experimenter. It has been argued that extensive human contact can lead to a 
fundamental change in the socio-cognitive development of great apes (Call & Tomasello, 
1996; Premack, 1983). It might therefore be disputed that the results of this experiment 
are an artefact of the rearing history of the subjects, and cannot be extrapolated to wild 
chimpanzees. However, it seems unlikely that evolution has favoured a dormant cognitive 
capacity that is not expressed under natural conditions. An opposing view is that human 
contact simply replaces the rich social and physical enviromnent which would be 
experienced in the wild (Boesch, 1996b). In addition, Great Apes have been reported to 
imitate humans with whom that have a close affiliation (Russon & Galdikas, 1993; 1995). 
For this reason, the results of this experiment are not believed to be an anomaly caused by 
the rearing history of the subjects.
In the first study, 50% of chimpanzee subjects reproduced the demonstrated 
behaviour with a total fidelity score that exceeded 50%, and with a maximum of 75%. In 
the second experiment, 90% of human subjects reproduced the demonstrated behaviour 
with a total fidelity score that exceeded 50%, and a maximum of 93.75%.
The data suggest that while both species demonstrated an ability to imitate, the 
fidelity of imitation was greater for children than for chimpanzees. This conclusion is 
consistent with a number of publications that indicate chimpanzees and children are 
qualitatively similar in their imitative abilities, but that there are quantitative differences 
in the fidelity of structural and detail matching (Whiten, et al,. 1996; Whiten, 1999; 
Whiten, in press).
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E x p e r i m e n t a l  s h o r t c o m i n g s  a n d  r e a s o n s  f o r  e x c l u s i o n  f r o m  m a i n  t h e s i s
Study 1; Chimpanzees
Although the irrelevant nature of the task makes it unlikely that stimulus 
enhancement was responsible for the observed results, a two-action design would allow 
this possibility to be ruled out.
The food-tube should be opaque so that the location of the reward cannot be 
determined in the clear condition.
A group should be included to counter balance the order in which the apparatus is 
presented, i.e. instead of the groups being Opaque > Clear, and Clear only 
they should be chance to Opaque > Clear, and Clear > Opaque
Subjects in this experiment found it difficult to manipulate the tool. Future designs 
should incorporate a more appropriate size of tool, and a non-tool use experiment as wild 
chimpanzees do not start to habitually use tools until the age of 3 or 4 (Goodall, 1986).
Study 2: Children
The methodology of this experiment was originally designed for chimpanzees. 
Therefore a number of problems came to light throughout the course of the experiment.
Children were rewarded after every trial. This may have caused inadvertent reinforcement 
of the first action that was used. Children should therefore only be rewarded once the 
trails are complete.
Children may have perceived the experiment differently, and thought that they 
were required to reproduce the actions of the demonstrator, irrespective of their 
understanding of the causality of the task. In future the experimenter should leave the 
room after each demonstration, to record the actions of subjects without the social 
influence of the experimenter watching.
